Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

138. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 8, 1977, noon

SUBJECT

• Consultations with British on Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• United Kingdom

  • Ambassador Ivor Richard, British Ambassador to the United Nations
  • Sir Peter Ramsbotham, British Ambassador to the United States
  • Sir John Moreton, Minister of Embassy
  • Sir Antony Duff, Under Secretary of State
  • Mr. Clifford W. Squire, Counselor of Embassy

• Department of State

  • Secretary of State Vance
  • Deputy Secretary-Designate Christopher
  • Under Secretary Habib
  • Assistant Secretary Schaufele
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Edmondson
  • Mr. Jeffrey Davidow (notetaker)

Ambassador Richard began with his impressions of his past day and a half of meetings in the Department. He noted that a lot of coordination still needed to be done, especially in defining the linkage between the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. He said that he had encountered a dilemma, which was most clearly expressed in his meeting with Assistant Secretary-designate Maynes, concerning relations with South Africa: “If you judge South Africa on the basis of its contribution to a Rhodesian settlement, they need a plus. If, however, the judging is done on the basis of their own internal situation, they deserve a large minus,” he said.

Secretary Vance stated that the problem of how best to approach South Africa would be discussed in a Policy Review Committee meeting which he would chair that afternoon.² It would not be a meeting at which final decisions would be taken. In the meantime, however, Britain and the United States must face up to the problems presented by the tabling of harsh Security Council resolutions, including those that will ask for sanctions against South Africa.³ The U.S. position will depend to a degree on what the situation in both Rhodesia and South Africa is at the time. Ambassador Richard stated that Britain would have great difficulty accepting economic sanctions against South Africa. It would cause very great problems for the British as well as for the French and Germans. He noted that if our policies diverge, it would be a matter of regret and that Britain is anxious to see us keep together on this issue.

Under Secretary Habib opined that if there were positive developments toward a Rhodesian settlement, Britain and the United States could argue that punitive resolutions, including sanctions, would rock the boat. He noted that in the conversations with the British a new package of propositions had been developed and asked Assistant Secretary Schaufele to outline them.

Ambassador Schaufele noted that in the previous day’s discussions of options,⁴ it was generally agreed that it would be both impossible and unproductive to reconvene the Geneva Conference under present circumstances. There must be movement on both the part of Smith and the nationalists before Geneva could be reconvened. The idea of simply maintaining contact with the parties and talking with them via our Ambassadors or elsewise should not be discarded, but has the obvious flaw of not necessarily leading anywhere. A further option is to reconvene Geneva on the basis of an agreed set of propositions. Ambassador Richard has come up with 11 propositions which the State Department has not gone over carefully, but which seem generally acceptable. (At this point, Sir Antony Duff noted that the propositions were tentative and did not have the backing of his government as yet. The British propositions were passed to the participants in the conversation and are appended to this memorandum.)

In reference to proposition number one, (“there will be a genuine transition period of limited duration from minority to majority rule,”) Secretary Vance asked, “What does genuine mean?” Richard responded that it means points two and three. Under Secretary Habib asked, “Doesn’t it really mean points two through five and all the others which emphasize the limited duration of the transitional period?” Richard responded that this was not necessarily so, that the nationalists demand transfer of power at the beginning of the interim period which, from the British point of view, would not allow for a true transition. Subsequently Under Secretary Habib suggested reversing the order of points two and three or, preferably, combining them and softening the flat rejection of an immediate transfer of complete power as contained in point number two.

In response to Secretary Vance’s question about the possible acceptability of the propositions, Ambassador Richard stated that he believed that there was no reason why the nationalists should not accept them. However, the key to their success would be Vorster and his ability to sell them to Smith. Ambassador Richard noted that he believed that we should begin the process of consultations on the propositions with the whites, Vorster and Smith. In response to a question asked by Secretary Vance he acknowledged the contrary argument that if we do not clear them first with the nationalists, the same problems that we had at Geneva will develop again and the nationalists will up their demands.

Secretary Vance asked what we had to lose by pressing the propositions. Richard responded that we had nothing to lose and at the most there would be simply another rejection by the Rhodesians for which Smith would have to bear the responsibility.

Secretary Vance noted that Vorster and Smith would be meeting tomorrow and asked if we should be saying anything to Vorster now.

Assistant Secretary Schaufele said that the intelligence analysts believe that Vorster will not agree to anything at their first meeting; that he will hear Smith out on the latter’s plan for an internal solution. Vorster will simply not accept a cosmetic solution. Ambassador Schaufele reported that we had received a message from Harold Hawkins stating that no decision would be made at the Vorster-Smith meeting.⁵ He noted that Ambassador Richard would be meeting February 9 with South African Ambassador Botha in New York. Richard said that he believed that we should not pass Botha any specific message, but give him a general idea of what we are thinking about. Ambassador Habib asked how London would react to the propositions, to which Richard replied that they would have to be cleared there, but it would help if “we could say that you’ve smiled on them.” He said it would take at least a week to clear the propositions in London.

Sir Antony Duff noted that his Minister was looking for something to keep the consultations going; to keep the nationalists engaged. Ambassador Schaufele agreed that concerted action was necessary but noted that one disadvantage of keeping the consultations going is that if the new propositions run into a roadblock, we would be hard pressed to continue. Mr. Edmondson noted that Smith was likely to be a roadblock and that this would be the danger of going to him and Vorster first.

