Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

137. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable¹

TDFIR DB–315/01361–77

Washington, February 5, 1977

COUNTRY

• Rhodesia

DOI

• 4 February 1977

SUBJECT

• Rhodesian Government Plan to Implement an Internal Solution Leading to Majority Rule

ACQ

• [less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

• [4 lines not declassified]

To State: No distribution except to Mr. Harold Saunders.

1. The decision of Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to seek an “internal solution” has the full support of the armed services and security chiefs. These officers have advised Smith that such a solution is the only one now possible which would lead to moderate African majority rule in Rhodesia. Smith has been advised that an internal solution can be made to work if agreement can be reached with any combination of Nationalist factions which would include African National Council (ANC) leader Bishop Abel Muzorewa as the initial center piece in a coalition government. The only exception is Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union, who probably could not be included in any initial coalition. Smith’s advisors have told him that a political solution must be sought and Smith has fully agreed. He has been told that Rhodesia cannot indefinitely survive the combination of a sopisticated military attack from neighboring states and increased international economic pressure.

2. The Rhodesian Government has decided that it is not possible to work out a solution that would include all the competing Nationalist factions. Smith and his advisors agree that the Geneva Settlement Conference was a failure because the British, under pressure from the Front-Line Presidents, strayed too far from the U.S. proposals and tried to bring together too many disparate elements who carry widely varying ethnic support. Involvement of all groups, while democratically desirable, would not lead to moderate majority rule but to instability and eventual rule by Mugabe and a militarily superior minority. Smith and his advisors agree that Muzorewa is the key to an internal solution and must be approached upon his return from Scandinavia to seek his views about which Nationalist leaders, other than Mugabe, might be worked into a coalition government. They believe that the optimum solution would be a coalition between Muzorewa and Joshua Nkomo, Mugabe’s partner in the Patriotic Front, with Nkomo agreeing to split with Mugabe or at least to try to limit Mugabe’s power. The Rhodesian officials believe Nkomo is a natural leader and should not be ruled out of an internal solution. Nevertheless, ethnic considerations, which are important but not paramount, dictate that Muzorewa should be the keystone of Smith’s effort to gain an internal solution. Smith is under no illusion that Muzorewa, because of his personality and lack of leadership qualities could maintain real power in Rhodesia without the support of one other Nationalist leader. A coalition with Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole is a possibility to be explored, and the current detention order against him can be waived.

3. Rhodesian Government leaders are agreed that an “open minded” attitude on the part of the United States and, to a lesser degree, the United Kingdom, is required if the internal solution is to have a real chance. The Rhodesians see no possibility of a moderate solution if the views of the Front-Line Presidents prevail because the Presidents’ solution will lead to a Mugabe victory and through that to Mugabe’s subservience to Mozambique President Samora Machel and the USSR. Given the current British position on the role of the Front-Line Presidents, the Rhodesian leaders believe it will be very difficult to get Nkomo into active participation with Muzorewa. An open-minded attitude on the part of the United States would permit the necessary overtures.

4. Smith will meet South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Cape Town on 9 February to explain why the Rhodesian Government believes an internal solution is viable. Smith and his advisors believe the chances of convincing Vorster of the correctness of this route are good after they point out to him the “dead ends” which would result from continued British efforts and the participation of the Front-Line Presidents. Smith will reassure Vorster of his intention to pursue majority rule and achieve it within two years.

5. Field Dissem: [1 line not declassified].

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 65, Sunday’s Developments: 2/77. Secret; Priority; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent to the Department of State and [distribution not declassified]. The cable was sent to Brzezinski under a February 6 covering memorandum from Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, E. Henry Knoche.