Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

265. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, February 8, 1977, 3–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• South Africa and Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President
• A. Denis Clift

• State:

  • Secretary Vance
  • William E. Schaufele
  • United States Representative to the United Nations:
  • Donald F. McHenry

• Defense:

  • Charles W. Duncan
  • Leslie A. Janka

• CIA:

  • Enno Knoche
  • William Parmenter

• Treasury:

  • Anthony Solomon
  • NSC:
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Dr. Jessica Tuchman
  • Michael Hornblow

At the meeting the participants agreed on recommended courses of action regarding US policy toward South Africa, US policy toward Rhodesia and US policy toward Namibia. Since these recommendations involve major issues and would in some cases mean a change in US policy, it was felt they should be discussed at a National Security Council Meeting after Secretary Vance returns from the Middle East.²

I. US Policy Toward South Africa

The participants all agreed on option 3 of the South African study.³ According to this option we would advise Vorster privately that our relations with South Africa are reaching a watershed and keep pressuring him to change South Africa’s apartheid policies.

Within four years we could not realistically expect them to abandon the concept of majority rule for whites but could for example push for significant changes in the educational system. In our discussions with the South Africans we would attempt to elaborate a positive vision of the future, a South Africa where whites would continue to live and play important roles.

While conveying this message to Vorster privately we would begin taking public steps which show that we cannot in any event conduct business as usual. If the question of sanctions comes up in the UN we might vote for some of them depending on their content, even if Britain, France and West Germany continue to vote against sanctions.

II. US Policy Toward Rhodesia

There was general agreement that we should continue to support British efforts even though these efforts might fail. The British are considering a fresh approach which would be an attempt to get the involved parties to agree on broad principles. There was some discussion about the desirability of the US taking over from the British if their efforts fail but no conclusions were reached. Everyone agreed that for now the best course of action is to support the British as vigorously as possible.

III. US Policy Toward Namibia

It was agreed that the US should take an active role and probe to see if fruitful negotiations are possible. The front line states would support more active US involvement. Although such an action might not succeed the consequences of failure would not be great and a success might create momentum toward settling other problems in the region.

Meeting began at 3:02 p.m.

Secretary Vance: Our relations with South Africa is the first item. Over the last 9 months we have sought South Africa’s cooperation to achieve our objectives in Rhodesia and Namibia. This led us to take certain courses of action. We are now faced with conflicting objectives. We on the one hand seek to obtain from South Africa agreement on firmer measures toward Rhodesia and Namibia. On the other hand we don’t want to give up on anti-apartheid and maybe want to strengthen our position. Yet we don’t want to be in the position of double crossing South Africa into making them believe that we are soft on apartheid. Yet we are faced with the problem of forcing them into a position where they won’t help. How can we resolve the conflict? The paper presents 3 options. One is to maintain our present policy on the grounds that it gives us the best hope of influencing South Africa. The second option is to put more pressure on them. This second option however implies that we are not going to press them on the apartheid question if they cooperate with us on Rhodesia and Namibia. I must admit that option gives me great problems. The third option suggests that our relations would depend on what they do with respect to Rhodesia and Namibia and their internal problems. Perhaps there are other options, Zbig?

Dr. Brzezinski: I lean to option 3. As I see it there is no real choice. This issue will surface very quickly in the UN and elsewhere. The mood of the South African front line Presidents is changing. As I have said before the possibilities are there to transform this from a black-white conflict into a red-white conflict. Vorster is not doing us any particular favor by working on Rhodesia. He is acting in his own self interest. The issue at stake is the future of the entire Southern African arc. There is very little time left. We should start squeezing. I am in favor of option 3 in some fashion.

Secretary Vance: Would that push them into a dug-in position?

Dr. Brzezinski: It is not an easy question to answer. The record so far has been that other courses of action are not so hopeful. A conflict will come sooner or later. If it is later it will involve the spectre of Communism.

Mr. Knoche: I would like to comment on the nature of Vorster as a political leader in South Africa. He is not a decisive leader who is willing to get out in front. He rules his Cabinet on the basis of consensus. And there is little pressure from within the African community for him to change his policies.

