Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

267. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, March 3, 1977, 9:30–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• South Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal
• Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
• Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
• U.S. Representative to the UN, Ambassador Andrew Young
• Admiral Stansfield Turner (CIA Director-designate)
• Other Attendees

• Defense

  • Deputy Secretary Charles W. Duncan

• JCS

  • Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith (Assistant to the Chairman)

• CIA

  • William Parmenter (NIO for Africa)

• WH

  • Stuart Eizenstadt
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Dr. Jessica Tuchman
  • Michael Hornblow

The President: I think everyone here knows the purpose of this meeting. The PRC has previously met on this subject and spelled out the options.² This could be one of the most important NSC meetings of the year. I will start the meeting by calling on Cy to discuss Rhodesia and Andy to discuss Namibia and we will then go on to South Africa. We should arrive at as much of a consensus as possible and reduce the number of options.

Secretary Vance: On Rhodesia I have been meeting with the British to discuss next steps.³ This has been based on the assumption that the British will be taking a lead role in consultation with us and that we will support them. We agree that it is desirable to try and restate a set of general principles and hopefully find some common ground which will permit everybody to return to Geneva. This is now before the British Cabinet and we expect approval in the next few days. We would plan to contact the leaders of the various countries through our Ambassadors and discuss the principles with them. This seems to me to be the best course of action. It was also the view of the PRC. It may fail but it is the best of the alternatives open to us.

The President: How do these principles differ from the ones considered by the PRC?

Secretary Vance: They are the same. In general they are not as precise as the previous 5 points⁴ and that might help us to get around some of the previous problems. The front line states view it positively. It will probably get Smith back to the table.

The President: Could you outline the points?

Secretary Vance: They are basically these (points to list in President’s briefing book).⁵

The President: Has British participation been considered?

Secretary Vance: Yes, they would basically play a blocking role.

The President: Do the British agree?

Secretary Vance: Yes.

The President: When would the election take place?

Secretary Vance: In 18 months.

The President: It would be a precondition for independence?

Secretary Vance: Yes.

Amb. Young: I have been talking with some of the black Africans. They are anxious to get back to the table. I met yesterday with Ambassador Salim of Tanzania. He said there is still not enough unity among the blacks. He said the Patriotic Front was just a convenient name and there was no substance to the unity. Nyerere felt and I too felt that the Blacks need to get together. Nyerere had hoped that the British could promote this. However I have talked to Richard about it and it is not in the works.

The President: What if Muzarewa won the election?

Amb. Young: The Blacks are committed to support him. They feel that he has been given access to the TV by Smith. They feel that in a fair election they would get more support than Muzarewa.

Gen. Smith: To what extent has Smith indicated his support of the electoral process?

Secretary Vance: I don’t know.

Amb. Young: His distrust of the British is the key to his reaction. There is nothing in the British proposal which would assure a stable transition. He feels there is not enough of a British commitment.

Secretary Vance: Yes, he is worried particularly that the military power would fall in the hands of others if the British left.

The President: How about other Commonwealth involvement?

Secretary Vance: The British are willing to discuss this but they feel the most important thing now is to get the parties back to the table.

The President: Wouldn’t Smith feel better if there was some Canadian participation?

Amb. Young: The crucial thing in Kissinger’s plan was the idea of a development fund.⁶ I do not know where he intended to raise it. Perhaps from private sources. The figure is $2 billion and it is an important key. One of the problems with the transition is that the British don’t think they can afford to pay for an 18 month presence.

The President: The same thing concerns Smith, right?

Secretary Vance: Everyone feels we should wait to see what political progress is made. I was up on the Hill testifying on our budget yesterday. We have $100 million in our budget for such a fund. With us taking the lead such a fund could be put together.

The President: Isn’t it true that in Kenya there was a similar fund and the money was not used.

Secretary Vance: The difference is that this is a development fund in addition to being a security fund.

Mr. Parmenter: Rhodesia used to have a good economy. If with the backing of the Fund they can regain economic success then the white elements would have a chance to sell their property.

The President: I think Andy pointed out to me previously that Smith had sent out a team to two African countries to examine how the Whites were doing under black African governments.

Amb. Young: Yes, Kaunda’s assistant took some leaders into Kenya and Zambia so they could see how the whites were doing under an independent government.

The President: I have no argument with the position. I agree that Great Britain should maintain leadership while recognizing that we are the force behind the British and that we should do everything we can to get the parties back to the bargaining table. We should continue to put pressure on Smith through Vorster since he is the only avenue to Smith. I read this morning in an Intelligence note⁷ that Vorster so far has acted in good faith. Since his last meeting with Smith, Vorster reports that Smith is less intransigent than his public statements would indicate.

Vice President Mondale: I have a question. Should we encourage a meeting of the black leaders?

