Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

164. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 4, 1977, 11 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting I with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • The President
  • The Vice President
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher
  • Ambassador Andrew Young
  • Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose
  • Ambassador James Spain
  • Mr. Henry Richardson, NSC Staff

• Tanzania

  • President Julius Nyerere
  • Benjamin Mkapa, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • John Malecela, Minister for Agriculture
  • Anthony Nyakyi, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Ambassador Paul Bomani, Tanzanian Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Captain Joseph Butiku, Private Secretary to President Nyerere
  • Samy Mdee, Press Secretary to President Nyerere
  • Professor Justinian Rweyemamu

During the press opportunity in the Cabinet Room, the President remarked that the Cabinet, with the addition of Secretary Schlesinger, had just been enlarged from 11 to 12, and that other officials such as Ambassador Young held cabinet-level rank and participated in Cabinet meetings. President Nyerere answered that from his experience the smaller the country is, the larger the number of people in the Cabinet. (Laughter) (The press opportunity ended and the talks began.)

The President said that in the brief time he and President Nyerere had spent together he found that he liked Nyerere. He hoped the same was true for Nyerere. I am looking forward to an unstructured discussion of our mutual concerns, especially in southern Africa. I have much to learn from Nyerere, and hope that throughout the course of the day we can discuss southern African problems as well as relations between the United States and Tanzania. I think for Zimbabwe we have the same ultimate hopes: majority rule on the basis of one person, one vote. We would like to see this come about with a minimum of violence and, I will be frank on this point, fair treatment of Rhodesian whites, with those wanting to stay being encouraged to do so. But the hope for peace at the moment is not now great. I look forward to getting your thoughts on the substance of these problems and your impressions of the personalities involved.

Nyerere said that he hopes that the President, relative to Zimbabwe, would give him more information on British/US plans for resolving this situation. But we can say we are agreed on the general objective of minimizing violence, and independence on the basis of majority rule, one man, one vote. You note that I still say one “man”, one vote and not one “person”, one vote.

The President said that we have a women’s liberation movement in this country that has forced those changes. (Laughter)

Nyerere continued that at one time we quarreled with the British over the concept of majority rule, which they could not accept, for Rhodesia. Independence on the basis of majority rule has now been accepted. But the question is what do we actually do? What are the British-US ideas? If you give me your ideas, I can then act like a British monarch and both warn and encourage. (Laughter) What is needed is additional pressure. We have been forced to apply the pressure of guerrilla warfare in Zimbabwe, even though in our own history Tanzania came to independence by conferences and agitation without firing a shot.

As of 1974 or 1975 we were still encouraging talks with Smith. Kaunda even talked with Vorster to persuade him to put pressure on Smith to resolve this problem. Had Smith agreed, things would probably now be resolved, and Zimbabwe would today be a member of the Organization of African Unity. But now we have fighting, which is going on right this minute. The question is whether the fighting will be long and bitter, or whether, with the application of Western pressure, it will be of shorter duration. Let me state the problem.

We have, and we have had, problems of unity among the Nationalist leaders since 1974. Both your country and mine have been under the British empire. I only believe half heartedly in the multi-party system; there are many parties in Rhodesia. But I do not (sic) believe in a multi-army (sic) system. We are just beginning to get the Nationalists to accept this. I hear that Joshua Nkomo is going to Havana to talk to the Cubans. I am also meeting the Cubans later, and I may have to warn them on giving arms to Nkomo. In any case, I want to find out what they are going to do.

If Smith had accepted proposals made in 1974 to agree with the Nationalists, then a constitutional change would have been possible with a new government inheriting the present army and police. The situation would have been one of subsequent gradual changes under a constitutional framework. In 1975, after we had given up talking, Nkomo, nevertheless, kept trying until it was clearly impossible; only then did he begin guerrilla warfare.

