Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

160. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, June 24, 1977

SUBJECT

• Rhodesia, Namibia, and Others

PARTICIPANTS

• United Kingdom

  • David Owen, Foreign Secretary
  • John A. Graham, Deputy to the Permanent Under Secretary of State
  • Ewen Fergusson, Principal Private Secretary to David Owen

• United States

  • The Secretary
  • Senator Abraham Ribicoff
  • Ambassador Stephen Low
  • Peter Tarnoff, Executive Secretary

The Secretary began by saying that he shared Dr. Owen’s concern about the need to move ahead quickly on Rhodesia. He favored progressing with deliberate speed as long as the necessary preparation was adequately done. It would be helpful for top British and American officials to sit down together and go over the details of Owen’s proposals² before the Foreign Secretary goes back to southern Africa. The Secretary said that he would be available for such consultations at any time.

In response to a question from Dr. Owen, the Secretary said that he would favor the Foreign Secretary going to southern Africa sometime in the latter part of July. Owen agreed, stating that HMG could not make any crucial decisions in the month of August and, therefore, had to act beforehand. He expressed his hope that it would be possible for him to travel to southern Africa during the week of July 18. Owen then explained that a serious problem exists on the future of law and order in Rhodesia. With respect to universal sufferage, there would be no problem with the Patriotic Front or the Front Line Presidents although such a provision, of course, leaves no safeguard to the whites. Owen would favor having the black nationalists agree to include 20 additional white and black members (10 of each) in the Zimbabwe legislative body in order to assure racial and tribal representation there. However, if the new Zimbabwe leaders reject this approach, Owen would not want to waste his leverage on this idea. He added that the most difficult problem to resolve might be the pension rights accorded by the previous Rhodesian governments.

The Secretary asked how such pensions would be paid, adding that there could be no U.S. funding for them. Graham explained that half the outlay would come from existing funds, and half would have to come from current revenues. He added that no U.S. contribution to this financing would be requested and explained that the nationalists do not want to accept these obligations for political reasons. Low interjected that he thought that a new Zimbabwe government would accept responsibility for the payment of the pensions. Owen suggested telling the new Zimbabwe government that, if the pensions are paid, it would obtain access to Rhodesian government assets valued at £250 million which are currently being held in British banks. Since the Zimbabwe Development Fund (ZDF) has now changed considerably from the original Kissinger model,³ Owen suggested using the fund in a way to reduce the chances of the Zimbabwe government reneging on its pension obligations. The total of the pension costs over a five-year period would be approximately £750 million, which is roughly equivalent to the amount proposed for the ZDF. Since the Zimbabwe government would need Western financial support during the difficult transition period, donors should insist on making any such assistance subject to acceptance by the new government of all the provisions of the new constitution. Although payment of pensions would not be spelled out specifically, this would be understood to be one of the obligations that the new government would assume.

The Secretary said that the new Zimbabwe government could not, in any case, draw freely from the ZDF. Owen replied that the Fund’s trustees should use normal criteria for any projects proposed by the government, but that funding would continue only if constitutional provisions were honored. Otherwise, the trustees would simply freeze disbursements.

Senator Ribicoff interjected his personal view that there would be some support among Southern representatives in the U.S. Congress for compensation of the Rhodesian whites. Mr. Vance pointed out that the ZDF is presently being considered in the House. It would only be endorsed in full if specific projects were described in some detail. Owen said that a judicious use of the ZDF would provide some confidence for the whites at least for a five-year period. Low pointed out that ZDF funds in their entirety should be available to finance development projects.

Owen then commented that much work still needs to be done on the package that he prepared for dealing with Rhodesia. Graham and Low would renew their consultations starting on July 6. He found the several Zimbabwe nationalists difficult to move once they have definite ideas on a subject, however unrealistic. Once whites and blacks agree on universal suffrage, however, much will be achieved. Owen predicted that the Patriotic Front would back his proposals for universal suffrage but might refuse to go along on the pension scheme. The nationalists might refuse to fund pensions for some white Rhodesians, although it might be possible for the U.K. to get these “undesirable elements” out beforehand and find a way to pay them off.

