Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

157. Memorandum From Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Schaufele) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 17, 1977

SUBJECT

• Status Report: Rhodesian Sanctions

The following is a status report on actions taken or contemplated to increase further the pressure upon the Smith regime through a more stringent enforcement of sanctions or an expansion of them. This message is in response to inquiries contained in your memorandum of April 27.² We have discussed in general terms with the British closer U.S.–U.K. bilateral cooperation on sanctions enforcement, and we will want to keep in close contact with them on the issues referred to below.

1. Closure of the Rhodesian Information Office

Our agreed upon strategy to force the closure of the Rhodesian Information Office as an official agency of the Smith regime is predicated upon the passage by the UN Security Council of a resolution, which we and the British formulated, expanding sanctions to operate against the regime’s overseas offices.³

The resolution, originally expected to be passed in March, has been delayed by the insistence of many African states, actively supported by the Soviets, on an amendment directing all UN member states to apply against Rhodesia the full range of sanctions available under Article 41, Chapter VII of the UN Charter. If applied, total sanctions would cut off all forms of contact, communication, travel or commerce with Rhodesia, virtually denying its existence. We have traditionally opposed such a complete cut-off as contrary to the free flow of ideas and as a poor precedent for the UN.

The resolution is presently scheduled to come before the Security Council on May 26. If the Russians and radical Africans successfully incorporate an amendment demanding unlimited sanctions, we will have to consider joining the UK and France in a veto. An acceptable compromise may still be possible if the Africans can be convinced that a veto could stiffen the resistance of the Salisbury regime.

However, if no compromise can be reached we will have to determine whether to continue with the current strategy of UN action preceding a USG move against the Rhodesian Information Office or to develop a new tactic for closing that office.

2. Importation of Chrome

Because of numerous and strenuous complaints from many of our key trading partners that the certification requirements originally issued by Treasury had prevented nearly all imports of chrome-bearing metals, Treasury has agreed that it will accept, until June 19, blanket assurances from foreign firms or their governments that their exports do not contain Rhodesian chrome. This will give us another month to work out certification procedures acceptable to Treasury and to our trading partners.

If we are to fulfill our moral commitment and legal obligation to prevent Rhodesian chrome from entering the United States, we shall need the cooperation of those countries which supply us products, particularly specialty steels, which contain chrome in its various forms. To do this, we shall have to avoid even the appearance of using our import controls as devices to restrict trade and protect U.S. steel producers. This is a matter of considerable sensitivity to many of our trading partners, since we have imposed import quotas on specialty steel products. In negotiating with other countries procedures to be followed for certifying that our steel imports do not contain Rhodesian chrome, we must pay particular attention to avoid requiring measures that are more rigorous than necessary or that impose American methods on countries whose own methods are adequate for our purposes. We must also maintain flexibility in dealing with individual problems such as those of suppliers who cannot certify that their products do not contain Rhodesian chrome because they bought semi-finished materials from the United States at a time when we did not prohibit the importation of chrome from Rhodesia. If we pay due attention to these matters, we should be able to find ways of keeping out Rhodesian chrome while maintaining good trade relations with our major commercial partners.

3. Sanctions and Bilateral Diplomacy

After discussing the matter with the British Government, the State Department instructed our embassies in most of the industrialized western countries, as well as Japan, to approach their host governments to note that with the repeal of the Byrd Amendment the U.S. is now in full compliance with its international obligations in relation to Rhodesian sanctions. The Embassies were also instructed to state that we are willing, in the spirit of co-operation, to discuss methods of improving the enforcement of existing sanctions with foreign governments. The responses were generally polite and cooperative in tone. Most countries made a point of noting their full compliance with sanctions (not necessarily an accurate representation of the truth) and expressed willingness to engage in further conversations. Some countries used the occasion of the demarche to express concern over the Treasury certification procedures referred to above. In any event, those approached should now understand that we view sanctions as a legitimate topic of bilateral discussion and the stage has been set for further consultations. In this, as in other activities relating to the sanctions enforcement, we must maintain close contact with the British before taking further steps.

4. Service of U.S. Citizens In Rhodesian Armed Forces

As the Report of the Interagency Group indicated, it is a criminal offense under current U.S. law for any U.S. citizen to enlist in the U.S. for service in the Rhodesian armed forces, or for any person to recruit a U.S. citizen in the U.S. for such service. However, U.S. law does not prohibit American citizens from serving in the Rhodesian armed forces if they enlist outside the U.S., thus allowing several hundred U.S. citizens to fight for the Smith regime without threat of U.S. punitive action.

