Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

68. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 5, 1977, 10:30 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting II with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • The President
  • The Vice President
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher
  • Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose
  • Ambassador James Spain
  • Ambassador Donald McHenry
  • Mr. Henry Richardson, NSC Staff

• Tanzania

  • President Julius Nyerere
  • Benjamin Mkapa, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • John Malecela, Minister for Agriculture
  • Anthony Nyakyi, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Ambassador Paul Bomani, Tanzanian Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Captain Joseph Butiku, Private Secretary to President Nyerere
  • Samy Mdee, Press Secretary to President Nyerere
  • Professor Justinian Rweyemamu, Economic Adviser to the President

During the press opportunity, the President asked Nyerere whether he had slept well; he hoped he had gotten some rest.

President Nyerere replied that indeed he had gotten some rest, but that last night and this morning had been a very lively time. (The press opportunity ended and the talks began.)

The President began by saying that he and President Nyerere had a brief talk last night after the dinner.² I just wanted to reiterate a few points that we agreed on. We agreed that we would move expeditiously towards getting an agreement for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. We see Smith as the most difficult problem, and then Vorster. If we can bring them around, then we and the Front Line States can agree on the basic principles of a settlement. This is an opportunity to make a last, strong effort for a peaceful settlement in this situation. If we are unsuccessful, a long and bloody conflict is sure to follow. The settlement would be based on the principle of one person, one vote; majority rule, free elections during the interim period, one army built predominantly on the basis of the Patriotic Forces by the government emerging from the elections, with the United Kingdom being the legal authority during the interim period in conjunction with a Commonwealth or UN peacekeeping force to keep order. I asked President Nyerere, and he agreed, if he could arrange a meeting of the Front Line States, including top-level U.S. and U.K. participants, to confirm these proposals and develop needed implementation. Vance will meet with Botha in London and then with Nyerere. After that, we will see what basis there is to proceed further. The United Kingdom might have some qualms about some of our proposals, and I do not want to speak for them in this situation. Do you concur in these statements?

President Nyerere said, that explains our position fully.

The President asked, with Nyerere’s concurrence, Acting Secretary Christopher to notify Secretary Vance of the agreements reached.³

Nyerere agreed to this.

(The discussion then turned to Namibia.)

The President said that he wanted Nyerere’s advice on Namibia. SWAPO has been difficult. I understand that Sam Nujoma is now in New York. The South Africans have been surprisingly cooperative in abandoning the Turnhalle concept and agreeing to an Administrator General. Recently, however, they have backed off somewhat. But they have agreed to the basic principle of majority rule and eventual withdrawal of their forces. The problem would seem to be getting someone to speak for SWAPO. We would like to see South Africa forced to comply with the latest proposal from the Five Power Contact Group. You can help this process by encouraging Secretary General Waldheim to move. I understand he plans to appoint Atashaari as UN Special Representative. I don’t know the man and don’t know whether he would be acceptable, but I want him to be acceptable to you. Generally, I would appreciate your advice on Namibia.

Nyerere asked Ambassador McHenry to give the latest position on Namibia, so that he might comment on it.

McHenry stated that a SWAPO delegation was arriving in New York to begin talks August 8. We have proposed the following to South Africa: there will be free elections for a constitutional assembly, which would then produce a constitution for Namibia covering all aspects of local and national government. All Namibians regardless of their past activities will participate in the elections. There must be certain preconditions for the elections to be deemed fair, such as freedom of the press, and some method of balloting not requiring literacy. The UN Special Representative has a role in the interim arrangement and in all phases of the transitional process. He must be “satisfied” as to all phases of those procedures. Notwithstanding the diplomatic compromise that “satisfied” represents, in point of fact nothing could be issued without his approval. The interim Namibian process will be supervised by the Administrator General and the Special UN Representative. The Administrator General is to abolish racially discriminatory and also restrictive legislation. Namibian returnees could re-enter without fear of arrest or harassment. Relative to political prisoners, the South Africans want linkage between their release of political prisoners and the release of Namibians held by Tanzania and Zambia, in order to insure that all such prisoners are released. They have indicated that they will release some prisoners immediately if those in Tanzania and Zambia are released. There was a disagreement between the South Africans and the Contact Group relative to the definition of political prisoners. Vorster first took the position that all such persons had been convicted in a court of law and, hence, were not political prisoners. The Five Power Contact Group did not agree, which resulted in understandings (1) that all Namibians would be returned; and (2) that a special tribunal would be appointed by the Secretary General composed of four members, two from South Africa, with the Secretary General appointing the president, who has a casting vote. This will serve to retain the control of the tribunal in international hands. The tribunal will decide who is or is not a political prisoner.

