Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

269. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1977, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• South African Ambassador Botha Pays Farewell Call on President Carter

PARTICIPANTS

• US:

  • President Carter
  • Vice President Mondale
  • Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
  • Thomas P. Thornton, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

• South Africans:

  • Ambassador Botha
  • Jeremy Shearar, Minister, South African Embassy

President: I would like to congratulate you on your promotion and let you know that we will be very sorry to see you leave.²

Botha: Thank you very much. I think I would like to stay here, but of course I am looking forward to my job.

Vance: We are torn in our feelings. Glad to see you becoming Foreign Minister, but sorry to see you leave.

President: I have heard many good things about the work you have done here; about your great sensitivity and knowledge.

I particularly want to speak with you and discuss frankly some Southern African problems. These are among the most crucial matters that we have to deal with, and South Africa is a key to their resolution. I have been reticent thus far in public because I do not want to cause any problems. I have been grateful for the close working relationship that we have had with you. If I may, I would like to speak very frankly on three sets of issues:

First, with regard to Namibia, we have to be able to meet pressures coming out of the UN. We feel that you should move immediately to comply with UN resolutions to bring about a government in Namibia that would be representative of the black people.³ We understand, of course, your need for a friendly neighbor.

We know of the (Turnhalle) discussions;⁴ it will be hard for us to accept an outcome that does not include SWAPO. We will maintain our position. Ambassador Young has been trying to prevent developments in the UN that could lead to an arms embargo. Our hope is that there will be realization of the seriousness of this matter and, if possible, the SAG will take action.

We would be eager to express public appreciation for such action, and it would make it easier for us to work with you economically and diplomatically in the future.

The second area is Rhodesia. We have deferred to the UK in their efforts to bring the parties to Geneva and have appreciated what Prime Minister Vorster has done. We depend on the SAG for communication with Ian Smith.

David Owen will be going shortly to Southern Africa, although present political problems in the UK may delay him. In the near future I would hope that South Africa, the UK, the United States, and the front-line presidents could have extensive discussions to develop a joint concept for the transition to majority rule. I think we could then move ahead and eliminate the threat to peace.

Third, is the question of US-South African relationships. There is a real need on my part to understand your concept of what black-white relations will be ten to fifteen years from now so we can better know how to help.

Perhaps we could send someone to South Africa to talk to Prime Minister Vorster directly.

You know our position on black economic, social, and political participation. It is certainly your responsibility rather than ours, but we should consult. We can help orient the attitude of other countries in Africa and elsewhere if we have a clear concept of your ultimate goal and the degrees by which you intend to move. Please understand that we are not trying to tell you what to do.

I would appreciate hearing your comments.

Botha: Thank you very much for this great honor of receiving me and fitting me into your tight schedule. You have touched on the three main areas of concern; I have been in extensive contact with Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski, and Mr. Schaufele and have discussed the background of these matters with them, so I will not bore you with history.

The situation in Southern Africa may not be dangerous, but it is grave. With all respect, may I be equally frank with you?

We sometimes see the American attitude as lacking in depth. A great nation that can send machinery to Mars sometimes has difficulty in devoting attention to a small country such as we are. We feel you are using us as a target.

You must understand we have nowhere else to go. There is a great difference between the situation in South Africa and that in Rhodesia or Southwest Africa.

President: I fully understand that.

Botha: We have been in our land as long as you have in yours. We fought a war against colonialism 75 years ago. We cannot forget the atrocities that were visited on us. Now we Afrikaners have political power. Our history is one long struggle for us to maintain our way of life.

We are not interested in dominating blacks. We have always opposed colonialism. We are ready to divest ourselves of the governing of blacks. We do not, however, want to share power with anybody. We are a little people on our own.

Discrimination on the basis of color is, in my view, indefensible, and I have said this publicly. But we cannot abandon our own right to self-determination. Elsewhere in Africa there is no really freely democratic government. We, however, have a system where we can, for instance, go into court and sue our government.

The issue of race is not basic, and we must do something to eliminate discrimination as soon as possible. But we will not hand over power to anybody else and thereby destroy ourselves.

The blacks in America came to this country as slaves while those in Africa continue to exist as separate nations. We understand that black African states cannot be fully democratic. They have different interests and national aspirations.

We believe that these (black) nations can develop on separate land. You know that Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland exist as separate states. We have many people of each of these nationalities in our country, and perhaps these groups can be united to form independent nations.

There are vast potentialities for solving the problems of these peoples on a national, not a racial basis.

Sometimes, though, it seems that nothing good can come out of South Africa. We are surrounded by a wall of antagonism, and whatever we do is wrong. We are taking modest steps such as opening certain theaters and restaurants to both blacks and whites. Those of us who are promoting change, however, have a very hard time convincing our voters, especially when our positive moves are not appreciated.

President: I understand.

Botha: The State Department puts out releases that say these are just meaningless cosmetics. You must give us some recognition or encouragement when we move in the right directions. We must proceed on some basis of trust.

President: The sort of thing you have been saying is exactly what I was suggesting. We need a clearer understanding of your policies so that we can support you publicly. The time is coming to send someone who will represent me so that you can spell out what you hope to achieve. I cannot say in advance that we will agree with you, but that is our inclination. Please note that neither Secretary Vance nor I has made public criticisms of your nation’s policies.

You can help very much in solving the Rhodesia and Namibia problems.

Botha: Yours is a very reasonable attitude. May I hand over to you a message which our Prime Minister telephoned to me to give to you at this meeting. I translated it into English.