Mr. Duncan: We are for option 3. This recognizes the indivisibility of South African problems and attacks them all together and demonstrates we do have a committment on human rights. Secretary Vance should talk privately to Prime Minister Vorster and take some public measures at the same time.

Secretary Vance: Supposing in March the question of sanctions comes up in the UN. It would of course depend on what sanctions. It would be a tough choice. It may happen and we might find ourselves split from Britain. If it is a reasonable kind of sanction we will vote yes.

Mr. Schaufele: We might find ourselves voting against the British, French and possibly the Germans.

Vice President Mondale: The British have gotten themselves out front in a mediating role which may fail. We should try to minimize their humiliation. It is the only action that Britain has going in international affairs reminding them they are an effective force in the world. If they fail we should act to soften the insult.

Secretary Vance: I agree. We should specifically keep this in mind when talking about next steps. They are now thinking of a new step. That would be to restate basic propositions and try to get agreement on those. However this idea still has to get through their foreign office.

Mr. Solomon: Even though we are showing opposition at various levels to apartheid, Rhodesia is still the priority issue. If we attack Vorster in public and apply pressure to him in private it might make it harder for him. We have argued publicly and with the third world that we don’t use multinational companies as an instrument of our policy. For us to call a conference in the White House with the multinationals would undercut our position globally.

Secretary Brown: I don’t disagree with option 3 but would place the emphasis on private communications. I think the risk of losing him (Vorster) would be tragic. He will be the key in Rhodesia.

Secretary Vance: The second option says to put more pressure on them and tell them that in the future we will be watching what they do regarding Smith and Namibia. If we take that position it implies that if they help us with Rhodesia and Namibia we would lesson our pressure on apartheid. This is dishonest and wrong.

Mr. Duncan: We concur.

Secretary Brown: The South Africans are realistic enough to know that our leader will be making statements about our policy which won’t be too well received in South Africa.

Amb. McHenry: These are separate issues and should be dealt with separately “Whatever advantage there is in going slow on apartheid would only be understood by diplomats. In the long term there is a need to come to grips with the central lesson in South Africa. We have no indication of how fast events will move and we don’t control events. There is a point at which all our good intentions will go down the drain because the possibility of a peaceful resolution is gone.

Secretary Vance: There is a consensus on option 3. Options 1 and 2 are unsatisfactory courses. Option 3 scares the daylights out of the British.

Vice President Mondale: What do we do in option 3?

Secretary Vance: Inform Vorster that our relations with South Africa depend on what he does about apartheid and in Namibia and Rhodesia.

Vice President Mondale: We would move him away from apartheid, to majority rule in Rhodesia and independence under majority rule in Namibia?

Secretary Vance: Yes and no separate deals with independent groups.

Amb. McHenry: I am not clear that the British are sure of their own views on this. They have behaved somewhat inconsistently.

Secretary Vance: Yes, there are differences within the British government itself.

Mr. Schaufele: They don’t want to do anything on Rhodesia which would affect their options on apartheid.

Dr. Brzezinski: The danger of our present policy is that it breeds illusions that our major concern is to resolve minor Rhodesian problems. This in turn breeds other illusions. If this is the beginning of a long and bitter historical process it is in our interest to accelerate this process. This is a fundamental policy decision. We must talk to South Africa in terms of a positive vision of change. This means we would assume a major role. The price of any other approach is high.

Secretary Vance: I agree.

Vice President Mondale: The President feels he knows something about this problem as a Southerner. He found that if you get the business community involved with and interested, that integration could work. The same forces could come to play in South Africa. That is why he wants to get the corporations involved. Any other policy would be alien to his traditions and beliefs.

Dr. Brzezinski: What follows from that is to complete our move toward more overt condemnation of apartheid.

Secretary Vance: Their position is quite clear. Under no circumstances would they accept majority rule in South Africa.

Dr. Brzezinski: Since they won’t deliver in Rhodesia anyway the effect on US-South African relations is not a high price.

Amb. McHenry: Basically as it operates majority rule and apartheid are the same thing.

Mr. Solomon: It is conceivable to have a society with no apartheid and still no democracy. They are not necessarily related to each other. There might be proposed sanctions. Would we support sanctions until South Africa abolishes apartheid and majority rule. Or would we go along if it was just about apartheid.