We have asked South Africa to submit a phased withdrawal plan to be discussed with other involved parties, and have taken the position that all its troops should be out by the date of Namibian independence, subject only to a prior agreement between the government of Namibia and the South African government. South Africa has not yet produced such a plan. At least part of their reluctance stems from not knowing SWAPO’s military objectives. The responsibility of the UN Secretary-General and of his Special Representative would extend to all instruments of South African authority not yet phased out of the territory. Since the last talks with South Africa, the Five Power Contact Group has worked to develop a plan of operation for the UN Special Representative in Namibia. Until the full scope of the UN role is developed vis-à-vis the Administrator-General, the full picture is not conveyed. As a first thought, it would seem that the United Nations would need up to one thousand people to efficiently monitor events throughout Namibia. This would not be a peacekeeping force, but only those required for sufficient observation.

Nyerere said, if we were not dealing with South Africa, I would say go ahead with the plan as it is. I have gotten word that Nujoma wants to come and see me from New York, but now I heard that he wants to return to Africa.

McHenry said that, as of last evening, there were no plans for him to return to Africa.

Nyerere said, your problem is Vorster, ours is SWAPO.

The President said, your problem is as big as mine. I can understand the natural inclination for Nujoma to want to protect his position. But Vorster has gone as far as he can go until there is some movement from SWAPO.

Nyerere said, I agree. We agree about elections, the principle of one man, one vote, etc.; there is no problem here. Our problem is with the processes which lead to these results. In Zimbabwe, we hope that the British will come in, with sufficient muscle, to supervise elections. In the case of South Africa, ideally, in Namibia we could tell them to get out so that the UN could supervise elections. But we have been telling them to get out for a long time, and they have not yet done so. We now need arrangements to satisfy all of us that the elections will be fair. And then we can recommend these arrangements to SWAPO.

Two kinds of withdrawal are needed by the South Africans from Namibia. First, there must be administrative withdrawal. We can appreciate Vorster’s political problems, and are willing to respond somewhat to them. However, we must be satisfied that he is actually pulling out, that there is some movement in that direction. At the same time, there must be a coming-in of the UN as the de jure authority in the situation. Secondly, there must be a military withdrawal by South Africa, and here we need some power. The UN must answer this question, and it must have a sufficient military presence that reassures SWAPO and everyone else. SWAPO might say “when South African troops leave, we will take over.” But the position of the Front Line States is that, when South African troops leave, SWAPO will take over from UN troops (sic). We accept some continued South African presence, in order to make it easier for Vorster to pull out, provided that he is not sabotaging the process. But at the same time, we also need a visible and effective entry into Namibia by the United Nations.

During the interim period we need to feel sure that the UN has sufficient power. Nujoma will stick to legality; we will tell them to instead stick to the substance of reality. South Africa has agreed that the UN Special Representative will have to be satisfied as to the interim process. But Security Council Resolution 385 says “supervision and control.” If this is really the position of the Five Power States, and Vorster understands this, and we are satisfied with the reality that the situation will really be one of UN supervision and control, we can tell SWAPO to accept those arrangements.

