197. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts1

63462. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Patriotic Front Leaders, March 11.

1. Following is summary of pertinent points of subject meeting.

2. In their meeting with the Secretary, Nkomo and Mugabe rejected the idea that the US and UK move rapidly to bring together all the parties to the Rhodesia dispute for a meeting designed to bridge the differences between them.

3. During protracted discussion on issue, PF leaders said that at Malta meeting Owen had withdrawn his invitation for a further get-together in New York at the time of the Five Power Conference on Namibia (Nkomo asserted that Owen had done this when the parties went downstairs after the formal meetings had ended). Assistant Secretary Moose and UK Embassy Minister Robinson countered that the invitation remained on the table and had been reafirmed on more than one occasion.

4. Nkomo and Mugabe asserted that US–UK unwillingness to proceed toward further negotiations with them as agreed in Malta, coupled with official Anglo-American statements noting “acceptance” of the internal settlement or characterization of it as “significant step” indicated to them that the US–UK are abandoning the Anglo-American proposals.

5. Secretary countered that the proposals, as we have made clear publicly, remain the yardstick by which we would measure any other settlement attempt. He argued that now is the time to bring all the parties together to resolve differences. Nkomo said that our current proposal will lead to “an appeasement meeting” at which the US and UK would try to “marry” the Anglo-American proposals and the Salisbury Agreement. Such an effort, he argued, would constitute an implicit recognition of the Salisbury Agreement as a legitimate basis for negotiation. PF is categorically opposed to this.

6. With greater enthusiasm for the Anglo-American proposals than the PF has hitherto demonstrated, they argued that negotiations should pick up where they were left off in Malta. They continually characterized the Malta meeting in terms which had originally been used by [Page 575] Lord Carver and Prem Chand to describe the initially proposed Malta meeting for November 16.2 According to Nkomo and Mugabe, the January 313 Malta meeting and subsequent meetings which were supposed to have evolved from it were concerned primarily with reaching agreement on military matters. They argued that this approach should be continued and the next stage in negotiations should be confined to discussions on military matters, including a ceasefire, among themselves, the British and Smith.

7. The PF leaders asserted that they had never excluded the other Nationalists but that Muzorewa and Sithole had excluded themselves by becoming Smith’s puppets. There would be room for them in further negotiations on constitutional matters but only after the military arrangements had been worked out.

8. The Secretary suggested structuring the proposed all-parties conference in such a manner that subgroups could discuss specific issues. In such a way the PF would be able to engage in negotiations on military matters as they have demanded.

9. Nkomo and Mugabe refused to entertain this as a possibility, arguing that in effect the only way the US and U.K. can clearly demonstrate that we are not abandoning the Anglo-American proposals is by entering into direct public negotiations with them which would not accord any status to the Salisbury conferees or the internal settlement.

10. Nkomo and Mugabe returned to New York Saturday evening where they are scheduled to meet with Ambassador Young. They will fly to London the following day for a Monday meeting with Owen.4

Vance
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780110–0700. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent to London, Lusaka, Cape Town, Maputo, and Dar es Salaam. Drafted by Davidow; cleared by [garble] (D/A), and Frank G. Wisner (S/S); approved by Moose.
  2. In telegram 4346 from Dar es Salaam, October 31, 1977, Spain reported on the meeting among Carver, Chand, and the Patriotic Front. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2339)
  3. See footnote 3, Document 185.
  4. In telegram 4037 from London, March 13, Brewster reported on Owen’s meeting with the Patriotic Front. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780112–0026)