Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

139. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter ¹

Washington, February 10, 1977

SUBJECT

• Options for the Rhodesian Negotiations

The Geneva Conference on Rhodesia broke down over the failure of the participants to agree on only one of the five points suggested by Secretary Kissinger as a basis for settlement. On Point 1, the principle of majority rule within two years, and on the basically procedural Points 2 (convening a conference to organize an interim government), 4 (agreement of the UK and Rhodesia to pass enabling legislation) and 5 (lifting of sanctions once an interim government is established) there was substantial agreement. Agreement could not be reached, however, on the all-important third point which dealt with the composition of the interim government, and therefore determined under what conditions and by whom power would be exercised during the interim period. The Africans came to believe that the provisions of Point 3 left the whites in a dominant position in both the Government and Security Forces. In turn, Smith flatly rejected the nationalists’ counterproposals, transferring almost all power to the nationalists during the interim period.

After the Geneva breakdown the British developed a compromise proposal providing for a balancing British presence to serve as an arbiter between black and white in the interim government.² Ivor Richard attempted to negotiate these proposals as the basis for further progress toward a settlement. Ian Smith rejected the proposals on January 24, thereby raising the question of where we should go from here.³

The options available to us range from deliberate inaction through various initiatives and degrees of U.S. involvement designed to resuscitate old proposals or try new ones. The major alternatives are set forth below.

We have committed ourselves to discuss next steps on Rhodesia with the British during the week of February 21, when they will have finished their own review of the issue. We are considering the following options.

Option 1. Reconvening the Geneva Conference on the Basis of General Principles. We have discussed with the British the possibility of reconvening the Geneva Conference on the basis of general principles which could be drawn from existing British, Nationalist and Rhodesian proposals for a settlement. These principles could include inter alia. (a) a commitment to orderly settlement; (b) the establishment of a transitional government; (c) the transfer of most but not all power to the Nationalists during transition; (d) a British willingness to play a balancing role in the government; and (e) agreement that elections would take place before independence. We and the British would seek South African, Rhodesian and African agreement to these principles and if they were accepted the British would call for resumption of the Geneva conference. We would also seek Ian Smith’s and the Nationalists’ commitment to come to final terms once the Conference was reconvened.

Option 2. Reconvening Geneva on the Basis of all Existing Proposals. Alternatively, we and the British could seek a resumed conference on the understanding that all proposals advanced to date continue to be open for negotiation, including the Five Points which Smith accepted from Kissinger in September but which the Nationalists have rejected. This would allow Smith to save face. However, prior to the conference, we would require Smith’s private agreement to drop the Five Points as soon as the conference resumed and negotiate in a manner that would lead to a rapid settlement. We would seek South Africa’s guarantee that Smith would keep his word and proceed to negotiate an acceptable settlement.⁴

Option 3. Reconvening Geneva as a Constitutional Conference. We have discussed with the British the possibility of sidestepping the tough question of transitional arrangements and reconvene Geneva as a constitutional conference. The parties would come together to negotiate a constitution for an independent, majority-ruled Zimbabwe as well as the terms of an election which would precede independence. We judge this option less likely to succeed than the preceding two options. The parties could become ensnared in protracted debates over constitutional issues.

Option 4. Suspending Efforts. We and the British might suspend efforts and allow for a hiatus in discussions that might last as long as three to six months, returning to the issue if the prospects for a settlement improve. During the hiatus we would continue consultations with all the parties to ascertain on what basis a new conference could be convened. Violence is certain to escalate during the period and the Soviet Union may deepen its involvement. We would run the serious risk of further polarization between the parties, making even more difficult the task of bringing them together.

Option 5. Encourage a Greater International Role in Negotiating or Supervising a Rhodesian Settlement. We might consider a wider showing of responsibility for the Rhodesian problem. This might involve a UN or Commonwealth role in sponsoring a conference, chairing a conference or serving as an administrator in a transitional government. Any such arrangement would be complex and could only move forward with strong African support.

Pressure on Rhodesia

Whatever option is chosen, an increase in our pressure on the Smith regime is required. The most obvious and logical step is the repeal of the Byrd Amendment which would have a significant psychological and financial impact upon the Smith government and would confirm to Africans our commitment to majority rule in Rhodesia.

There are other steps available to us. We have under inter-agency study proposals which would expand UN-approved sanctions, and others which would make more restrictive U.S. regulations administering our sanctions program. Specific possibilities include cutting off the remaining sources of dollar flows to Rhodesia, applying sanctions forcing U.S. subsidiaries operating abroad to abide by regulations governing trade with Rhodesia, and developing plans to apply diplomatic pressure to obvious sanction-busting nations.

With regard to the latter possibility, South Africa’s role as Rhodesia’s principal trading partner is central to effective sanctions. We might consider telling Vorster that failing rapid movement toward a negotiated settlement we will contemplate actions designed to encourage South Africa to comply with sanctions.⁵ Our possible tools include requiring end-user certificates for, or limiting the export of, goods to South Africa which we believe are being reexported to Rhodesia.

In the final analysis, the influence South Africa can bring to bear offers the only decisive way to bring Smith to terms. Therefore, we must conduct our relations with the South Africans in such a way that makes it clear that our future relationship with them will be affected by their actions regarding Rhodesia and Namibia, as well as their handling of their own race relations.

U.S. Role

There is substantial disagreement on what the proper role of the United States should be in attempting to foster a negotiated Rhodesian settlement. President Kaunda of Zambia has suggested that we eclipse the British, whom he views as ineffectual, and take a leading role in seeking a settlement. President Nyerere of Tanzania has, on the other hand, asserted that Britain, as the colonial power, must bear the prime responsibility for Rhodesia. He has suggested that we concentrate our principal efforts on the Namibian problem. If we decide to abandon our current role of lending full support to the British (which I do not believe we should do at this time) and assume the lead in negotiations as suggested by Kaunda, we could consider the following steps:

a. Adopt a leading role in bilateral consultations to win support for new or revised proposals, engaging in further shuttle diplomacy as needed.

b. Emphasize U.S. interest in any reconvened conference by sending a high-level observer with authority to assist the chairman to negotiate.

c. Alternatively, adopt a more active part in a reconvened Geneva conference, perhaps offering to co-chair it.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Official Working Papers of S/P Director Anthony Lake, 1977–January 1981, Lot 82D298, Box 16, Rhodesia/Southern Africa ’77–’78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “To Cy.”
2. The British Government announced the indefinite adjournment of the Geneva Conference on January 11. Richard developed proposals for an interim Rhodesian Government and gave them to Ian Smith on January 21. The proposals called for the establishment of an interim government, to be followed by an end to the guerrilla war and UN sanctions and the establishment of a trust fund. The proposals also called for a British resident commissioner. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28309)
3. Smith claimed that the acceptance of the British proposals would lead to immediate black control of Rhodesia and questioned the role of Front Line Presidents over the Rhodesian settlement. (Ibid.) See Document 131 and footnote 2 thereto.
4. Carter circled options 1 and 2 and wrote in the left-hand margin: “best of 5 for now, then increasing U.S. role.”
5. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this sentence: “Secondary boycott.”