Relative to the Secretary-General, Salim has reported to me on these matters. There would seem to be two problems. First, the United Nations is the legal authority in the situation and the Secretary-General symbolizes that authority. He wishes to be sure that he has African backing for steps that he might take, at the risk of our denouncing him. Secondly, the United States will have to reassure the Secretary-General against the possibility of being ridiculed as ineffective. We can give him political reassurance; you can give him power. The UN presence must be paid for. He will want this assurance. Until then, he is reluctant to say what he wants and possibly risk a confrontation with South Africa. In short, he will ask for something that is already going to be given to him.

The President said, your analysis has been very helpful to me. I had been very critical in my own mind up to this point of the Secretary-General, and now I understand his position better. In our letter to Waldheim, we can make clear our support of the Five Power initiative and our support for him.

Nyerere said, we will give him political support. I will probably have more trouble with Sam than with the Secretary-General.

The President asked Ambassador McHenry whether any further points needed to be made on Namibia.

McHenry said the question of South African withdrawal needed further attention. We are now at the point where South Africa is asking, what is the other side going to do? We have to be aware that we are operating here in a situation of mutual distrust. South Africa believes that the minute they withdraw their troops SWAPO will march in. SWAPO thinks that if it reenters Namibia with South African forces still there, and the process breaks down, they will be at a distinct disadvantage because they will have disbanded their forces and their camps. There is an effort here needed to break down the suspicion. The question is, what can we count on SWAPO to do if we can get South Africa to withdraw.

Nyerere said that once we find that South Africa is serious about getting out, in my view, they will be replaced by UN troops. Once elections have taken place, the South African troops should go. However, we realize that South Africa will not totally withdraw. We, if there is a sufficient UN presence for purposes of balance, are willing to tell SWAPO to stay armed but to stay out of Namibia. For this to happen, South Africa should begin to pull out in such a way as to reassure SWAPO that fair elections will take place. We will reassure SWAPO on this point if sufficient UN forces are brought in to do the job. SWAPO needs the reassurance of the United Nations.

McHenry asked, what if SWAPO stays armed, elections are held that most observers agree are fair, and SWAPO loses? SWAPO may not be willing to accept the results of such elections, and will then be an outside armed force sitting on Namibia’s borders. This represents a legitimate concern among other groups in Namibia.

Nyerere said, only SWAPO and South Africa have the armies. Do these people want both of those armies inside of Namibia at the same time?

McHenry answered, we could ask SWAPO to withdraw, disarm, and then reenter. Simultaneously, we could ask South Africa to withdraw.

The President asked, what if SWAPO loses the election?

Nyerere replied, the UN would be there to provide military forces.

The President said, I believe that the SWAPO army will be loyal in the case of many of its personnel to Namibia as an independent state rather than to SWAPO.

Nyerere said that SWAPO will almost certainly win the elections.

The President said, if SWAPO loses, the United Nations should prevail. Namibia is a new country. I cannot imagine that SWAPO would oppose a new independent Namibian government.

Ambassador Spain asked what kind of UN presence would be required to insure fair elections?

Nyerere replied, SWAPO demands UN troops to guarantee the fairness of the election.

The President said, it is my understanding that the UN force could be relatively small. The fact that South Africa is willing to embark on a course of negotiations and ultimately pull out indicates that Vorster does not want to destroy his relationship with each of the Five Powers. But, in any case, we could not have a UN force as large as the South African military presence in Namibia. I cannot imagine South Africa attacking UN forces in the middle of the elections. This indicates that there is some common ground, which may be able to be met by an agreement on the size of the UN force.

Nyerere said, if South Africa and SWAPO differ on the size of the force, I am suspicious of South Africa. The size of the UN force is the Secretary-General’s problem. It needs to be sufficient for us to be able to reassure SWAPO.

The President asked what was the next move in the situation.

McHenry answered, he would meet with Nujoma in New York on August 8.⁴

The President said that Vance will, in his discussions with Botha, bring up these questions.

Nyerere said that he hoped that Nujoma would not decide to leave and go back to Africa.