Now, the problem is that we have two armies. One will have to go, and that is Smith’s army. It cannot become the independence army, just as the French army could not become the independence army of Algeria. In 1974, Rhodesia was a political (sic) problem, and it could be said that a solution is possible if Smith politically could be removed. Now, Smith and his army (sic) must go. Therefore, I am interested in your suggestions on what we can do to apply joint pressures to solve this problem. Secondly, I am interested to know what happens during an interim period. Let us assume that under pressure from the both of us the fighting stops, elections are organized and contested, and the winning party emerges. Who is the power (sic) during this interim period? I would not wish the boys with the guns to fight their way into Salisbury. Who will be the power in lieu of this possibility? Does this make sense to you? We hope that with your help the situation will not deteriorate into a fight to the finish.

The President replied that it would be contrary to our policy to support the annointment of a particular leader for Zimbabwe without the participation of the people of Zimbabwe. I could not go to the American people and ask them to support such a situation. You have therefore answered one of my questions with respect to holding elections to choose the government of an independent Zimbabwe.

I do not know all of the answers to your questions. The British cabinet met yesterday to consider alternative proposals towards a solution. I understand that on August 12th Vance will meet with Botha in London. If possible, I would like for you and Vance to meet, perhaps in London, so that he can report to you what happened in his meeting with Botha. I received a dispatch this morning from Prime Minister Callaghan of Britain which was encouraging.² The United Kingdom has a unique role in this situation, and they have not relinquished their responsibility.

We believe it is desirable to draft a constitution that would meet your approval and that of the Front Line States and the Nationalists and other parties, if possible, such as Smith and Vorster. The British, perhaps, understand better and are further along on the constitutional questions than we are, and the British Parliament has a special role in this situation. But we are clear that such a constitution must be based on the principle of one man, one vote majority rule. However, we ourselves do not wish to write a constitution for Zimbabwe.

I hope that you do not foreclose the possibility that some of the present members of the Rhodesian armed forces might be able to serve under other leadership in Zimbabwe. I agree that there should be one army with its people acceptable to Zimbabwe’s new leadership. We are envisaging an interim arrangement that will (1) earn the trust of the people of Zimbabwe, and (2) be strong enough to maintain law and order. We have not yet fully resolved the details of this arrangement with the British. Two options have been discussed: a UN peacekeeping force or a Commonwealth force. I believe that the United Kingdom is willing to choose a person who meets with your approval and that of other parties, as an interim leader in Zimbabwe. This will create a possibility for peace.

If the Front Line Presidents and the United Nations agree that this is a fair proposal, I am willing to put greater pressure on Smith and Vorster then we have done before. However, my own attitude on these steps is not dependent on theirs. I hope that Smith and Vorster see cooperation on these matters as in their own interests. If a settlement is not obtained, then the fighting will be long and bloody with an uncertain outcome.

But we are concerned with the lack of coordinated opinion among the Front Line States. For example, we are uncertain whether you will accept free elections in Zimbabwe, or wish to install some one person as leader. We cannot accept the imposition of some leader without elections, and the American people could not accept this. Also, there is a problem of how to set up procedures that respect the pension and property rights of white Rhodesians. I wish to be frank on this matter. The United States, perhaps, can help to some extent financially here. I feel that the time has now come that we and the United Kingdom, combined with your good offices, can move towards a settlement. South Africa can cut Smith off if it wants to. Canada, West Germany, France, and the United States have influence useful in ending the war. If the latter know that our proposition is fair and that it has your support, we can line up their concurrence and support to go forward. However, we are still in the formative stage on these issues.

Nyerere stated that there are no differences between us on the question of a constitution. Smith is the problem.

The President said we are committed to the principle of majority rule, one man, one vote, and Smith’s opposition does not change that.

Nyerere said that he understood that. In 1974, I was willing to accept, and encouraged the Nationalists to accept, a limited franchise majority rule in Rhodesia, and not one man, one vote. Tanzania came to independence with a reserved minority franchise, but after independence this was abolished. But Smith would not accept such a proposal in 1974. The government of Zimbabwe should be an elected government. But the chances of elections are limited if the war continues. We want elections to be under the principle of one man, one vote by the people of Zimbabwe.

