150. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 4002. For Tarnoff and Lake. Subject: Secretary’s Consultations on Southern Africa.
UK Participants:
Foreign Secretary David Owen
Minister of State Ted Rowlands
Permanent Under Secretary Michael Palliser
Deputy Under Secretary John Graham
Assistant Under Secretary Philip Mansfield
FCO Africa Adviser Denis Grennan
Private Secretary Ewen Fergusson
Rhodesia Department Head Patrick Laver
Central Africa Department Head Martin Reid
Press Adviser Hamilton Whyte
US Participants:
The Secretary
Press Spokesman Hodding Carter
Political Counselor William Woessner
First Secretary Raymond Seitz
Date: May 6, 1977; The Foreign Office
1. Foreign Secretary Owen opened the discussion of Rhodesia with a comment that he is not pressing for a decision on an announcement of next steps nor for a decision to convene a conference. He said that we should not totally commit ourselves to a formal conference until there appears to be more assurance of eventual success. Nevertheless, the momentum of the initiative must be maintained. Owen then explained the failure to arrange a meeting with Joshua Nkomo for that morning. Attributing Nkomo’s demand that Owen come to his hotel as a manifestation of Nkomo’s insecurity, both physical and political, Owen said that we can not be seen to be manipulated by the Patriotic Front.
2. Owen expressed his belief that the US and UK should go ahead jointly with bilateral consultations and in the process downgrade the [Page 407] issue of American participation at a conference. He pointed out that discussions cannot be confined to constitutional questions but would also need to address the problems of the transition and of post-independence stability. He said he understood the US reluctance to negotiate the details of a constitution which was essentially a British legal Parliamentary exercise. At the same time, Owen said, the UK will need American help on the basic structure of a constitution, such as the franchise and possible constitutional safeguards for the white community. Owen said that while we must become accustomed to differing public and private positions by the Patriotic Front, the US and UK must remain in harmony. He mentioned the necessity that we “keep in line” in Maputo and that the 5 Western Powers should act in concert at least on the question of Namibia.2
3. The Secretary complimented Owen for his outstanding trip through Southern Africa.3 He said that the US was prepared to enter into a phase of intensive bilateral joint consultations. We will undertake these discussions either together or individually depending on the wishes of each party. The Secretary welcomed Owen’s remark that it was not necessary for the United States to involve itself in the details of a constitution but expressed our willingness to support the British on matters of constitutional principle. He informed the Foreign Secretary that we are prepared to assign a senior diplomat to the proposed Consultative Group. He further suggested that the US and UK promptly inform the Front Line Presidents and the Nationalists of our decision. We would then follow with a simultaneous public announcement not later than Wednesday, May 11.
4. Owen asked whether we would be prepared to join the group on its visits to Salisbury. The Secretary replied affirmatively so long as the headquarters remained outside Rhodesia.
5. The Secretary said he would inform Joshua Nkomo of our decision during his meeting with the ZAPU leader later in the afternoon.4 He said our Embassies will be asked as soon as possible, perhaps tonight, to also inform the Front Line Presidents and the Nationalists. Owen agreed that we should move quickly to give advance notice to the interested parties. He said he would plan to announce our decision in Parliament on Wednesday, May 11, and that John Graham, heading [Page 408] the group, is prepared to depart for Africa on May 16. The Secretary agreed and suggested that in the interim we exchange views on specific negotiating tactics.
6. Ted Rowlands urged that the Secretary attempt to convince Nkomo that the current initiative was “in deadly earnest”. He said that Nkomo will likely complain to the Secretary that constitutional consultations are just another paper exercise. Owen echoed Rowlands’ suggestion. He said that the Nationalist leaders had not yet absorbed the importance of the change in administration in the United States. “They still talk about the CIA and Allende”, he went on. “I keep telling them that you’re more radical than we are.” Owen emphasized that the US and the UK must stick together throughout what is bound to be a controversial process. He said the joint approach had had a strong impact inside Rhodesia, for it underscored the serious nature of the venture. He indicated that the political mood among the whites is already changing, and he referred to a letter he received recently from the President of the Rhodesia Farmers’ Union which revealed a real desire to improve racial relations. Owen said it is difficult to assess Ian Smith but that he is inclined to believe that Smith has undergone a measure of change. “Smith is still capable of falling back; he always has his life lines out. But I think he can be brought along in the momentum and that he understands the South Africans won’t accept any deviousness.”