(The message is attached.)⁵

As regards Rhodesia and Southwest Africa: We, as one of the allied powers, kept Southwest Africa away from the Germans in World War I. We administered it as a mandate through World War II. The UN has taken a number of political steps against our position, but there are still no judicial pronouncements to support the UN’s claims on Southwest Africa.

If we had three years ago offered what we are now offering we could have peace. Numerous people who used to be abroad with SWAPO are now sitting around the conference table. There will be a black majority government. We cannot hand over power to a black minority simply because they have guns. We can meet the substantive demands of the West; not, however, of the UN, which tends to be theatrical and where we can never get our point across. Southwest Africa is really not such a big headache.

President: When will there be a black government in power in Namibia?

Botha: We have only put one condition on inviting them (SWAPO) to negotiations—that the fighting must stop. They have not accepted it. We went a long way last September in accepting the seven points put forward by the former Secretary of State.⁶ Now it is March. And there must not be stagnation. The negotiations are moving forward. Racial discrimination is being basically eliminated. We do not control the situation. Kissinger later gave me an eight-point program that SWAPO had forwarded through Zambia.⁷ There was no flexibility in it, just a demand to hand over power. We cannot do this for the situation will be just like Angola where the MPLA and Soviets took over. The people of Southwest Africa are defenseless. We are ready to accept a black majority government but not a minority government on the basis of armed force.

The situation is similar in Rhodesia. We expect Smith to hand over power in two years, and we might be willing to give some guarantees. But the black factions must reach some arrangement among themselves.

President: Are you committed to support any particular black leader?

Botha: We will support anyone that has majority support—anyone who has the black jungle on his side (i.e., the one who controls the Bush). If such a leader emerges and can agree with Smith, this will lead to peace, for such a leader will be able to deal with the whites and will not have to take increasingly radical positions.

If you have any suggestions, we will try to sell them to Smith. Mugabe does not even command the support of the guerrillas, but we will accept Mugabe if the people choose him freely. Rhodesian and Southwest African problems can be solved in accordance with American principles. But we must move fast.

Vance: How can you get from Turnhalle to a transfer of power without bloodshed and chaos if SWAPO is not involved?

Botha: If there is a majority in power, it need not involve bloodshed.

Vance: But if SWAPO is not involved, won’t there be conflict?

Botha: We tried to get SWAPO to talk, but we cannot force them to.

Vance: Neither can we, but we can try.

Botha: The next best thing is to ensure that the people give majority support. It is the only guarantee—also for you who are also members of a minority in the world. We believe the Soviets are seeking to seize positions of power in Africa. The Africans may get fed up with them, but how long will that take? If the Cubans are in Rhodesia and a slaughter of women and children, black and white, takes place, my government will be under intense pressure. Once war starts in South Africa, it will be the greatest tragedy in the last thirty years. The problem is that we have only limited means to prevent this. I do not think you can say we are intransigent with regard to Rhodesia or Southwest Africa. Every time we have done something, we encounter more radical demands. The front-line presidents just won’t compromise. We need time. It took you decades to integrate your society and under much easier circumstances.

President: Who is the most reasonable of the front-line presidents?

Botha: Khama. Despite some troubles we have with him, Kaunda is also reasonable. We have saved his life several times. We are able to cooperate fully with Machel on economic matters. These three desire peace. Nyerere seems to be jumping from one point to another. Despite ideological differences, we have no trouble with Machel.

We see the need for African development as a guarantee against communism. It can be done through hard, solid work, and we will be able to do it, but not if the Soviets are involved.

Brzezinski: What you have said is profoundly moving. We have great historical concern and empathy with you. These things can be done if they are done fast. I am impressed by your slowness in Rhodesia and Namibia. This weakens the moderates. You must keep ahead of the radicals, and concessions offered now are often too late. The locomotive of history could crush you—and us.

Botha: I agree fully, but how do we proceed?

Brzezinski: We must move rapidly with the SWAPO and Rhodesian situation.

Botha: Some things are inevitable and can be brought about through will power. Who would have thought a year ago that the Governor of Georgia would be President of the United States.

President: We want to plan to send someone to South Africa. We will have to work out the time and be sure the visit would be productive. We will also consult with the British. In the meantime, I hope you will be putting information together and outlining your concept for a very rapid solution for Rhodesia, Namibia, and a description of your government’s (domestic) plan for the future. I would like to comprehend an overall settlement.

Ambassador Young has good rapport with the black Africans. If we, you, the British, and perhaps Machel and Kaunda could agree on a basic settlement, we could put it into being.

The UN decision on Namibia is hard to undo. The SWAPO involvement will be difficult, but the longer we delay settlement the more certain it is that future radical leaders will reject changes that would be possible now. The situation will deteriorate rapidly. Your government will suffer. We are not in a posture of abuse to you. We have not made statements to embarrass you. South Africa is the key to the solution in Southern Africa. You can help us, as outsiders, in finding a solution. Our government now has the trust and confidence of many black African leaders. These are proud nations but often weak. They would benefit from a solution.

There are many options and we have all been going in different directions. A picture of a comprehensive settlement could lead to an unacceptable settlement. It will require strength and boldness.

I am glad to accept this invitation of Prime Minister Vorster to send someone. I did not know of his offer beforehand. We will send somebody to meet with you and the front-line presidents.

We will miss you here in Washington.

(End of Meeting)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: President: 3/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting adjourned at 3:20 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)
2. Pik Botha assumed his duties as Foreign Minister on April 1.
3. UNSC Resolution 385. See footnote 3, Document 264.
4. See footnote 2, Document 43.
5. Message was not attached. See Document 270.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 203.
7. See Tab 2, Document 264.