Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

57. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 3, 1977, 1537Z

1756. Capetown for Embassy. Subject: Briefing of UNSYG Waldheim on Vienna and Capetown Talks. Ref: (A) State 123224,² (B) 1708 USUN.³

Summary: In response to Ambassadors Young and McHenry’s briefing on the Vice President’s talks with Vorster in Vienna and the status of the Capetown talks on Namibia, UNSYG Waldheim showed particular interest in the projected UN role in the Namibian settlement. He suggested Namibian Commissioner Ahtisaari as the best candidate for SYG Special Representative in the transitional period in Namibia. He indicated that his office was generating some study of the whole question of the UN involvement. End summary.

1. Ambassadors Young and McHenry called on UNSYG Waldheim June 2 to brief him on the Vice President’s meeting with Vorster in Vienna and the status of the Capetown talks with the South African Government on Namibia. (UK’s Ambassador Murray readily ceded his assignment to brief the SYG in light of planned meeting with Waldheim on Vienna talks.) The Secretary General expressed warm appreciation for the briefing and strong support for our various negotiating efforts in Southern Africa. He said he believes the international community is generally positive toward these efforts, despite some skepticism that they can actually succeed.

2. Waldheim focused primarily on the question of UN involvement in the Namibian settlement. He said that this was a critical issue in the negotiations and one on which we must proceed with extreme care. He said his past experience is that the South Africans tend to keep definitions of such things as a UN role vague and then manipulate implementation to suit their purposes. On this issue, care is particularly essential because SWAPO’s Sam Nujoma was concerned with the point in his discussions with Waldheim in Maputo.

3. Waldheim said Nujoma of course stipulated, among other conditions, that Namibian elections must be under UN control. SYG said he hoped that the Group of Five contact group would find out from the South Africans in their next talks in Capetown just what they envisage as the UN role in the transitional political process. McHenry said the SYG’s representative in Namibia must be able to satisfy himself at every step that the process is fair and is consistent with Security Council Resolution 385. Young raised the related facet of a role for the Council for Namibia.

4. Waldheim said Nujoma commented that the SYG’s rep should not be someone from outside the UN system. He recalled the disastrous Escher Mission of 1972.⁴ The Special Rep should be someone familiar with the UN’s structure, procedures and internal politics and with the substantive history of the Namibian problem. Waldheim said he had been thinking that Namibian Commissioner Ahtisaari might be the best choice for this job. Ahtisaari is knowledgeable, balanced and competent (unlike his predecessor), and he has the confidence of SWAPO and the SYG’s office. Waldheim also thought he should be acceptable to the Western and other members of the UN interested in the problem. Appointing Ahtisaari would solve the problem of a role for the Council, since Ahtisaari could continue to wear two hats in relation to the Namibian problem. Waldheim said he had another two or three names he could put forward if Ahtisaari were unacceptable for some reason (he mentioned the new Finnish Perm Rep Pastinen for one), but he thought Ahtisaari would be a particularly apt choice. He suggested that the Western Five attmept to sound out the South Africans on this idea during the course of their upcoming talks in Capetown.

5. McHenry suggested that it might be useful if the SYG would stimulate some concrete thinking in the Secretariat about the nature of the UN involvement in Namibia. Beyond the selection of a Special Representative, there are many detailed questions that will have to be planned. Young suggested it might even be useful in the negotiations with the SAG and other parties to have in hand a preliminary UN study of its role, rather than waiting until the negotiations produced an urgent need for such planning. Waldheim acknowledged the utility of some work on this and said he had ordered that a study be started.

6. Waldheim referred to the likely need for some kind of peacekeeping forces as part of the UN role and said they could be organized, depending on South African acceptance.

Young

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770198–0891. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, and Cape Town. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, and Pretoria.
2. In telegram 123224 to all African diplomatic posts, May 27, the Department provided talking points on Mondale’s meetings with Vorster to brief host governments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770190–0548) For the records of the Mondale/Vorster meetings, see Documents 158, 276, and 278.
3. In telegram 1708 from USUN, May 28, the Mission reported on a meeting of the Western Five on the next round of talks with the South African Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770190–1049)
4. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 73.