We have supported the Patriotic Front as the ones with the army; since they have the army, we must talk with them. The OAU recognized this, up to the point of elections (sic). After that, the people of Rhodesia will determine the leaders. This leads to the question of whether we will be able to end the war and enable elections to take place. All of the British colonies in southern Africa have had elections, although eventually the army takes over. (Laughter) I am not choosing Nkomo or anyone else, but I am supporting their fighting forces.

At one time I told Nkomo, along with Sithole, who was with him then, that, if they wished, a constitution could incorporate special provisions to protect minorities, and I recommended that they be firmly committed to the principle of protection of minority rights. Nkomo had no problem with this. The army is the problem. Last year the British sent out Ivor Richards, and we had discussions. I was surprised to learn that the United Kingdom was planning on re-entering Rhodesia without an army. I asked them, where is your power? The British were being naive; the Rhodesians represent a rebel (sic) army; taking an oath to the Queen is insufficient to resolve the situation. Nor will a transfer of command to British commanders alone solve the problem. If they managed to do that, I have told the British that they will have appeared to have replaced Smith, without changing anything of importance.

Now, the army is key! (sic) We cannot use the Rhodesian army. Relative to the question of using some members of the Rhodesian army, the issue is how. Which of the two armies is to be the base (sic) army? This is a serious question. At that time, the British saw the Smith army as the base (sic) army. But now the Zimbabwe army must be the base army.

After independence, I believe that the power structure, the economic system, and the civil service will remain, with few changes, in Zimbabwe for a number of years. The army will be the key new element contributed by the new independent Zimbabwe government. But this does not mean that some of the people in Smith’s army cannot be picked up for the new army.

Ambassador Young stated, I agree with your analysis. If we had one new army we could muster power and create a situation for elections. Our problem in the United States is to prevent civil war from breaking out in Rhodesia. We can muster support for an orderly (sic) transfer of power. I would suspect that if a transfer of power took place and civil war followed, that would bring down the government of Britain. It perhaps would not bring down this government (laughter), but we must deal with that issue around this table. We do have the moral authority to tell Smith what to do. Yesterday the largest bank in the world told me that they would provide no more money to South Africa (Interjection by Nyerere: Good.) There is a sentiment growing in this country that will support our exercising leverage on Vorster toward bringing about majority rule in Zimbabwe. But we have no leverage on the Nationalists.

Nyerere said that he would relate a little history. ZAPU was originally the popular party. ZANU broke away in 1963. I perhaps made a mistake when I urged Nkomo to return to Rhodesia; he could not fight his struggle from Dar es Salaam. I urged him to return and even threatened to deport him if he wouldn’t, and he eventually did. At that time Sithole was organizing to break away, but I did not know that. Both Nkomo and Sithole were detained in Rhodesia. This had the effect of freezing Nkomo’s popularity where it was; Sithole had virtually no popular base. Meanwhile, the Mozambique and the Angolan revolutions began, and then the Zimbabweans wanted to fight, but how were they to do so with two parties? I suggested that ZANU join FRELIMO if they wanted to fight, and this is what they did. When Nkomo was released from detention, ZANU by that time had a fighting group with some experience with FRELIMO. Nkomo’s people had organized a smaller force, and suspected me of being pro-ZANU, which was not the case. I advised them to form a single army and tried very hard to get them to do this, but at that time I was unsuccessful. Eventually, I got the fighting forces to come together. I will tell you that we have a camp in Tanzania with 5,000 members of this army. We are accepting recruits for only one army, and we make fighting for one army a condition for recruitment for each of these people. We discovered that ZANU had infiltrated these recruits; we have now removed some 350 of them and will keep them in Tanzania until Zimbabwe becomes independent. We are determined (sic) to train a single army. We have that ability because we are doing the training in camps in Tanzania. I cannot promise that this army will be 100% unified, but we will do the best we can because we do not want a civil war.