The President said, before we get into bilateral discussions about US/Tanzanian relations, I want your comments on Angola and the large number of Cubans there. I would hate to see the concept perpetuated of encampments of Cuban troops remaining in Angola and other countries. We feel that neither the United States nor the USSR ought to be sending forces to Africa, because it greatly increases the risk of conflict. We regard the Cubans as surrogates of the USSR. It is difficult for us to understand how African leaders can condone this situation. I do not know whether Neto can survive without the Cuban troops. I know that his opposition is supported in part by South Africa, and we might help here. The Cuban presence first declined, but now it has increased to approximately 20,000 troops. Moreover, it is impossible for us to normalize relations with Cuba while this situation continues.

Nyerere said, I think we have finally found a question on which we totally disagree, but perhaps it is a matter of interpretations. The Cubans were generally not in Angola prior to independence. The MPLA fought without Cuban support; the FNLA did not fight at all. I know Holden Roberto better than I know Neto. Mobutu was very reasonable during this time, and prohibited his country from being used as a Portuguese base against the MPLA. The MPLA had to move to Dar es Salaam. I got the Chinese to train them and provide them arms, and we opened the eastern front. They then went on to fight and win.

The President asked, do you equate UNITA with South Africa?

Nyerere said, not entirely. A small group in UNITA did fight for independence, and they were an element in the tripartite negotiations with the Portuguese just prior to independence. But an anti-MPLA fear developed; some of this was related to events in Lisbon, where a pro-Soviet Portuguese communist party was emerging. It appears that there was a real effort around April 1975 on the part of Western countries to stop the MPLA from taking over and to stop the communists in Portugal from taking over. I was worried about this hostility being transferred to the MPLA, since they had fought and died for independence. I expressed these fears to British and American ambassadors, and told them that the Portuguese communists were not going to win because we had talked to the Portuguese soldiers and the army would not let this happen. But your people were determined to stop the MPLA.

The President acknowledged that this was basically true. But why does Cuba still need (sic) to be there?

Nyerere said, the South Africans and the Zaireans began to move military forces into Angola before the country became a sovereign state. Certainly Neto must have told Castro that he was in trouble. The Cubans must have been enroute to Angola prior to the date of independence. The MPLA had every right to ask them to come. As for the question of why they are still there, let us finish the problem of Namibia first.

The President said, I do not doubt that UNITA has some South African support. But UNITA and South Africa are not identical.

Nyerere said that if you keep South Africa out, the Cubans will leave. They are linked in this way with the Namibian problem.

The President expressed doubts as to whether South African troops were still operating in Angola.

Nyerere said, the MPLA can deal with UNITA but it cannot deal with South Africa. From time to time South African troops cross the border into Angola. I have been arguing Neto’s case for the Cubans coming to Angola, but I have told him I cannot argue his case that they can stay. The Cubans must leave at some point. We have talked to my friend Mobutu, who behaved well at first, and asked him, why are you causing Neto so much trouble? Here, Mobutu is being silly.

I agree that the Cubans should not be there. But once Namibia is resolved and the South Africans are no longer on the Angolan border, the situation will improve.

The President said, I feel, and I may be wrong on this, that Neto can only stay in power among his own people if he is supported by Cuban troops. Cuban troops in that number are not needed to combat outside pressures. I have no preferences between MPLA and UNITA. I believe that the Angolan people should decide between them.

Nyerere said, there is no doubt that Neto’s popularity has declined, largely because of conditions brought on by the civil war. But we must ask, where was UNITA in the war for independence?

The President said, we know Cuba has forces and people in varying strength in 13 African nations. Angola is a reservoir of Cuban troops which can spread. It is difficult for Western democratic states not to rally to support UNITA, because it appears that Cuba has forced its will on the people of Angola. There is no outside army in Angola that justifies that Cuban presence.

Nyerere answered, Angola is an independent state notwithstanding the presence of such a large number of Cubans. Examples could be cited for the French in Djibouti and Senegal, where no one argues that they are any the less independent. Moreover, Angola was the first (sic) African state to be attacked by South Africa.

