I have certain reservations about simply moving straight down the old
path without taking into account the fact that Kaunda, Smith and Nkomo
all do not support the Anglo-British plan.
I therefore believe Cy’s proposals require some serious discussion and
have scheduled a PRC meeting for
Thursday, December 1.
Attachment
Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter
3
Washington, November 29, 1977
SUBJECT
Ian Smith’s conditional offer
to talk with internal Rhodesian nationalists about majority
rule4 is not, in our view, likely to produce a viable “internal
settlement.” Muzorewa and
Sithole, to whom
Smith addressed the
offer, have cautiously welcomed it, but said they will have to
examine any conditions very carefully. They seem to be insisting on
the inclusion of external nationalists in settlement negotiations
and that they will accept nothing short of a genuine transfer of
power on the basis of one man, one vote.5
Smith is unlikely to settle
for less in the way of assurances to the whites than he has demanded
in connection with the British-American plan, including a blocking
vote for whites. This alone could deter an internal deal.
Nevertheless, we expect Smith’s statement to have a significant short-term
impact. It could induce a more reasonable attitude on the part of
Nkomo and Mugabe, and even serve to reunite
Kaunda with his Front
Line colleagues in support of an open election. The Patriotic Front
may well be alarmed by the prospect of an election in Rhodesia from
which they were excluded. They might fear that if a black government
takes power, support for the Patriotic Front from elsewhere in
Africa might fade, leaving the Patriotic Front isolated.
At the same time, it is still our view that a majority rule election
from which the Patriotic Front is excluded would signal the start of
a new round of violence in Rhodesia, with the Patriotic Front
disrupting elections and/or attacking a black Rhodesian government
which it would portray as a front for white interests. It is
precisely this eventual[Page 511]ity,
one which would likely invite increased outside involvement, which
our plan seeks to avoid.
While it may be tactically useful to have Nkomo worried about the possibility of an internal
settlement, we must be alert to the danger that the Front Line or
Patriotic Front may charge collusion on the part of the British and
ourselves with Smith in
Smith’s latest move. Some
of the press commentary suggests a British willingness to consider
Smith’s offer. In part
this interpretation is traceable to Owen’s rather positive comments on the Smith statement in contrast to our
own statement which was more guarded. We are making clear to the
press, the Front Line, and the Nigerians our misgivings about
Smith’s offer and our
will to press on with our proposal. Without going so far as to
appear to reject Smith’s
movement towards one-man, one-vote, or to relieve the pressure on
the Patriotic Front we are emphasizing the importance of elections
open to all, and of avoiding a civil war.
We have now reviewed the current situation in the light of the
inconclusive Carver
round6 and Smith’s statement. We conclude, as we always have,
that it is essential to press ahead with the British-American plan.
Indeed, in the light of recent events, it is more important than
ever to demonstrate that our plan is still alive. Our energetic
espousal of independence for Rhodesia and our active engagement in
efforts directed toward that end have been a major contributing
factor in our improved relations with the OAU states.
I plan to see David Owen
during my December 7–9 visit to Brussels for the Nato Ministerial
meeting. I would like to be in a position at that time to agree with
him on a course which would move our proposals ahead. Subject to
your concurrence, I intend to say to Owen:
—We strongly believe we should move ahead and avoid a passive or
temporizing defensive posture.
—If we cease working for a genuine democratic transfer of power in
Rhodesia, the only alternative to Smith’s inadequate proposals will be escalating
violence and growing pressure on us to remove Smith, but without concurrent Front
Line and Patriotic Front agreement to a follow-on process designed
to ensure an orderly transfer of power by democratic means.
—We should move as quickly as possible to complete staff work on the
various components of our proposals so as to present them to a
meeting of the Front Line Presidents before Christmas.
—Specifically we should complete the draft constitution and an
elaborated proposal on transition arrangements, including
peacekeeping provisions.
[Page 512]
—At the same time we should agree on a new strategy for pressures to
induce South Africa to bring Smith to accept our proposals, so that we can give
assurances to the Front Line on this matter, confident that we
really know what we can do.
—On the basis of President Carter’s affirmations to President Nyerere
7 and General Obasanjo
8 that we are
prepared to take the necessary steps to implement our plan (once
African support for it has been achieved), we are prepared to decide
with them upon various measures to induce South Africa to press
Smith.
—The South Africans may respond favorably without pressure being
placed upon them, since South Africa’s best interests would be
served by a stable settlement in Rhodesia. But some pressure may be
necessary, and we want to be prepared.
—At the proposed Front Line meeting, we suggest that David Owen and Andy Young lay out our elaborated
proposals and invite them to comment particularly on those
provisions such as plans for the transition and future of Zimbabwe
army, which will necessarily be incomplete because of the lack of
cooperation of the Patriotic Front.
—We would ask the Front Line states to endorse our final proposals
and give us their full support in securing Patriotic Front
acceptance of the plan. We would provide, in return assurances that
our influence would be used to secure Smith’s acquiescence once we had complete African
support.
I have already written to Owen emphasizing the need for quick movement on our
part and raising these general topics as areas for concentrated
study over the next few days, before we meet in Brussels.
Pursuant to your affirmation that the U.S. would take the necessary measures to put our plan
into effect once African support had been obtained, I am prepared to
discuss the issue of pressures with Owen in Brussels in the terms laid out above. If you
believe, however, that a PRC
meeting to obtain general agreement on this course of action is
necessary, such a meeting could be scheduled for December 3.
