151. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 4004. For Tarnoff and Lake. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Nkomo.
Participants:
ZAPU President Joshua Nkomo
ZAPU Deputy, External Affairs, Daniel Madzimbamuto
The Secretary
Mr. Brzezinski
Hodding Carter, Press Spokesman
Raymond Seitz, First Secretary
Date: May 6, 1977; Britannia Hotel.
1. Nkomo expressed his pleasure in meeting the Secretary. He said he had read extensively about the new administration but also wanted to hear first-hand the administration’s views on Zimbabwe and on what the US can do to help.
2. The Secretary told Nkomo: a) We are determined to work for the independence of Zimbabwe in 1978 under majority rule and that this is a fundamental tenet of administration policy; b) We recognize military pressure will continue but believe that independence can be obtainable in a shorter time through negotiations; c) The repeal of the Byrd Amendment reflects our determination; d) We have consulted closely with the British and believe that consultations about a constitution can help achieve a negotiated settlement; e) If there is progress in the consultations we are prepared to put pressure on Smith to move; f) We do not wish to negotiate the details of a constitution which should properly be left to the Zimbabweans and the UK; g) We wish to be helpful on questions of principle and to offer our support, financially and otherwise; h) There are limits to our ability but we believe we can have a constructive influence; i) We seek Nkomo’s advice on how best our role should be defined; j) The British will open a special office in Africa to carry on consultations, and we will assign a senior officer to help in the process; k) We will consult jointly with the British or separately depending on the wishes of the individual parties; l) The British have our full support in this endeavor and we are ready to contribute [Page 412] fully; m) We do not seek to impose any form of government on the people of Zimbabwe.
3. Nkomo responded with a long description of the Geneva Conference, of its failures, of Nationalist grievances against the British, and of Owen’s initiative, much along the same lines as has previously been reported to the Department. He pronounced Geneva dead. He said in his discussion with Owen he had emphasized the need to define concepts such as “majority rule” and “surrender of power”, and had appealed to Owen to recognize that Zimbabwe is in a state of war. Efforts must be directed to removing the cause of the war after which a constitution will fall into place.
4. Nkomo said he had warned Owen that US “cosponsorship” invited unmanageable controversy. US participation in a conference would open the door to big power politics. “If the US can assist by means other than getting into a conference, please do so.”
5. The Secretary told Nkomo that we had agreed to cosponsor a conference, but that after the Foreign Secretary’s trip we had jointly consulted on what we could do short of cosponsoring and how we could get around the question.2 A conference might in the end only be a Lancaster House exercise. But we believe we can help move the process forward by separate and/or joint consultations. This is a change in framework, the Secretary said, which seems to meet the objections of the Patriotic Front. We will take part in the consultations but not in the details of constitutional negotiations.
6. Nkomo was reluctant to give his reactions to the Secretary’s explanation. Madzimbamuto said that the consultations which the Secretary described will obviously help shape a constitution and that a Lancaster House conference would merely be a rubber stamp to what had already been agreed. The exercise, therefore, is internationalized. He asked what would stop the parties meeting with other powers during this process. The Secretary answered that nothing could stop consultations with anyone, but that the United States was in the best position to assist the process of negotiations. Nkomo said that he welcomed US assistance but along the lines of the present meeting. “We cannot have a conference in bits and pieces.”
7. The Secretary reiterated that we are prepared to sit in the consultations jointly or separately and stressed that if the United States did not play such a role, Britain might not be willing to begin the process. When Nkomo objected that the Secretary’s description sounded like US participation in a series of small conferences, the Secretary said that if a realistic process is not commenced, then there will be no [Page 413] independence in 1978. In response to a question by Madzimbamuto the Secretary said that the consultative office will not be located in Salisbury.
8. When the Secretary asked whether the process as he had outlined it was satisfactory, Nkomo replied that he did not know. “If it means a decentralized conference with something centralized later, my fears are still there.” Mr. Carter pointed out that there seemed to be little difference between what the Secretary had proposed and what Nkomo had described.
9. The Secretary asked that if an American sat in on the British consultations, would that be useful? Nkomo was unsure of his response saying at first that he had no objection and then later that he would need to think more on the question. Such a US role would be acceptable, he said, if it did not get out of hand. The Secretary reassured Nkomo that we did not wish to involve ourselves in constitutional details. Madzimbamuto offered the description that “the Patriotic Front is meeting with the British but the British happen to have an American adviser.” Nkomo said that this sounded better but that he did not fully understand and would still want to think about it. He emphasized that he sought strong US assistance as he had sought assistance from all parts of the world.
10. After some more reflection, Nkomo asked the Secretary if we were in effect “ruling out cosponsorship”, to which the Secretary answered affirmatively. The Secretary said we will want to talk further with the British on next steps. Nkomo returned to the question whether cosponsorship had been ruled out. The Secretary agreed, saying there was too much concern about the word and that our real purpose was to assist the process.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2111. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- See Document 150.↩