Brzezinski said, if the proportions of Cuban troops to Cuban population and Cuban troops to Angolan population are examined, the Cuban involvement in Angola is greater than US involvement in Vietnam.

Nyerere said, Vietnam is not applicable here. The Cubans are now fighting the South Africans. If you remove South Africa, the Cubans will pull out. I can assure you of that. We will embarrass them. The Cubans may not always be needed to fight South African troops, but the South Africans are engaged in a pattern of sabotage.

The President said, we will use our good offices with respect to the South Africans on this point.

Nyerere said, I have advised Neto to keep the Cubans around as long as there is a South African threat. South Africa wants an acceptable Angolan government on its border.

Brzezinski asked whether we could let the Angolans fight it out among themselves after the Cubans leave.

Nyerere said, I will promise you that the Cubans will get out. But what about the French who have an army in several parts of Africa? I cannot control them.

Christopher said, I would like to return to Zimbabwe for you to touch on a couple of points which were mentioned in yesterday’s session. The first is that, assuming the United Kingdom takes over in an interim period in Rhodesia, the United Kingdom wants the Rhodesian police to be able to remain and operate in conjunction with a British and UN presence. The second point concerns insuring that the settlement is a fair one as regards white Rhodesians.

Nyerere said, the army is key. If the situation had been such that the transition was a purely constitutional change, then the new government could inherit the army. In the present situation, the new government may have to inherit other structures, especially the civil service which will be useful to them. I assume that this will be true also for the police. But the ideological leadership of the police would have to be removed and it would have to be cleaned up. For example, those people who were prominent in arresting Nkomo’s people would have to be removed. This is possible. But the army is different.

The President said, we understand. But what of the white citizens in Rhodesia?

Nyerere said, I have talked about this to the British. I agree that all whites who desire to stay should be allowed to live in Rhodesia on the same basis as everyone else. I don’t believe, however, there will be many whites staying; in fact, I am sure of this, as illustrated by examples in Algeria, Mozambique, Angola and Kenya. I have told the British that they should help answer the question that is now posed to the whites with respect to their farms, etc., by making it possible for them to go if they wish to. The British have told me that they cannot go to Parliament for money to make it easy for British to get out of Rhodesia, but only for money to enable them to stay. The new Rhodesian constitution should protect those who are staying.

Christopher asked whether this meant that the white settlers should get fair settlements for their property.

Nyerere said yes. But the new government will have no money.

The President asked, what would happen in the case of a farm of 1,000 acres which is sold during the interim period?

Nyerere answered, I don’t know. In Tanzania the farm probably would not be sold to a single African, but would be used on a cooperative basis.

The President said, we need some way to repay the cost of that farm to the farmer.

Nyerere said, the new state of Zimbabwe would probably split up the farm, since one of their problems is the inefficient holding of large tracts of farm land. But I don’t know.

The President said, I could listen to your advice and counsel all day on these and other points about these matters. Do you have other points to raise?

Nyerere said, I have no other points to raise. If you keep South Africa out of Angola, I will ask Cuba what they are doing in Angola.

The President told Nyerere how much he had profited from these talks, that he hoped they would stay in close contact, and that he hoped Nyerere would never feel reluctant to contact him either through diplomatic channels or by personal letter whenever he wished.

Nyerere said he would gladly do that.

(The President then presented Nyerere with a book of satellite photos. He told Nyerere that the United States could assist Tanzania through satellite photos with respect to agricultural and other matters, and if Tanzania wished this kind of assistance, let him know through Ambassador Spain. Nyerere said that he would. In return, Nyerere presented the President with three volumes of his writings, noting that he had not written every word of all of them, but that often words can make an impact.)

The President rose to end the meeting at 12 noon.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 116, Tanzania: 5/77–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
2. No record of the conversation was found. Many of these issues were discussed during the August 4 morning meeting between Carter and Nyerere. See Document 164.
3. Vance was in Damascus and Amman to review the Middle East peace process with President Assad and King Hussein.
4. See Document 69.