Moreover, we are keen to end this war because Zambia and Mozambique have had no chance to develop. They finished one war and immediately started another. There are more people being killed in this war in Mozambique than there were in its war of independence. When Podgorny came, and began handing out arms, I asked him whether he wanted a civil war. Eventually, he agreed that this was undesirable. I am not certain whether this attitude led to his recent demise or not. (Laughter) I have also told the Chinese, who are assisting us in training and supplying arms, that we will only have one army.

The President asked how many troops there were in the Rhodesian army.

Young answered, about 12,000. There may be some potential for forming a black army for the interim period out of this force.

The President asked what did Nyerere think of a UN peackeeping force for the interim period?

Nyerere said, I would accept it if the United Kingdom accepted it. I told the British that they needed some muscle. From their point of view in the Rhodesian situation, a Commonwealth force might be easier. But I don’t mind which one it is, if it gets the situation through the interim period.

The President said that he could accept either force. If we issue a public call for a Commonwealth force, this may put pressure on the British cabinet to agree to it. I don’t know about the other parties in the situation. Perhaps we could persuade Uganda to participate. (Laughter)

Nyerere replied, not only Uganda but also South Africa. (Laughter) Nkomo has said that he wanted power transferred “to us”. He is just throwing his weight around. (Interjection by Young: And he has a lot of weight to throw around. (Laughter)) We need to establish conditions to enable elections to take place. I have no problem urging my Front Line Nationalist colleagues to accept this in order for the UN to come in and play their proper role.

The President said, I am very encouraged by what you say. If we can set this proposal down cohesively, and get Botha to understand the situation, can Andy and David Owen meet with the Front Line States to demonstrate that we mean business?

Nyerere said, yes.

The President said, I want Vance to meet with Nyerere.

Christopher said that this might be arranged from the present schedule Vance was now on.

The President asked whether the Vice President had any comments; the Vice President said that he agreed with all that had taken place.

Christopher asked what, in more detail, would be the reactions of the Nationalists to the proposal that there should be elections for an independent government?

Nyerere said that all will accept elections. I will tell them to prove your popularity by helping us to shorten the war, if indeed you are so popular. Formerly, Nkomo’s group was the most popular. And now the roles of fighting and negotiations relative to Nkomo, Sithole, and the Bishop have changed. Now, Nkomo and Mugabe are identified with the fighting. When the Bishop first returned to Rhodesia he was very popular, perhaps because he had previously been identified with a willingness to fight. In this respect, Nkomo’s popularity might now be going up and the Bishop’s might be falling somewhat.

The President said, the one thing we can do is decide whom to ask Smith to endorse. (Laughter)

Nyerere said that Sithole is now Smith’s boy and, while this may not be the kiss of death, it is certainly the kiss of sickness.

Brzezinski asked, what would be the role of this proposed UN force? Would it supervise and organize the elections?

Nyerere said, I don’t know. I hope that the Smith army will be gone. If so, it will hand over to a British or a UN force. Let us assume that legal authority will rest with the British. The UN force, in conjunction with our efforts, will serve to give muscle to the British. The British will organize the elections on that basis.

Young asked whether Nyerere agreed that this meant that a cease fire could be arranged before the elections took place.

Nyerere said that he agreed, by all means.

The President suggested that the talks adjourn for the Vice President’s luncheon. He looked forward to seeing President Nyerere tonight at dinner and then at tomorrow’s talks where they could cover the subjects of Namibia and Angola and bilateral relations with Tanzania. Meanwhile, Nyerere had access to all of his Cabinet members, should he have problems or matters to bring up with them.

The President rose to end the meeting at 1215.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 116, Tanzania: 5/77–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
2. In telegram Tosec 80118/183318, August 5, the Department transmitted the text of Callaghan’s letter to Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–1259) Vance was en route from Damascus to Amman to review the Middle East peace process.