Ambassador Ramsbotham stated that he had not been at the previous day’s talk, but was wondering whether the Nigerians or the OAU might not come through with some positive suggestions on getting negotiations going again. He specifically mentioned President Senghor as someone who might be helpful in this regard. Ambassador Schaufele noted that he had “spent a lot of time leaning on that thin reed” without success and stated that the best we should hope for would be Senghor’s influence in keeping the OAU Foreign Ministers from going beyond the line that the OAU Liberation Committee took concerning recognition of the Patriotic Front.⁶

Under Secretary Habib pointed out that a main issue was how to communicate our thoughts to the South Africans. He suggested that we should be doing something special in presenting our position to Vorster. Richard agreed that it was basic that we should talk to the South Africans as well as with the nationalists. Ambassador Schaufele noted that Vorster would be under pressure to decide soon South Africa’s position on Smith’s internal option. He suggested that both Britain and the United States separately engage Vorster in a discussion of why it is in his best interests to come to a Rhodesian settlement. Secretary Vance said that we certainly could do that.

Ambassador Richard said that he would be returning to London and that the British ideas would be sorted out next week. During the week of February 20 the British would return to Washington for further consultations.

Secretary Vance stated that the idea of the propositions is worth pursuing and that we will follow this course. In the meantime, we will weigh in with the South Africans about the need to not let the situation stagnate and to tell them that we will be coming to them within a few weeks with specific thoughts. Ambassador Schaufele said that the South Africans are already aware that we are reviewing the Rhodesian situation, both internally and with the British. Ambassador Richard said that he would make these points with the South Africans when he meets Ambassador Botha on February 9.

Ambassador Schaufele noted that we have told the South Africans not to go too fast in relation to Namibia. He recognized that the EC–9 had also made a pitch in this direction which Sir Antony Duff characterized as “a preemptive defensive move.”

Ambassador Habib asked if crossing Vorster on Namibia at the UN would cause him to disengage from his association with us regarding Rhodesia and Namibia. Richard responded that he doubted that this would be the case; that Vorster is pretty realistic about the UN and so far has only expected help in protecting him from some of the more idiotic resolutions, e.g. the Lesotho matter.⁷ He noted that we cannot give Vorster a concrete bribe for his assistance. Vorster might ask for direct help in relation to a sanctions vote, said Ambassador Richard, but then immediately noted that the British would not vote for sanctions in any event.

Ambassador Ramsbotham suggested that Britain and the U.S. get together to discuss their long term objectives and policies towards South Africa. Secretary Vance agreed and said that the U.S. was beginning its policy review that afternoon.

Ambassador Richard suggested that, though he was not wedded to the idea, there was some thought that Britian might want to draw the EC–9, as well as Canada, New Zealand and Australia, into the Rhodesian negotiating picture. Ambassador Schaufele and Under Secretary Habib noted that such action would risk over-pressuring Vorster as well as possibly scaring him off.

PROPOSITIONS

1. There will be a genuine transition period of limited duration from minority to majority rule.

2. There will be no immediate transfer of complete power to the Nationalists at the outset of the interim period; but there will be a nationalist majority in the Council of Ministers.

3. There will be an immediate transfer of power from the Rhodesian Front to the interim government but the minority will have a substantial voice in the interim period.

4. A British Resident Commissioner will be appointed with sufficient residual powers to enable him, during the interim period, to play an effective balancing role.

5. The process to majority rule must be irreversible, peaceful and orderly and must take place within a defined period of time.

6. The interim government must be established by agreement between all the parties and must be representative of the main strands of Rhodesian opinion.

7. There must be guarantees from all concerned that upon the establishment of the interim government etc. war will cease. Sanctions would also be lifted.

8. The tasks of the interim government will be to run the country, to supervise the creation of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, to draw up the independence constitution and to arrange for the holding of elections.

9. Free and fair elections must be held in Rhodesia before legal independence will be granted.

10. The independence constitution will be based on a non-racial society. It will provide for the protection of property and there will be a Bill of Rights to guarantee individual rights and freedoms.

11. The interim government and the independent government will accept the cooperation of an internationally sponsored Zimbabwe Development Fund, the aims of which will be to assist with the economic development and social re-structuring of the country.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1977. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 9 by Davidow; cleared by Edmondson; approved on February 23 by Twaddell. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
2. See Document 265.
3. The United Nations Security Council held nine meetings in March on the question of sanctions against South Africa. For a summary of the meetings, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, pp. 134–140.
4. Records of Richard’s other meetings with Department of State officials were not found.
5. In telegram 178 from Cape Town, February 7, the Embassy reported on a discussion with Harold Hawkins: “Hawkins said that Smith is determined to press on with the ‘internal solution’ and as opener in talks with Vorster will undoubtedly try to enlist his support. Hawkins does not expect Vorster to accept such a solution but hopes that out of the meeting will come an understanding to encourage the UK and US to come up with a new formula ‘somewhere between the Kissinger and Richard packages’ which the British ‘with a large measure of US involvement and support’ will be able to negotiate with the Nationalists and Front Line Presidents.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086–0954) Hawkins’s message was not found.
6. In telegram 294 from Lusaka, February 1, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Richard and OAU Secretary General Eteki. Eteki held that the OAU Liberation Committee would back the Patriotic Front because they were the ones doing the fighting: “The object of the fighting and therefore of the recognition was to force Smith into negotiations.” Eteki also said that the OAU would probably withdraw its recognition of Sithole and Muzorewa. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 88, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 1–6/77)
7. In October 1976, Lesotho brought a complaint against South Africa for closing the border between Lesotho and South Africa, adjacent to the Transkei. Prime Minister Jonathan asserted that the closure was an attempt to coerce Lesotho into recognizing the Transkei. UNSC Resolution 402 (1976), adopted by consensus on December 22, called on all member states not to recognize Transkei or any other Bantustans and to provide assistance to Lesotho. It also condemned South Africa’s actions and called upon them to reopen the border. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1976, pp. 167–170)