Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

173. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, November 14, 1977, 2246Z

18732. From Moose. Rome for Ambassador Young only. Subject: Rhodesia: Talks With the British.

1. We met Monday afternoon and evening with Owen, Carver and company in a series of satisfactory discussions on next steps. The British agreed with substance of our working paper,² and with need to move expeditiously to bring Rhodesia negotiations to a head. Much of the conversation centered on immediate considerations relating to the Malta talks (which now scheduled for about November 25) and follow-on. It was our general feeling that though Mugabe to date was the only one to accept the talks, it was more likely that in the end either both he and Nkomo or neither would come to Malta. No one was optimistic that the Malta talks, if they took place with both PF leaders, would produce much, but everyone agreed that we had to go through with the exercise, inasmuch as the invitation has been extended. We saw a certain advantage in having an opportunity to expose the PF to the details of our proposals on military aspects of law and order, and political organization of the transition period. It was recognized that Nkomo would table his own proposals and probably register negative reactions to the discussion.

2. We concluded that following Malta it would be necessary to meet with Muzorewa and Sithole again. Carver was reluctant to return to Salisbury for such a meeting and Owen suggested that he call them to London.

3. During the course of the talks the British came a long way toward recognizing that the next major step must be a reference back to the Front Line. If the meeting at Malta and subsequent talks with Muzorewa and Sithole take place, then the Front Line meeting will be afterwards. But if the Malta meeting falls by the wayside, we will proceed directly to meet with the Front Line. The British accepted our position that we need to move ahead promptly and to present the Front Line with a total package on which we can stand. Our position with the Front Line will be based on our willingness to proceed provided we have their support.

4. Owen was agreeable, if hesitant, to accept that we must proceed with whichever groups are prepared to go along with us. We all agreed, however, that this step would have to be considered more carefully if we get to it. In a private conversation with Moose, Owen had no problem with Moose’s suggestion that the presentation to the Front Line be made by a high level political figure; he himself would be prepared to go and he hoped that Andy Young would accompany him.

5. We reviewed and jointly approved British messages to Nyerere, Machel, Nkomo and Mugabe, noting the invitation to Malta, Mugabe’s acceptance and the hope that Nkomo also would agree to attend. The idea of a similar message to Kaunda was considered and rejected, in view of the fact that Nyerere would be seeing him on Friday and it would be better not to complicate that meeting.

Streator

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2535. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Lusaka, Maputo, Pretoria, and Rome.
2. In telegram 18646 from London, November 13, the Embassy transmitted the text of the working paper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2543)