67. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter 1
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]
Namibia. The August 1 talks between the Western Contact Group and Vorster and Botha demonstrated some favorable evolution of the South Africa position on Namibia.2 The crux of the South African presentation was that they will make no further concessions until SWAPO shows its willingness to negotiate seriously.
On specifics, Vorster told the Contact Group that:
—He will delay official action on the Administrator-General until August 22 which should give us more time to work out arrangements with SWAPO and the UN.
—Grudgingly, he is willing to accept the appointment of Ahtisaari as the Secretary General’s Special Representative whenever the Security Council provides Waldheim a mandate for Namibia.
—He will not present a phased troop withdrawal plan absent an expression of SWAPO’s willingness to cease military operations. If [Page 162] SWAPO meets this condition, he is willing to withdraw some troops prior to elections.3
After the talks between the Contact Group and SWAPO, which begin in New York on August 8, we will have a better estimate of the prospects for a settlement.4
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]
- Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 8/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “Warren.” Vance travelled to the Middle East August 1–11 to review the peace process.↩
- In telegram 3807 from Pretoria, August 1, the Embassy reported on the meetings between the Five and Vorster and Botha. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770275–0751)↩
- Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “We should pressure Waldheim to move—should I write him?”↩
- In an August 13 memorandum to Carter, Young summarized the meetings between the Five and SWAPO, which concluded on August 11. He wrote: “We succeeded in engaging SWAPO in serious discussions within the framework of Security Council Resolution 385, and thus our previous discussions with South Africa. However, it was clear that two fundamental issues separate SWAPO and South Africa. SWAPO insists on the withdrawal of all South African troops before elections and their replacement by a United Nations peacekeeping force. It also wants the United Nations to play the dominant role in the transitional period leading to independence.” Young noted that this would not be acceptable to South Africa. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 45, Africa: Southern Africa: 3–8/77)↩