Amb. McHenry: Let’s define apartheid. It is not just segregation. It also includes political participation. They are dead set against any black political participation if it would affect whites. They have created an elaborate structure which makes it impossible for blacks to govern any whites.

Mr. Schaufele: Yes and with white rule depending on black labor.

Mr. Solomon: For us to vote in the UN on sanctions and break with Britain, France etc is a serious measure. Will you try to work with them and negotiate the language?

Secretary Vance: Yes my guess is that we will have different kinds of resolutions.

Dr. Brzezinski: Young was asked about this and said it would not be realistic to expect majority rule in the next four years but we could expect some changes in their educational systems. In other words some kind of change.

Mr. Aaron: The options are mechanistic. Kissinger did not clarify the time limits. The problem is we don’t wish to create an enormous disincentive for South Africa. There are two choices. Buy time or fight it out in Rhodesia or Namibia. Our strategy is to avoid this and rightly so.

Mr. Knoche: We are seeking changes in their fundamental attitudes. This will require very close observation by this government. We now have [4 lines not declassified].

Secretary Vance: The specifics are on pages 31–33 of the paper. We are talking about something close to 3. Lets now go on to Rhodesia. There are three options. I don’t think there is much of a problem in choosing between those alternatives. Is there anybody who feels we should not be working with the British? Supposing the next go-around with the British fails? What should the US do then?

Dr. Brzezinski: What will the next British effort be?

Secretary Vance: Possibly to get all sides to agree to a restatement of a basic set of principles.

Dr. Brzezinski: I lean toward option 1. However I have some uncertainties about the British. They have become political pleaders for South Africa. The Black African leadership does not really trust them. I don’t see how the British effort can suceed.

Secretary Vance: A lot of what you say is correct. Yet they were the colonial power and seem to be a logical mechanism. Nyerere is in favor of the British effort. Who would take their place? I have grave doubts that we could do it.

Dr. Brzezinski: It gains us time.

Secretary Vance: The British might succeed with our help.

Mr. Schaufele: We have to give them more help than we did last time.

Dr. Brzezinski: Perhaps it could become a joint effort.

Mr. Schaufele: The British started out on this partly because of their concern of relations with Zambia and other states in the region. In Geneva they had a difficult time with the nationalists and black leadership? The nationalists asked Britain to take a role in an interim government. The British found Vorster relatively reasonable but had trouble with Smith.

Amb. McHenry: The British have a historical and legal basis for assuming a role in an interim government. Maybe their attempt to get the parties to agree on basic principles will help narrow differences. They have to see what the various parties are looking for. The first proposal was pro white and the Africans rejected it.⁴ The African proposal was pro black and the whites rejected it.⁵ The advantage of the British proposal is that it puts a third party in as a blocking element. However some Rhodesians don’t trust the British to act in an objective way. The present shortcomings of getting people to accept an outside power is the need for all sides to have confidence in that blocking party.

Secretary Vance: Who should be the blocking party?

Amb. McHenry: I don’t know.

Mr. Schaufele: The blocking party can’t cut and run either.

Secretary Vance: What about some sort of institutional mechanism?

Mr. Schaufele: There is none that would be acceptable to all parties.

Dr. Brzezinski: Supposing it was the US?

Mr. Schaufele: I don’t know how acceptable we would be to the South Africans. They might wonder what we would do in a crunch.

Dr. Brzezinski: But it might be a great accomplishment.

Mr. Schaufele: It would mean major power involvement.

Mr. Duncan: And might bring a Soviet reaction.

Dr. Brzezinski: For now there is not much choice.

Secretary Vance: I am not sure Congress would support the idea of our being a blocking party.

Dr. Brzezinski: It is not inconceivable. If Congress was advised of what the options and consequences are they might feel differently. It is similar to the Sinai agreement.⁶

Secretary Vance: The chance of getting involved in guerrilla warfare is much greater than in the Sinai.

Mr. Aaron: How about a role for the UN?

Amb. McHenry: There is a possibility of trying something but the problem with that is the Soviets would block it.

Mr. Schaufele: Perhaps there could be international guarantees.