Secretary Vance: I think the first thing to do is to work through our Embassies and encourage them to talk to the black leaders about a set of principles. We may at some point want them to have a meeting.

The President: What is the time schedule for that?

Secretary Vance: The first of next week.

The President: How about Geneva?

Secretary Vance: As soon as we can get the process in place.

The President: We don’t envision sending an emissary?

Secretary Vance: No. We would work through our Ambassadors and the British Ambassadors.

The President: Are there any other comments? No. Andy will you start off on Namibia.

Secretary Vance: There is one more thing. I am interested in discussing what additional sanctions if any we could impose on Rhodesia. Moving on the Byrd Amendment would be an important symbol in Rhodesia and with the Black Nationalists.

The President: Perhaps we should enforce the sanctions we have publically espoused and get our friends to do the same. What about the other nations?

Secretary Vance: The Japanese record is not good.

The President: We should speak to the Japanese. Stan will you get information on what other countries are trading with Rhodesia and give it to Cy and then Cy could speak to these other countries.

Secretary Vance: It is important to get our own house in order.

Mr. Parmenter: Most of this material is being diverted inside South Africa. It is not easy to get at the information.

Secretary Vance: I am talking more about things like chrome and the use of a boycott.

The President: We should tell Vorster that this surreptitious channeling is something that we are all aware of.

Dr. Brzezinski: We could also ask the Agency to provide us with an assessment of Rhodesian dependence on oil supplies. It is a major item and its reduction would put a real squeeze on the Rhodesian military.

Adm. Turner: There is an E.O. which limits the things we can do with US companies.⁸

Dr. Brzezinski: It will be hard to put the squeeze on the Japanese.

The President: There again we can express our concern. We can just ask them to give us an assessment of what they are doing with regard to Rhodesia and ask them what they could do to restrict that trade. Andy could you now speak about Namibia?

Amb. Young: Namibia is part of the South African question. Under UN Resolution 385 majority rule is to come this year.⁹ So far the South Africans have not abided by that resolution and have set up their own internal solution. They are seeking to turn power over to a tribally oriented government. We have told the South Africans that this solution is unacceptable to us. In the UN a group of 9 European countries have advised the South Africans that an internal solution is not acceptable. I am trying to find a way of keeping the UN from having another divisive rhetorical debate on the issue. I have sent a memo to the Secretary General.¹⁰ I have not yet had a chance to discuss it with him but have discussed it with the West Germans and the British. It is an attempt to organize five Western members of the UN Security Council. This Committee however, is so biased that the South Africans have refused to deal with them. The five Western members could develop a common strategy and set up a Committee to talk to the South Africans about Resolution 385. In order for that to be effective we would have to have the willingness to say that if the South Africans refuse we would be prepared to vote in favor of a mandatory arms embargo to South Africa and declare Namibia a threat to the peace. We could expect good cooperation from the West Germans and maybe from the British and problems with the French. I think we would get a good response from the African leaders. The Tanzanian Ambassador did tell me at one point that if it looked like we were serious they would try to control the Soviets and the Libyans.

The President: Do the Soviets and the Libyans have relations with SWAPO?

Amb. Young: Yes, good relations. SWAPO is generally recognized as the legitimate government in exile. SWAPO says that they are willing to take their chances in a free election but not in an election held hurriedly or sponsored by South Africa.

Secretary Vance: I understand that UN consideration of Namibia and Rhodesia has been put off from March to May.

Amb. Young: There is a change. Instead of considering South Africa they will be considering southern Africa.

Secretary Vance: I agree it would be useful to have a demarche by the five countries. But is the German Ambassador to the UN saying the same thing as their Ambassador in Washington? And I am not sure about the French and the British. But I agree with it. It is a positive step.

The President: You have had a chance to talk with the South Africans. What is their attitude?

Secretary Vance: Their recent attitude is that the Turnhalle Conference is so far along that it is too late to change. We have told them that we regard this as a serious matter and have asked that they reconsider their position. They have conveyed that message back to their government and we are awaiting a reaction.

The President: There is a June deadline?

Secretary Vance: Yes. I don’t know what will happen with SWAPO. It may mean increased problems and increase the chances for violence.

Mr. Parmenter: We agree. It could eventually lead to guerrilla terrorism.

The President: Who is the SWAPO leader?¹¹

Mr. Parmenter: They have a leader in exile.¹² We know very little about the SWAPO internal mechanisms.

The President: What kind of a person is he?

Amb. Young: He is a gentle, scholarly fellow. He does not seem to exert much leadership in meetings. The Nigerians are disappointed in him because they say he runs around the world playing President but does not exert much political or military leadership. He feels insecure in the political arena. He has travelled to Havana and Moscow seeking support, but there were no takers.

