Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, February 26, 1978, 2159Z

49706. White House for Brzezinski. Subject: Rhodesia: Response to Owen Letter² and Talking Points for Use With Front Line and Nigeria. Ref: State 49593.³

1. Please pass following message to FCO for Foreign Secretary Owen from Secretary Vance:

Dear David:

I have studied your letter, and I believe that there are really no substantial differences between us as to our objectives or our assessment of the circumstances which affect our immediate actions. Clearly we cannot, at this juncture, focus our efforts on the continued pursuit of the Anglo-US Plan ignoring the significant talks going on in Salisbury.⁴ At the same time, as you point out, we cannot retract our support of the principles of the Anglo/US Plan or be seen to abandon that initiative. To do so would undermine our ability to pursue common, long-term objectives in Southern Africa and advantages which we both recognize the Anglo/US Plan offers as a possible bridge between the Salisbury parties and the external Nationalists.

I believe that the only significant difference which may exist between us at the moment has to do with the nature and degree of interest which we are disposed to evidence to the Front Line governments with regard to further discussion of the plan. In my view it is important that we maintain a continuing dialogue with the Front-Line about developments in Rhodesia at this critical juncture. And, I do not believe that we can be successful in this if we show no disposition to be willing to continue discussion of the plan with the Patriotic Front. At the same time, I don’t believe that we have to chase after them.

After studying the views of our Ambassadors in Lusaka, Dar and Maputo, we have put together, as you and Dick Moose agreed, a set of talking points designed for joint use by UK and US Mission Chiefs with the Front Line. As you will see, they seek to walk a careful line between too much and too little interest in further pursuit of the Anglo/US Plan. I would appreciate your views on them. The Front Line Presidents may be meeting later this week and I think our approaches should be made before that meeting convenes.

I look forward to hearing about your trip to the Middle East.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Cy. End message

2. Following are proposed draft talking points for use with FL and Nigeria:

Begin text.

—We continue to share with you as the primary goal in Rhodesia a genuine transfer of authority to the majority of the population through a process which guarantees the opportunity for the people of Zimbabwe to choose their own leaders under impartial circumstances. The AAP so far seems to us to provide the best way to achieve this result.

—Divisions within the PF, and its continued insistence on a dominant role for itself during the transition period have kept us from moving ahead with the AAP.

—We do not think that an internal settlement is assured: Indeed our reaction has been one of healthy skepticism.

—At the same time, frankly, developments in Salisbury have created a situation which we cannot ignore. The apparent acceptance by Smith of one-man-one vote has given many people the impression that he has at last accepted a genuine transfer of authority to the majority of the population. Nevertheless, despite strong political forces in our own countries we have not accepted the Salisbury agreement.

—We recognize that in fact the Salisbury talks are a long way from achieving an overall agreement which embodies a genuine transfer of power. We cannot pass judgment until the details of an agreement are known, but whatever comes out will be compared to the British-American Plan and must meet the essential test of a relinquishment of power by Smith.

—As one might assume, the purpose of Rev. Sithole’s recent visit to London was to seek endorsement of the Salisbury talks. Dr. Owen explained in some detail our serious concern that the agreements now being negotiated in Salisbury will not produce a genuine transfer of power and therefore could not be counted on to end the war or win international acceptance. We are also making clear to the internal Nationalists our desire to achieve a settlement that would include all the parties.

—We want to get your views on how to proceed in circumstances where PF will not agree to our minimum essentials and Sithole, Muzorewa, and Smith may reach some agreement in Salisbury. [Omission in the original.] [garble] for all of us.

—It would also be helpful for us to have your views on how we could continue discussions on details of the Anglo-American Plan, keeping in mind the importance of its being a plan that all parties can be brought to accept.

—Another meeting with the PF that only ends in disagreement over the powers of the Resident Commissioner and over control of the police and military forces would be harmful to our cause. It would strengthen Smith’s hand and leave us further from a satisfactory solution than ever, as well as subject us to a great deal of criticism which would tie our hands.

—Moreover, the gratuitous attack on our two governments in the PF statement of February 25⁵ raises questions about whether the PF is interested in such talks, and complicates our political problem even further.

—We remain committed to the principles of the AAP and we have been deeply appreciative of your support for our efforts to achieve our mutual goal, an independent majority-ruled Zimbabwe. We look forward to continuing to have your help and understanding as we work towards that goal in the critical days ahead. End text.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2174. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Drafted by Keough; cleared by Moose; approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to Dar es Salaam, Pretoria, Lagos, Lusaka, Lilongwe, Maputo, Gaborone, USUN, Cape Town, and the White House.
2. See Document 190.
3. In telegram 49593 to multiple posts, February 25, Vance transmitted the draft instructions for a joint U.S.–U.K. approach to the Front Line Presidents and Nigeria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780087–0592)
4. Reference is to Smith’s negotiations with the “internal” Nationalists to reach a constitutional settlement.
5. Nkomo and Mugabe condemned the United States and United Kingdom for their “connivance and assistance,” in the Salisbury talks. (Washington Post, February 26, 1978, p. B5)