161. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter 1
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]
Supporting a Commonwealth Force for Rhodesia. As you remember, David Owen approached Cy last week in Paris on the possibility of our providing assistance to a Commonwealth force in Rhodesia.2 He argued that US support would give a vital “psychological boost” to the operation, an assessment we share. Since Owen will soon be discussing the proposal with his Cabinet colleagues, he asked us to convey our informal reaction by the end of this week.
It was understood with Owen that no American forces would be directly involved in peace keeping activities within Rhodesia. Furthermore, the Commonwealth force would be sent only if agreement were reached on the larger constitutional issues, including a peaceful transition to majority rule, and there were sufficient guarantees that guerilla warfare within Rhodesia would cease. With these conditions in mind, we have looked into the question of possible support for a Commonwealth force and have come up with the following initial findings:
1. Legal Considerations:
Under the above assumptions, the War Powers Act and its Congressional consultation requirements do not apply. However, given the sensitivity of such an initiative, early consultations with Congress would be required to facilitate endorsement (or, at a minimum, diminish opposition) to our backing for the peacekeeping operation.3
2. Transportation:
The Department of Defense could use U.S. Air Force aircraft to lift one or two battalions of peacekeeping troops of other nations to Rhodesia and provide logistical transport thereafter. Such support could be approved by you as Commander-in-Chief. The U.S. Air Force would expect to be compensated for operational costs from other budgets. [Page 457] Funds could come from the Secretary of Defense’s contingency fund and the Presidential contingency fund.4
3. Communications Support:
Since Commonwealth forces would be involved, we assume that the British would be in the best position to provide communications support for the various units. This would make sense in terms of equipment compatibility and standard operating procedure. For us to supply equipment would almost inevitably require American operators, which is ruled out by our understanding with Owen on U.S. involvement.5
4. Financial Support:
While transportation support could be supplied, underwriting the upkeep of the force would be considerably more difficult for us. Any substantial expenditure of funds would probably require supplemental funding. We are precluded by law from paying foreign troops, but the Security Supporting Assistance Program might be able to finance rations and resupply, assuming certain statutory requirements can be met.
If you agree, Cy will relay our preliminary reactions to Owen.6 He plans to stress that we would like the British military’s evaluation of the mission of such a Commonwealth force before making commitments to support it. In addition, he will repeat to Owen that we would plan to consult extensively with the U.S. Congress and our own Department of Defense before extending a firm commitment of any kind.7
- Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 6/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “To Cy.”↩
- In telegram 7016 from the Secretary’s aircraft, June 24, Vance reported on the meeting with Owen during which he asked “whether the US could give some forms of support for a 2000-man Commonwealth force to be stationed in Zimbabwe for the 3 to 6 month transition period.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2510) See also Document 160.↩
- Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “agree.”↩
- Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “ok.”↩
- Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “ok.”↩
- In telegram 153440 to London, July 1, the Department asked the Embassy to deliver a message to Owen from Vance. Vance wrote: “We believe it will be possible for us to assist in transportation and possibly logistical support. We will have to look at the matter more precisely when we know the nature and extent of the requirements.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2524)↩
- Carter wrote below this paragraph: “My preference would be to provide transportation for the forces, and then not a sustained involvement. Let the Commonwealth countries provide logistical support. I’m not adamant on this. J.C.”↩