The President: Is he popular in Southwest Africa?

Amb. Young: It is hard to say. There is one SWAPO leader who is imprisoned in Southwest Africa and there is one in Tanzania.¹³ I don’t think that SWAPO can do much militarily or politically for a while. The UN has the responsibility to sponsor the creation of a majority government there. We could not agree to a solution whereby the whole thing would be turned over to Sam Nujoma.

The President: How would you bring it to an end?

Secretary Vance: There are seven points.¹⁴ There are differing views on some points among the various parties. It is still worthwhile to see if we can make further efforts to reach an agreement to get discussions going on the basis of the seven points modified. We would require help from Nigerians with SWAPO and a slowing down of the South Africans.

The President: Is SWAPO willing to accept the seven points?

Amb. Young: They say they don’t want to talk at Turnhalle.¹⁵ They are willing to go to South Africa.

Secretary Vance: They want to talk face to face.

Amb. Young: The South Africans propose to send many of the Turnhalle conferees to Geneva.

The President: Does the UN have a presence in Southwest Africa?

Amb. Young: No and the Namibia Committee is a rhetorical group which has lost much of its credibility.

The President: Would they agree to the seven points?

Amb. Young: No, they are too loaded on the left.

The President: Would SWAPO be in sympathy with UN sponsored elections?

Amb. Young: Yes. But they say that all their leaders are jailed. They say that South Africa must let them out before there can be talks. South Africa has agreed to let a considerable number out.

Secretary Vance: They could release more. Now South Africa is waffling on the seven points.

Dr. Brzezinski: We have limited leverage with South Africa. Is it wise to use it up on Namibia.

Secretary Vance: It is all inter-related.

Dr. Brzezinski: Yes, but it is a question of focus.

Amb. Young: We have a lot of leverage with South Africa.

Dr. Brzezinski: On South Africa?

Amb. Young: Yes. They see it as being in their own self interest to work for a Rhodesian Government. They don’t know where they stand with this Administration. They felt they had a deal with the previous Administration that as long as they cooperated with us on Namibia and Rhodesia we would not pressure them on apartheid.

The President: Is that our position?

Amb. Young: They won’t move on Rhodesia and Namibia until they know where they stand with you. They tend to feel that in the final analysis they may have to go it alone. Richard says that they are prepared to fight to the death. Our opposition is to their political system of apartheid, but we do share other things in common like an economic system. Richard says that they don’t understand that when we start talking about “majority rule”, they interpret majority rule as meaning that the blacks would take over tomorrow.

The President: One of the things that impressed me Andy during that meeting we had on a Saturday a few weeks ago is the apparent concern that you have that we should not be too abusive to South Africa and that maybe there should be some means of accommodation.¹⁶ I want to have you work with me and the others to evolve a position on South Africa which is correct but as easy on them as possible. We must sell the American people and the South African leadership that we are acting in good faith but at the same time don’t want to turn over South Africa to the Reds. What could we do? How do you see the possibilities?

Amb. Young: It is similar to the position Cy was talking about regarding Rhodesia. The African group in the UN does not want to put us in a corner. If there could be a general statement on principles, or a consensus statement from the UN Security Council it might be helpful and might prevent the area from being loaded up with Soviet arms. Nobody in Africa can deal with South Africa. Thus, they feel that any change depends on the U.S. Therefore, they are willing to go along with us. The passage of the Byrd amendment would increase our credibility. The Africans realize they could not do anything in five years. The Nigerians told me that from a security view the South Africans are impregnable. They are willing to follow our lead. If we could persuade 100 corporations to train 10 middle level blacks a year that would add up to 1000 new black middle class a year. That added to the colored and Asians would give you a majority and would give them a stake in the country. It would then be conceivable to keep the political system while abandoning apartheid. That is what we did in the South. The whites control the money and the blacks control the votes. I tried this out on Nyerere. He said “I am opposed to Vorster—he is my enemy but if you can do something with him, then go ahead”. Nyerere said that in Rhodesia it would be too late to have four black cabinet members but in South Africa that would represent significant progress.

Secretary Blumenthal: I am not as optimistic as Andy regarding the chances toward progress toward universal franchise. The analogies with Atlanta are imperfect. We can take some steps—statements on human rights in the UN and disapproval of the ERDA contract.¹⁷ The best we can hope for is to use our influence to push them toward gradual progress in integrating the black and colored majorities into their economic system. We have to be careful in approaching US corporations. It has implications for other corporations in the world. There are multinational companies. We do not want the accusation made that they are an arm of the U.S. Government. Thus, a White House conference of the corporations makes no sense. We should work quietly to encourage them to do training. But make clear to them that they will be doing it on their own. South Africa is the last and toughest nut to crack. It will take much longer than five years. If we push too hard and too fast they will stonewall us. We should work with and talk with US corporations quietly.

