175. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting1

SUBJECT

  • Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Secretary Cyrus Vance
    • Assistant Secretary Richard Moose, African Affairs
    • Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning
  • USUN

    • Ambassador Andrew Young
    • Stoney Cooks, Executive Assistant
  • CIA

    • Admiral Stansfield Turner
    • William Parmenter
  • JCS

    • Lt. General William Smith
  • NSC

    • Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron
    • Henry Richardson

This meeting considered next steps on Rhodesia in light of Ian Smith’s recent offer to negotiate with Muzorewa and Sithole on a qualified basis of majority rule towards a Rhodesian settlement.2 Discussion focused on a moderately active approach versus an active approach, the difference lying mainly in the speed with which the United States and the British move towards meeting with the Front Line states to confirm their acceptance of the Anglo-American Plan. Sithole’s views expressed during his recent visit to Washington, as they related to Smith’s offer of talks, were noted.3 A fundamental question was whether the Front Line states must express unified agreement for the Anglo-American plan before the United States committed itself to force Smith out.

It was generally agreed that unless the United States gave fresh indication of its willingness to remove Smith, events including the [Page 514] Chomoio raid into Mozambique by the Rhodesians4 would force our hand, so that we would be faced with a possible Security Council resolution on oil sanctions, presenting a decision on a US veto. In this connection, there was some indication that Kaunda may be moderating his position on installing Nkomo without elections somewhat back toward the Anglo-American Plan.

There was general agreement that Kaunda’s personal emissary, Mark Chona, should be treated warmly, including seeing the President. The importance of continued communication with the Nigerians was discussed and agreed.

It was suggested that the Special Requirements Fund might be used to buttress Botswana and Lesotho against the detrimental effect of possible oil sanctions against Rhodesia, as a signal of US determination.

Secretary Vance summed up:

—General agreement on the moderate active approach; he would talk on this basis with Owen on December 7. This would exclude an early Front Line meeting with Ambassador Young and Owen. He will urge Owen to send Carver to see Machel.

—The United States should prepare to act affirmatively on oil sanctions on a graduated basis, if necessary. If the issue poses the question of a US Security Council veto, it should be most carefully negotiated towards foregoing such a veto.

—The US should attempt to dissuade African states from bringing an oil sanctions resolution to the Security Council, but in response to African pressure, which might come within the next week, the British or the US would initiate an “Indian” resolution on oil sanctions calling on all nations to review their domestic oil policy on the activities of overseas subsidiaries which might be engaged in violation of sanctions against Rhodesia.

—The United States will seriously consider initiating a resolution of condemnation in the Security Council against Rhodesia for the Chomoio raid.

—The possibility of declaring Mozambique a disaster area for PL–480 purposes, and extending aid to it on that basis will be urgently explored.

—The Secretary will immediately contact the British on the oil question, discuss the dangers of having the US-British hand forced, and suggest that the British take the initiative in introducing an Indian resolution.

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—The Secretary will seek the opportunity to publicly announce humanitarian aid to Mozambique, if this proves possible, and to publicly condemn the Rhodesian raid.

—In this connection, State will be consulting appropriately with Congress.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 1–12/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
  2. See footnote 4, Document 174.
  3. In telegram 273087 to London, November 15, the Department, reported on the November 14 meeting between Vance and Sithole. The Department noted: “He has refused to become involved in an internal settlement because it would ruin his credibility. He believes Smith would be prepared to accept a settlement if he can save face, is given an honorable way out, and can be assured that whites who remain in Rhodesia will be treated fairly.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2459)
  4. Rhodesian forces attacked a ZANLA camp near Chimoio on November 23. See Document 176. For additional details of the raid see, Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, p. 28948.