Turning to the position of the different nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, Mr. Vance mentioned recent reports that Mugabe was principally a front man for the guerillas “in the bush.” Nkomo was being supported by the Soviets, and there was a good chance for a split between these two. The Secretary said that he hoped that the nationalists would be able to present a common front in dealings with the Salisbury regime. Owen said that he would do his best to get the nationalists to agree on the package he would be proposing. He would hope to get the contributors to the ZDF on board as well. Owen would try to present a clear and straightforward proposal that would be acceptable to the nationalists, although they might have problems accepting the obligations which the previous Rhodesian governments had accepted. Low pointed out that the Front Line Presidents had all accepted such obligations in their own constitutions and could be expected to encourage the independent Zimbabwe government to do likewise.

The Secretary said that Foreign Minister Botha had told him earlier in the week⁴ that it was necessary for the US and the UK to draft a constitution and then “ram it down the throats” of all concerned. Owen responded by saying that he anticipated real difficulties in the transition period. It was absolutely necessary to maintain law and order in order to satisfy the “sensible white moderates” whose allegiances could be funnelled off from Smith. These moderates would ask, “How can a free election take place with guerilla warfare continuing?” After elections, the new Zimbabwe government will be responsible for internal security. But during the caretaker period, Owen asked, can the guerillas be convinced to respect the truce? Time is of the essence, Owen added, and then he went on to explain the need for a peacekeeping force in Zimbabwe. Stressing that he did not have HMG authority for his proposals, Owen said that such a peacekeeping force could unfortunately not be from the UN. The Secretary said that the Soviets would veto any UN force and Low added that most Africans would oppose it as well. Owen said that either all UK or Commonwealth forces were conceivable but that an all British force would not be politically acceptable in the UK. It would be possible, with luck, to get a Commonwealth force established. Some Commonwealth governments are reluctant to participate and it would be difficult for the UK to press them because the US could not be part of such an operation. Owen then explained that a Commonwealth force would not come into existence without agreement on the constitution, a transition period, and acceptance by the Rhodesian Front. On the first day of the transition, the British Internal Commissioner, “who would constitute the area’s administrative authority” would have the Commonwealth force at his disposition. The force would have to remain in Rhodesia for 3–6 months, during the transition period, and its main mission would be to supervise free elections.

In response to a question from the Secretary, Owen explained that the Patriotic Front forces would remain alongside any Commonwealth forces. The Rhodesian forces, however, would be disbanded, although individual members would be invited to sign up with a new Zimbabwe Defense Force. Owen said that he would expect the Front Line Presidents to support such a scenario although he did not know whether Muzorewa and Sithole would agree to it. Nkomo would also be reluctant although he might be pressured to agree. The new Zimbabwe Defense Force would have as a major task to integrate the guerilla elements, while most of the white officers who currently lead the Rhodesian forces would have to be removed and be paid off by the British during the transition period. Within 6 months, an indigenous force would have to be formed that will be acceptable to a new government and incorporate many ex-guerillas. Some of the officers in the Commonwealth force might be persuaded to stay on after the transition period to officer the Zimbabwe Defense Force.

Owen then explained that the new government in Zimbabwe would probably want to retain Rhodesia’s airforce, (almost all [of] which is white), for prestige reasons. It might be possible to get New Zealand or even Nigerian or Kenyan officers to serve as the leaders of the 1200-man airforce. On the ground, Owen said, he would conceive of 3 batalions of 6–700 men each, one Gurkha, one UK, and one Commonwealth. The Nigerian attitude about participation is unsure at this point although Lagos could afford to do so. Ghana is interested in providing a batalion but could not pay for it. Kenya has its own security problems. India might be willing to participate. The Canadians and Australians are hesitant about making any commitments—they prefer to wait-and-see, fearing that their force might get “sucked in,” since no one can guarantee that the guerilla war would stop completely during the transition period. Hopefully the Front Line Presidents would agree to moderate the guerillas. Much depends on Nkomo’s views of his own chances in the electoral battle. If Sithole heads up the ANC, he can bring pressure to bear on Nkomo.