Secretary Vance: I agree. On two occasions Sullivan¹⁸ has come to see me and told me what he planned to do. He wanted to know if that was inconsistent with US policy. I told him that it would be consonant with US policy but that it was your decision to make. Some of the leading corporations are in this group and there may be others which will join. We may then see corporations in other countries joining. A White House conference would not be the way.

The President: This action that has been announced is very significant and does compare with what occurred in Atlanta 15 years ago. This sort of thing is better handled when it is removed from the Government. We might ask Blumenthal to follow up letting them know we approve it and asking them about their quotas.

Secretary Vance: They are all trying to set their own targets.

Secretary Blumenthal: We used to get pressure to move our operations to restricted areas. We decided we would not do that. That is another thing they could discuss.

Dr. Brzezinski: What the companies are doing is excellent. What we have to decide is about the central focus of our policy. Until recently it was to use South Africa to help obtain a settlement in Rhodesia and Namibia. Now perhaps the central focus of our policy should be the promotion of a moderate South African policy. The focus would be to promote the progressive transition of South African policy. It is a very important decision and we should be very explicit when we make it.

The President: The hang up is that in the normal political world we use short hand symbols like “majority rule”. That phrase strikes terror among the South Africans. What intermediate steps would be acceptable to Vorster? It is hard for us to say publicly that we are abandoning the concept of majority rule. We should encourage the companies. If Vorster raises hell for political purposes and also quietly encourages GM that is a good first step. That suits me as long as the next step is greater black participation. If we keep talking about “majority rule” it could be counter-productive and drive them into a closet.

Dr. Brzezinski: If we can promote the idea of a quiet evolution then a number of things can follow.

Secretary Vance: There could be difficult choices in the UN.

The President: That’s Andy’s responsibility.

Secretary Blumenthal: It is easier to agree on a goal than to decide on concrete steps. The real issue is what steps we should take to get there. It is a long run goal, fraught with great difficulty and probably lending to eventual unrest.

Amb. Young: Two years ago I said it would be 5–10 years before Angola and Mozambique became independent. Our planning should accept the fact that things happen faster than anticipated. We may be wrong about South Africa. The situation may not be so bad in South Africa. They are capable technically and morally of doing more than they are doing.

The President: You, Andy, take the responsibility in working with the State Department to describe a sequence of events we desire toward the liberalization of South African society. Consider also whether or not we should talk with Vorster directly. Should he be invited here? If we could we should alleviate South Africa’s concern that we are going to put immediate and absolute pressure on them for a revolution. We should spell these steps out in sequential terms without a time schedule. This could help me and give us more leverage on South Africa and Namibia.

Amb. Young: If this were leaked, I’d be ruined.

Secretary Vance: You could do it but it would be the State Department doing it.

The President: None of us around this table but you can understand the consciousness of the Black African and what would be acceptable to him.

Amb. Young: I feel more confident telling whites what is possible than telling blacks what is acceptable.

The President: Perhaps the two are close together.

Dr. Brzezinski: A Presidential directive is needed. We are now operating under NSSM 39.¹⁹

The President: Cy, you can take the leadership on the paper. Andy will advise you on it.

Vice President Mondale: Mike, perhaps you should call the Presidents of the corporations and tell them the President appreciates what they are doing.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC Meeting: #5 Held 3/22/77, 3/77. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
2. See Document 265.
3. See Document 138.
4. See Tab 1 to Document 264.
5. Briefing book not found. See Document 140.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 215.
7. Not found.
8. Reference is presumably to Executive Order 11322, pertaining to trade and other transactions involving Southern Rhodesia. It was signed into law on January 5, 1967.
9. See footnote 3, Document 264.
10. Not found.
11. Sam Nujoma.
12. Not further identified. Possibly a reference to Andreas Shipanga.
13. Not further identified.
14. See Tab 2, Document 264.
15. See footnote 2, Document 43.
16. Minutes of the meeting were not found.
17. Reference is to the Energy Research and Development Administration contract with a South African Government-controlled company (Sasol) to purchase coal liquefaction technology. See Document 264.
18. Reference is to Reverend Leon Sullivan, who developed the Sullivan Principles, a code of conduct for U.S. companies operating in South Africa. The Sullivan Declaration, also known as the Statement of Principles, reads as follows: “A. Non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities. B. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees. C. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time. D. Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other non-whites for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs. E. Increasing the number of blacks and other non-whites in management and supervisory positions. F. Improving the quality of employees’ lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health facilities.” The text of the statement was transmitted in telegram 45121 to Cape Town, March 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770070–0866)
19. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 6.