281. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- My Meeting with South African Foreign Minister Botha
I met the South African Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha on Tuesday afternoon, June 21. At Botha’s request we met alone, for one and one-half hours.
Despite the length of the meeting and Botha’s stated desire for privacy, the meeting produced nothing new. On both Namibia and Rhodesia Botha adhered to known positions. In both instances he stressed the need for rapid settlements. Perhaps the most interesting of Botha’s points was his flat assertion that the South African Government would not tell Rhodesia to stop cross border raids when Rhodesia believed them necessary for its own protection. One novel feature of Botha’s presentation was an apocalyptic appraisal of the deteriorating ecological situation in Africa. He sees a process of deterioration in health, environmental and agricultural conditions which parallels what he sees occurring in the political realm.
The following are more specific points on each subject area.
Namibia. Mr. Botha emphasized the need for speed in working out an agreement on Namibia. I cautioned that excessive speed could render the elections meaningless. The Foreign Minister thought that six months would be sufficient time to prepare for an election. Our exchange on this point ended inconclusively.
I told Botha that we found the South African Government’s agreement to appoint a civilian administrator to be a constructive move. I emphasized the need for the appointment of someone with a reputation for impartiality. Botha said they believed that a judge would be the type of person best suited for this role and that they previously had a particular individual in mind. Unfortunately, Botha said, his government had decided upon reflection that the person in question might be tainted in the eyes of some by virtue of his having represented the South African Government at the International Court of Justice proceedings concerning Southwest Africa.2
[Page 858]On the subject of a United Nations special representative for Namibia, I sought Botha’s opinion of Mr. Ahtissari, now the UN Commissioner for Namibia.3 Botha replied that his government had some reservations about Ahtissari but they are not ruling him out. Botha cited as troublesome Ahtissari’s chairmanship of the Namibia Commission. I urged Botha to discuss this question with Secretary General Waldheim.
I next raised the question of the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia. Botha said that the South Africans are willing to withdraw their forces in accordance with a timetable to be set by the new government to be elected. If that government wished South African forces to withdraw immediately (i.e., immediately after the second election), this would be done. In reply to my inquiry about the possibility of progressive withdrawals prior to that time, Botha replied that the first step would be the appointment of an administrator. When I pointed out that this was not meaningful in terms of a military withdrawal, Botha agreed that the matter should be discussed further. He seemed to be willing to go no further than saying that the troops would be withdrawn after the new government was in place.
Several items of a transitional nature were raised by Botha such as how the South Africans would ultimately be indemnified by the future Namibian Government for railroads and other permanent installations. The future of Walvis Bay was discussed but in an inconclusive manner.
Overall, Botha’s position on Namibia was that if the South Africans could get a moderate government in Namibia, they would gladly leave as soon as possible.
Rhodesia. I inquired of Botha what Prime Minister Ian Smith had told him in their recent meeting. Botha replied that after having talked with Smith and his Cabinet for two hours, he is convinced that Smith has made his decision. According to Botha, Smith is prepared to accept black majority rule within the agreed time frame. While some Ministers may feel otherwise, Smith is prepared to follow through.
As on Namibia, Botha felt that a speedy resolution of the Rhodesian situation is essential. He believes that existing divisions among the Rhodesian nationalist parties would be further exacerbated by the passage of time. In this connection Botha noted that Mugabe has already been replaced by Tongagara as the most significant figure among the black Rhodesian military leaders. He added that in his view the seriousness of tribal divisions among the nationalists is not fully appreciated [Page 859] by the United States and tribalism is sure to complicate any eventual settlement.
Botha suggested that the U.S. should send someone to talk to Smith.4 He believes that the universal franchise is not an insurmountable obstacle and that Smith, despite his public position, is prepared to give in on this issue.
I told Botha that the cross border raids from Rhodesia must stop and pointed to South Africa’s potential role in this connection. Botha responded that although the South African Government had told Smith to end the last large raid and will continue to counsel restraint, his government is not prepared to tell Rhodesia that it cannot undertake cross border operations when Rhodesia believes these to be necessary for its own protection.
Botha said that it was apparent from the most recent Rhodesian attack on Mozambique that the Rhodesians could have gone all the way to Maputo had they chosen to do so. There is no guarantee, Botha said, that they will not move again, or that they may choose to carry their attack as far as Maputo. Botha argued that for this reason it is important to get a settlement quickly.
South Africa. The majority of our meeting was devoted to a discussion of South Africa’s internal policies. Botha made an impassioned speech charging that American endorsement of “one man one vote” was a “knife in the back” of the South African Government. I stressed that the U.S. cannot accept a continuation of discrimination by the South African Government or failure on the part of the South African Government to deal in time with full political participation. Needless to say discussion of this subject was wholly without agreement of any kind.
(At one point in our conversation Mr. Botha handed me a letter from Prime Minister Vorster to you concerning Namibia. In reading it I noticed on the second page of the letter an undertaking on Vorster’s part to keep “The United States Representative closely informed.” When I questioned the terminology, expressing doubt that the Prime Minister had meant to say the “United States,” Mr. Botha acknowledged that it should have read “United Nations.” He then took the letter back to be corrected. It has now been sent to you separately).5
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 7–8/77. Secret; Nodis. Carter initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.↩
- Not further identified. Reference is presumably to D.P. deVilliers, a member of the South African bar and leader of the South African legal team at The Hague.↩
- Reference is to Marti Ahtisaari, a Finnish diplomat who served as UN Commissioner for Namibia from 1977 until 1981.↩
- Carter underlined this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin next to it: “Zbig & Cy—What do you think?”↩
- Not found.↩