Owen then asked what “psychological support” could be expected from the United States for the Commonwealth force. If Ghana needed financial help or if transportation or logistical support were necessary, would the U.S. be able to provide some concrete aid, he asked. The Secretary said that there was a precedent for supplying both logistical support and air transportation for international peacekeeping forces. He would have to look at whether supplemental funding would be necessary for such support or whether it would be possible to pay for it in another way. The Secretary stressed that he could make no promises on this, but he would not rule out some U.S. support for the operation.

Senator Ribicoff said that his first impression was that Owen had made a rational and fair proposal. If the Commonwealth force was designed to stop bloodshed between whites and blacks, he had the feeling that Congress would go along if the President convoked the Democratic and Republican leadership to discuss the issue. Protecting white lives and pension rights would be important to the Southern members of Congress in particular. The “symbolism” of such an action would be favorable.

Owen said that he would be in close touch with the Secretary on this. He needed, by July 1 if possible, an indication of the United States’ attitude on providing logistical support. The more assistance the U.S. provides, the less fearful the Rhodesian whites will be since they are now thinking of a Vietnam-type fight in the jungles in order to preserve their rights and property. Owen underlined that he would not commit a Commonwealth force that would have to fight white Rhodesians. The Secretary then added that participation by Australia and New Zealand would have a favorable political impact in the U.S., where public opinion is used to being on the same side with these countries as well, of course, as with the U.K. Owen said that the Australians and New Zealanders might provide “a couple of majors,” but it would be hard to mix too many elements without running into command problems. The Indians might be especially helpful, and the Commonwealth force was feasible provided that agreement was also reached on the constitution and the ZDF. Owen explained that the Patriotic Front does not want him to come to southern Africa with a previously negotiated package, because once proposals are formally on the table, they are difficult to modify. The British package must also appeal to the South African government, Southern sentiment in the U.S., the U.S. Congress and the Tories, not to mention the French and the Germans whom Owen said would probably be willing to go along.

Graham suggested that the $1.2 billion originally envisaged for the ZDF might be more than the new country could absorb, and that it was conceivable to think of a smaller sum for the fund. Owen replied that it was dangerous to think of a reduction now given the need for leverage on the pension issue. The Secretary expressed his doubts about the transferability of ZDF monies to the pension account. He added that it was difficult enough as is to keep the ZDF alive with Congressman Mahon. Senator Ribicoff added that his sense of the Senate as a whole was that the body was very uneasy over the prospect of a slaughter of the whites in Rhodesia. Knowing the Senate, Ribicoff said that Owen’s attempt to protect all Rhodesians would be appealing. He urged the Administration to not concentrate exclusively on the African Subcommittee on these issues but to involve the President, the Democratic and Republican leadership, and to try to encourage “middlemen” to work on Congressional attitudes.

Owen then suggested that each contributor to the ZDF could choose whether to earmark funds for pension guarantees or not. However, if there was to be a renegotiation on the sums to be provided and the way disbursements would take place, this would open the ZDF to serious challenge. Graham mentioned that the ZDF might underwrite the foreign exchange costs involved in guaranteeing the pensions and thereby generate counterpart funds within Zimbabwe which could be spent on local projects. Owen added that HMG now has two cabinet-level committees working on the law and order and pension questions. The Foreign Secretary himself is working not only on the contents of the Zimbabwe package but on how to present it to the Cabinet and the British public. Turning to the Mozambique situation and the related debate in the UN, Owen said that he was very reluctant to apply sanctions against South Africa because of his concern that this would cause the SAG to turn down his Zimbabwe package. Owen then asked whether he should informally present his package to the SAG before discussing it with the Africans and Western countries.

The Secretary said that after his talk earlier that week with Botha, he believes that something has changed and that the SAG really wants to disentangle itself from the Rhodesian problem. The Secretary added that if he were Vorster, the Zimbabwe package would be more convincing if the other governments concerned were already on board. However, there might be some virtue in giving Botha an indication of the way Owen is thinking of proceeding. Graham suggested that the British Ambassador in South Africa inform Fourie on what is being considered with respect to the constitution and law and order problems, emphasizing the consultative nature of the discussion with SAG.