To deal with this problem, the Report of the Interagency Group recommended that action be taken within the UN Sanctions Committee in the form of a proposed resolution to be adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such a resolution would require States to take appropriate measures to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territories do not enlist for service in the Rhodesian armed forces or recruit others for such service. In addition to applying present U.S. law against enlistments in the U.S., the U.S. Government would enforce such a resolution under the authority of Section 5 of the UN Participation Act (which authorizes the President to enforce Security Council sanctions) by prohibiting U.S. citizens from accepting any remuneration or financial support while serving in the Rhodesian armed forces.

The U.S. Mission to the UN has been instructed to consult with the UK Mission in New York on the desirability and feasibility of pursuing such a proposal in the Sanctions Committee. If these consultations suggest that an initiative along these lines would be fruitful, we will proceed with it, hopefully in conjunction with the UK and in cooperation with other western members of the Sanctions Committee.

It is possible that other actions will be required by U.S. authorities to deal effectively with the problem of the service of U.S. citizens in the Rhodesian armed forces. We understand that the Justice Department has recently been investigating allegations that U.S. laws have been violated by alleged activities of persons in the United States to facilitate such enlistments. We intend to request Justice to provide a report on the results of those investigations, so as to provide a basis for interagency consideration of possible additional U.S. Government actions to deal with this problem.

5. U.S. Corporate Subsidiaries and Sanctions Policy

Under current U.S. policy existing Treasury and Commerce regulations restricting trade with Rhodesia do not apply to foreign U.S. corporate subsidiaries. A serious source of possible violations is the approximately 350 US subsidiaries located in South Africa, but violations by US owned companies in other countries could occur.

A decision to require foreign U.S. subsidiaries to respect the Rhodesian boycott would have political value, but implementation would not be without problems and potential costs. Several questions should be resolved before such a decision is made.

—Will U.S. regulation of foreign subsidiaries enhance the effectiveness of the Rhodesian boycott?

A U.S. initiative might spur some countries to apply sanctions more rigorously. In South Africa, it could force companies into a position of breaking either U.S. or South African law relating to the boycott.

—Can regulations be effectively enforced?

Effective enforcement might be possible for subsidiary exports directly to Rhodesia. However, for re-exports by non-American third parties, violations would be almost impossible to detect or prevent unless other nations enforce sanctions more effectively.

—Would unenforceable regulations have any value?

While significant political and deterrent value could exist initially, both of these could be undermined if regulations were not enforceable.

—Will regulation of foreign U.S. subsidiaries be at odds with other U.S. policies?

Would the proposed action be counter to our policy concerning the Arab boycott, and consistent with the loosening of trade restrictions affecting Cuba?

A State Department paper on this topic will be prepared by May 23.

An Interagency paper will be prepared by June 1.

6. Certification of U.S. Exports to South Africa to Discourage Re-export to Rhodesia

The Interagency group recommended discussions with the British on a proposed UN expansion of sanctions to compel member states to take steps to discourage re-export of their goods from South Africa to Rhodesia. The issue is whether the political benefits from tighter Commerce controls even before comparable controls are put into effect by other UN members will compensate for the increased paperwork burden that will be placed on U.S. exporters.

We would implement the proposed UN resolution by requiring that special destination control notices be placed on invoices and bills of lading on all shipments to South Africa stating that re-export to Southern Rhodesia is prohibited. Existing Commerce regulations require such notices only for certain items of strategic significance, export of which to South Africa is not otherwise prohibited. Current regulations governing these goods prohibit re-export to any country contrary to U.S. Government regulations, which would include Rhodesia. The Commerce position is that the proposed requirement applied to all goods would impose an administrative burden on U.S. exporters that could not be justified unless all other UN members agreed to the same requirement. State believes that the initiation of such restrictions even before the UN resolution is put into effect would demonstrate to the South African Government that we are concerned about diversion of U.S. goods to Southern Rhodesia.

State and Commerce will endeavor to reach an agreed interagency position by June 1.

7. Promotion of Tourism to Rhodesia

As the Report of the Interagency Group noted, the Treasury Department has interpreted its current Rhodesian sanctions regulations to allow U.S. travel agents to promote and assist travel to Rhodesia by U.S. tourists. Treasury believes that such activity by U.S. travel agents is simply incidental to the right of U.S. citizens to travel to Rhodesia. The State Department, however, believes that commercial operations in the U.S. to promote such tourism violate the letter and spirit of the UN sanctions program, and should be viewed as prohibited under the present Executive Order.

This interagency difference of opinion has not yet been resolved. It appears that an options paper will be required to resolve it. State will draft such a paper by May 23, and request interagency clearance and recommendations by June 1.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 88, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 1–6/77. Secret.
2. See footnote 2, Document 149.
3. Reference is to UNSC Resolution 409, proposed by 15 powers and adopted unanimously without a vote on May 27. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, pp. 180–181)