7. The Secretary explained the purpose of the Vice President’s forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Vorster.5 He said that the Vice President will inform Vorster that the United States will be looking closely at South African efforts to resolve the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia. But he will also let Vorster know that unless there is real change within South African society, relations between our two countries cannot help but be affected. Owen said that he was deeply pessimistic about internal change in South Africa and the Secretary added Pik Botha’s comment that the South Africans “won’t commit suicide”. Owen described Vorster as “old-worldy. He doesn’t think the Africans are inferior, just different. He wants to talk about the domestic situation in South Africa but he builds his conversation on a false premise and one cannot address the premise. It will be very difficult.” Owen added that he agreed with the Mondale Mission and said that such efforts will necessarily have a cumulative effect on South Africans. He added, however, that it is important that black governments understand that evolution within South Africa will take time. [Page 409] The pace of change there will be very different from what can be expected in Rhodesia and Namibia.
8. In response to the Secretary’s inquiry about Angolan President Neto, Owen said that he had left Luanda with a better impression than he had expected. Neto had not denied his association and limited support for the Katangans, but he had strongly rejected any suggestion that he masterminded the incursions into Shaba. He said that Neto seemed obsessed by his internal difficulties and that confusion seemed to reign in the Angolan Government. “Mozambique is civilized and organized in comparison to Angola.” Grennan expressed his belief that the MPLA leadership wishes to be pragmatic and non-confrontational but they find themselves in the Soviet pocket and dependent on the Cubans.
9. The Secretary described our interest in discussing normalization with the Angolans once they had demonstrated a constructive attitude in the Nigerian mediation effort. (Owen here asked whether the United States would object to the sale of some sensitive telecommunication equipment by the UK to the Angolan Government. The Secretary replied that we had no objections.) Sir Michael Palliser said the situation in Angola was reminiscent of Guinea when the French departed, leaving the Guineans no option but to turn to the East. The Angolans, he said, have no alternatives. The Secretary agreed.
10. The two Secretaries then discussed Zaire. They agreed that it was important to take a firm stand on the issue of territorial integrity, but that so far as possible this African problem should be solved by the Africans.
11. The Secretary described for Owen the administration’s planned approach to Congress on the issue of the Zimbabwe Development Fund and the aim to win congressional approval in principle. Owen emphasized that the fund is a major psychological and political element for bringing along the Rhodesian white community. He said he had underscored to the whites that the Fund was not designed as a “buy off”, a statement which had disturbed the Rhodesians. He said he had received the impression that former Secretary Kissinger had committed himself to a great extent on the concept of a safety net. Owen pointed out, however, that the Fund “legitimizes” the US involvement in the negotiating process but said he recognized our own political difficulties.
12. The Secretary asked about British strategy during the consultations, whether they would approach the hard or easy issues first. Graham said they would clarify their approach over the next few days, but they would plan to set aside the question of a conference and, instead, ask the parties about their thoughts on a constitution and the problems of the transition. The Consultative Group would develop the process and extract basic principles leading eventually to an outline [Page 410] draft constitution. At the same time the UK and US would reserve a final decision on “this is how it will be.” Owen said there would be a constitutional lawyer on the British team, and if all went well, the group could establish a technical, constitutional unit. There would be no need for the United States to participate at this level. As an aside, Owen also mentioned that the FCO was looking at the idea that independence should be granted at the beginning of the electoral period, but this would require close consideration.
13. Both Secretaries agreed on the danger of becoming involved in the politics of Nationalist leadership. There followed a brief discussion on the forthcoming Maputo conference. Owen said that the Western Powers should not attempt to negotiate the resolutions of the conference. We should stand aside, listen and advise, but not be drawn in to a declaration. The Secretary said he agreed in general. Owen said he approved of Ambassador Young’s decision to attend the conference, commenting that the Ambassador’s commitment to the issues had a very favorable impact in Africa.
14. On Namibia the two Secretaries agreed that the results of the Five-Power demarche6 and discussions with the South Africans were encouraging.7 Grennan said that it may be difficult to get Nujoma into the negotiations because he is unsure of his own position within SWAPO and within Namibia. He suggested Front Line pressure on Nujoma may be essential. Ted Rowlands said that we run the danger of an embarrassment by our own success. If SWAPO will not come along then Vorster would seem free to go ahead on his own. We have sought to avoid a mediating role but we are already in it, he concluded. Secretary Vance agreed that the “administrative arrangements” in Namibia could be a dangerous imitation of the Turnhalle constitution.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia and Namibia.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2099. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Vance was in London to attend the G–7 Economic Summit.↩
- The conference took place May 16–21. In telegram 1504 from USUN, May 12, the Mission reported on the consultations among the Western Five and the guidelines for the approach of the Five to Maputo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770168–0307)↩
- Owen visited Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Cape Town, Gaborone, Lusaka, Salisbury, Luanda, and Lagos April 11–17.↩
- See Document 151.↩
- See Document 158.↩
- See Tab A, Document 50.↩
- See Documents 52–55.↩