Mr. Aaron: One of the problems with the British is that they have done a lousy job. Maybe we could do a better job at that.

Amb. McHenry: We should explore the concept of institutional arrangements.

Secretary Brown: The blocking power—it is not a physical thing is it?

Secretary Vance: No, but the blocking power is responsible for seeing that the situation does not deteriorate.

Lt. Gen. Smith: It would lead us down a slippery slope.

Secretary Vance: Zbig you may be right but where the idea leads scares the hell out of me.

Mr. Aaron: The trick is to get behind the British as a blocking power.

Mr. Schaufele: That means the crunch comes later.

Secretary Vance: This is about all we can do on Rhodesia today.

Mr. Solomon: I have one point about the Byrd amendment.⁷ With regard to the Arab boycott we are pushing for a positive certification rather than a negative one. We should be consistent with that on the Byrd amendment. When you give your testimony you could say that you support a positive certification.

Secretary Vance: Yes. Lets go on to Namibia. There are seven options.

Mr. Duncan: We support option 4. This would align us with much of world opinion. There should also be frank discussions with the Soviets.

Secretary Vance: That has already been done. I have talked to the Soviets about this twice in the last week. Would option 4 accomplish anything?

Mr. Duncan: It is consistent with what we are saying to South Africa in other respects.

Secretary Brown: I agree. It is consistent and in tune with world opinion. It may not be productive but other courses may not be either.

Dr. Brzezinski: There are indications that South Africa may be moving on this anyway. Perhaps the issue may be resolved.

Secretary Vance: I don’t really think that is the case. The British are encouraging them in this position. Their internal option rules out participation by SWAPO at all.

Mr. Schaufele: The British say there may be a real problem if the South Africans go to a unitary option.

Amb. McHenry: The current approach is not consistent with the Security Council resolution.⁸ We need to get back to the Security Council resolution. I have no problem with option 4. If you have a situation where there is free participation under the Security Council resolution. I have no problems. The Security Council resolution of January should be guiding us.

Mr. Schaufele: My principle problem with option 4 is that it would insure that South Africa would go for an internal option. If we want to have the Security Council resolution implemented, option 4 would not have that effect. There is now an indication of some give on both sides which should make another round possible.

Amb. McHenry: The problem is that paper differences would jump out in Geneva.

Secretary Vance: That raises the question of should we take a leading role. The British don’t want it and nobody else does. Should we go to the parties and try to see if there is some basis for Geneva talks and some give to the SWAPO position. Here you could make a better argument for a US role than in Rhodesia.

Mr. Schaufele: The front line states would support such an approach.

Mr. Solomon: The price of failure is not so great as in Rhodesia.

Amb. McHenry: The front line states would support an active US role.

Dr. Brzezinski: It might be a useful trial run which would generate momentum elsewhere in the region.

Secretary Vance: Option 1 is where I come out.

Amb. McHenry: The front line states would support an active role for the US but it is not clear in what framework. The question is up in the air. We should not come up with a policy leaning toward South Africa as does the present one. At the same time we should not get into the SWAPO bag.

Secretary Vance: I agree. We won’t find out unless we get into it. We need to probe and find out what the situation is and how best to move toward negotiations with agreed terms of reference.

Amb. McHenry: I favor probing. The problem with option one is that it has us probing under the current framework.

Dr. Brzezinski: I favor a modified option 1. I have a procedural point. These are very fateful decisions which should be discussed at an NSC meeting.

Secretary Vance: I agree. You could have a meeting in my absence.

Dr. Brzezinski: It is important for you to be there as you may have to do some of the negotiating. We can wait one week and have the meeting after you return.

The meeting ended at 4:15 pm.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 47, South Africa: 1–3/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. The NSC meeting was held on March 3. See Document 267. Vance traveled to Jerulsalem, Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Riyadh, and Damascus February 15–21 to discuss the Middle East peace process.
3. See Document 264.
4. Reference is to the Five Points. See Tab 1, Document 264.
5. Reference is to the Patriotic Front Proposals. See Tab 1, Document 264.
6. Reference is presumably to the Sinai II Agreement, signed by Egypt and Israel on September 4, 1975.
7. See footnote 3, Document 259.
8. See footnote 3, Document 264.