The Secretary said that he would leave to Owen the decision on whether to talk to Botha now or later, adding that after the British package was put together he would want to put it to the President and probably to the Congressional leadership. Owen said that he needs more of his own cabinet colleagues on board before proceeding further with the package and the Secretary expressed understanding for this dilemma. Owen said that governmental and public opinion in the UK had to be softened. He had told the Commonwealth Conference that HMG was going for universal sufferage. He said that there was a tendency for the Rhodesian and South African governments to be surprised at the evolution of British policy on this issue. Although Owen has begun to talk about the Commonwealth force idea with some governments that might contribute, he asked that US officials not comment publicly on the idea at this stage.

Low said that the most difficult question to resolve is the Patriotic Front’s role in guaranteeing law and order during the transitional caretaker period. Owen responded with the hope that the Patriotic Front soldiers could be gradually integrated into a Commonwealth force. It was absolutely necessary to do something for the young guerillas who want to stay in the army. At the recent Commonwealth conference the more reasonable leaders concentrated on the need for a steady transfer of power to the guerilla forces. Nkomo himself was reluctant to discuss the constitution without some talk about how the transfer of power would take place. Owen thought that it might be appropriate to use the term “crusaders” rather than “guerillas.” He added that the British resident commissioner would oversee the integration of the nationalist forces which are presently fighting for independence and would rightly demand a leading role in the new Zimbabwe Army. All suitable candidates from both the guerilla and Rhodesian defense forces should be considered for membership in the new Zimbabwe Defense Force. The Front Line Presidents would only accept a final package that acknowledged the Patriotic Front’s primacy in the armed struggle.

The Secretary said that the US would like to have HMG’s analysis of the military situation that a Commonwealth force would have to face in Zimbabwe, and that a British team might come from London to Washington for this purpose. Owen responded affirmatively, noting that he was still working on the basic structure of his initiative. A starting point was the need to convince the military that it would not be confronting a guerilla situation in Zimbabwe. He again asked to have by July 1 a preliminary reaction from the Secretary as to what kind of support the US might be able to give to an eventual Commonwealth force.

Namibia

Raising Namibia, the Secretary said that the Western governments should all weigh in with the SAG to insist on receiving the name of the proposed administrator of the territory. He expressed concern that Waldheim might have problems with the Security Council on this issue and the U.S. and U.K. need to make clear to Botha that Waldheim needs his help in order to head off Security Council involvement. Botha told the Secretary that the SAG will withdraw all its forces at independence when the responsibility for peacekeeping will lie with the UN. The unanswered question has to do with who polices the territory during the interim period. The Secretary said that he told Botha that a thin-out of South African forces during this transition period would be welcome, particularly if the UN peacekeeping force [is] already in place. Botha expressed understanding for the Secretary’s point, did not specifically turn it down, and said that the SAG was also concerned about working out compensation for turning over the railroads, hospitals and other installations in Namibia. The Secretary added that it was necessary for the Western powers plus Waldheim to keep in close contact on developments in Namibia. Owen responded that the five Western countries, individually or together, should reiterate to the SAG the need for an independent legal figure to be named administrator and that South African forces should be reduced during the transition period. The only security threat to Namibia comes from its border with Angola and the UN peackeeping force could well be stationed along this frontier. There would be no SWAPO endorsement of the overall plan unless immediate reductions in South African forces were part of it. In response to the Secretary’s comment that Botha had remarked that the SAG would push for early election to the assembly by the end of the year, Owen said that speed was of the essence since he did not want the Namibian settlement to conflict with the timetable being negotiated with respect to Rhodesia.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia and Namibia.]

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on July 20 by Tarnoff and approved on August 4 by Jacklyn A. Cahill (S). The meeting took place in the OECD Building. Vance was in Paris to attend the OECD Ministerial meeting.
2. Reference is presumably to Owen’s brief (see Document 146).
3. For the Kissinger model, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 234.
4. Vance and Botha met on June 21. For Vance’s report to Carter, see Document 281.