198. Letter From President Carter to Tanzanian President Nyerere 1
I am grateful for your thoughtful letter of March 3 on Rhodesia.2 As usual, your views contributed greatly to my understanding.
As you know, together with the British, we quickly acted on your suggestion to Prime Minister Callaghan and me that all the principal parties in the Rhodesian conflict be invited to meet. I still think this remains the best way to handle the situation in the present circumstances.
Your support has done much to obtain wide acceptance for the Anglo-American proposals as a basis for an enduring Rhodesian settlement, perceived by Rhodesia’s majority as bringing a definitive end to minority rule. At Malta, we and the British agreed that Africans must play important and substantial roles in the governance of Zimbabwe during the transitional period. However, that interim period itself should not be used by any one faction or group to expand its authority or power. We cannot acquiesce in demands either from the Patriotic Front or from other nationalists that they be accorded a predominant position during the interim period. We continue to seek the implementation of the principles embodied in the Anglo-American proposals and will not associate ourselves with any arrangement that does not include them.
Secretary Vance has urged Bishop Muzorewa and Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe to give serious consideration to attending a meeting of all the parties.3 We have also presented the idea to other parties and have received noncommittal or negative responses.4 The Patriotic Front leaders, whose initial reaction was one of rejection, argued that the United States and Great Britain are attempting to propel them into the Salisbury agreement.5 They asserted that by meeting with the internally based nationalists they would grant the Salisbury agreement legitimacy [Page 577] and recognition it does not deserve. Finally, they insisted that all military and transitional arrangements should be negotiated solely with the Patriotic Front, leaving negotiations on constitutional issues that would include other nationalists for a later date.
Secretary Vance told Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe that it is not our intention to abandon the principles of the Anglo-American proposals, to accord any legitimacy to the Salisbury agreement, or to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept the Salisbury arrangements. We do recognize that there are certain matters relating to the ceasefire and the disposition of military forces during the transitional period which must be negotiated with the Patriotic Front, and that this fact must be taken into account in any negotiating process. Despite the initial responses, we continue to believe that an all-parties meeting would provide an opportunity to reach a settlement based on the principles of the Anglo-American proposals. I hope that you will be able to counsel the Patriotic Front leaders to accept the idea of an all-parties meeting without unnecessary preconditions.6
It is a source of great satisfaction to me to enjoy your confidence and support as we together seek a just solution for Rhodesia. And even beyond what we can accomplish on this difficult issue, I place the highest value on maintaining the friendship between our countries.
Sincerely,
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Tanzania: President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, 1/77–5/78. No classification marking.↩
- In telegram 940 from Dar es Salaam, March 3, the Embassy transmitted the text of Nyerere’s letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2698) ↩
- See Documents 194 and 197. ↩
- Telegram 789 from Lusaka, March 12, transmitted Kaunda’s comments on the proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780110–0984) ↩
- See footnote 5, Document 191. ↩
- In telegram 1326 from Dar es Salaam, March 28, the Embassy transmitted Nyerere’s response to Carter. In the letter, Nyerere noted: “I think I can say that we achieved success in overcoming all the major reservations or objections which the Patriotic Front leaders have been expressing at Malta and elsewhere to the Anglo-American Proposals. I am convinced that the remaining problems are minor ones and could be quickly cleared up if a follow-up to the Malta meeting was held prior to the conference of all the Rhodesian parties.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780134–1196)↩