Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

474. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)¹

Washington, August 1, 1979

SUBJECT

• PRC on Central America (U)

It may be useful to recall where the SCC meeting on July 20th left off: (1) We agreed on a strategy to encourage reforms in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala (HEG) in exchange for U.S. assistance. (2) Vaky was to travel to the region to hear what the Latin Americans had to say about the problems in Central America and to sound out the possibility of a Foreign Minister’s meeting. (3) We were to prepare a strategy paper (Tab A); a list of desired reforms in each country; a list of possible increases in economic assistance; and a list of ways to increase security assistance.² The purpose of this meeting is to hear Vaky’s report and balance packages of reforms and assistance in order to develop new strategies for the US to use on Central America. (The summaries of the July 20 SCC meeting on Central America, and the June 13 PRC meeting are at Tabs G and H.)³ (S)

El Salvador

As my memo (copy attached) on Central America indicates, El Salvador is clearly the most urgent case.⁴ I am more and more convinced that if we (and Romero) don’t try something dramatic soon, El Salvador will go down the tubes very quickly. We will not lose anything by trying to encourage an acceleration of the electoral process; if it doesn’t work, then we can always adopt State’s suggested strategy (Tab A, pp 5–6), but I think it could work.⁵ I would certainly like to try it with Blatchford first; I think I can convince him, and I believe he can convince Romero. (S)

The only problem with State’s strategy is that it places too much reliance on military assistance and too little on economic aid. (For that, see Tab B). (S)

Honduras

I agree with State’s strategy (Tab A, pp 2–3), supplemented by increases in aid (Tab C).⁶ Honduras should be an easy case. All we need to do is step up our aid and make Honduras into a showcase. We need also to make this fact known throughout Central America in conjunction with a repetition of public assurances from the Honduran government that it will transfer power to a democratic and civilian government, beginning with free elections for a constituent assembly in April 1980. (S)

Guatemala

Guatemala could be a hopeless case, but nonetheless, we ought to try State’s strategy. (S)

Regional Programs

I strongly recommend increases in economic assistance to regional programs as suggested at Tab E. We should use this regional aid to encourage greater cooperation between Nicaragua and its neighbors, and also frankly, as a way to provide some necessary leverage by Nicaragua’s neighbors. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 183, PRC–120, 8/2/1979, Central America. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that Brzezinski saw the memorandum.
2. Attached but not printed at Tab A is the undated strategy paper. The lists are attached as Tabs B–F, but not printed.
3. Tabs G and H are attached but not printed. See Document 470 and 473.
4. Not attached. See Document 474.
5. The strategy paper noted: “Basically we would seek to extract a quid pro quo in terms of political and human rights improvement; for some assistance from us.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 183, PRC–120, 8/2/1979, Central America)
6. The strategy paper proposed a range of economic and military assistance to Honduras in order to “cultivate Honduras’ confidence and friendship; encourage it to continue on its constitutional path; and generally demonstrate our support and encouragement.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 183, PRC–120, 8/2/1979, Central America)