Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

131. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, January 25, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

3. Rhodesia: In the wake of Ian Smith’s January 24 statement,² we have undertaken an urgent review of what we can do to salvage the Rhodesian negotiations. We told the press today that despite Smith’s rejection, we support British proposals for a negotiated settlement.³ As a result of our encouragement, the British appeared in somewhat better spirits today, although our Embassy in London reports they are still uncertain about what can be done. In Parliament, Secretary of State Crosland voiced disappointment but stated that the situation is still under review. He has also instructed Geneva Conference Chairman Richard to stay in Africa in order to talk to the South Africans and the Rhodesian Nationalists before returning to London this weekend.⁴

South African Ambassador Botha called on me this evening to convey the South Africans’ surprise at the Smith decision after Pretoria had told the Rhodesians not to reject the Richard proposals out of hand.⁵ I then asked Botha to have his government convey to Smith a message along the lines of the attached talking points. I stressed the point that an outright rejection of the British proposals by Smith would face stiff US opposition including a determined effort to review the sanctions currently in force with a view toward closing any loopholes. When Botha asked me whether your administration would encourage Congressional repeal of the Byrd Amendment⁶ even if Smith showed greater flexibility on a settlement, I told him frankly that we would have to move ahead with repeal in any case, adding that Smith has shown absolutely no willingness to move forward.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

Attachment

Talking Points for Meeting Between Secretary of State Vance and the South African Ambassador (Botha)⁷

Washington, undated

—President Carter has asked me to convey through you to your Prime Minister the assurance that the United States will continue its search for peaceful solutions to the problems of southern Africa.

—We have given the Front Line Presidents and other African leaders similar assurances.

—Ian Smith’s January 24 speech greatly complicates the Rhodesian negotiation. His rejection of the British proposal is contrary to what we understand he planned. An internal solution to the Rhodesian problem is not realistic, and as we have told Smith it will receive no American support.

—We are trying to keep the door to negotiations open and have said publicly the British proposals are a basis for continued talks. Smith must realize no settlement can be based on the five points alone. His statement that he is willing to negotiate the original five points with flexibility is no help at all.

—Smith has given the Africans an opportunity to reject further negotiations. If a deadlock is reached, he must be aware that he will be faced with American opposition.

—We will move to repeal the Byrd Amendment and will review our policy of sanctions with a view to closing any existing loopholes.

—Until an interim government is formed Rhodesia cannot count on American interest or sympathy, nor will it emerge from its current state of isolation.

—We are prepared to continue our search for a negotiated settlement and are discussing what can be done with the British. We need to have your government’s views on what steps can be taken to correct the present situation and expect to stay in close consultations with you.

—With respect to Namibia, we have told the Front Line Presidents, the Nigerians, and other African leaders that we remain committed to Namibian independence and a negotiated settlement which will achieve this objective. They know that our good offices remain open. We are currently reviewing what steps will move a settlement along. We trust that your government will continue to refrain from taking any decisions that might foreclose the possibility of an internationally acceptable settlement.

—Your government may wish to communicate the gist of my remarks on Rhodesia to Salisbury.

—We have maintained useful communications to your government through you. We wish to continue to use your good offices and will rely on Assistant Secretary Schaufele’s meeting with you regularly to make sure that our communications remain as effective in the future as they have been in the past.⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77. Secret. A stamped notation reads: “The President has seen.” Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “cc Vance.”
2. In a January 24 speech Smith rejected the British settlement proposals claiming they were unacceptable as a basis for further negotiation in Geneva, and called for an internal settlement which would exclude Nationalist leaders involved in the armed struggle. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28309) The British proposals are in Tab 1 to Document 264.
3. During the Department of State’s Daily Briefing on January 25, Frederick Brown said that the United States regarded the British proposals as “an acceptable basis for negotiation.” (New York Times, January 26, 1977, p. 3)
4. In telegram 1357 from London, January 25, the Embassy reported on the status of the Rhodesian negotiations. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77)
5. See Document 260.
6. The Byrd Amendment to the Military Procurement Act (1971), allowed for the importation of Rhodesian chrome in violation of UN sanctions. Carter wrote in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph: “We should move on this.”
7. Secret.
8. Carter wrote next to this paragraph: “ok J.”