Office of the Historian

473. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, July 20, 1979, 3–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Central America

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Secretary Cyrus Vance
    • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
    • Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
    • Mr. Viron Vaky, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

  • OSD

    • Mr. David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs

  • JCS

    • Lt General John Pustay

  • DCI

    • ADM Stansfield Turner
    • Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
    • Mr. Martin Roeber, Analyst, Office of Political Analysis

  • OMB

    • Mr. Bowman Cutter, Executive Associate Director for Budget
    • Mr. Randy Jayne, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

  • AID

    • Robert Nooter, Acting Administrator
    • Mr. Edward Coy, Deputy Administrator for Latin American Bureau

  • White House

    • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • Mr. Henry Owen

  • NSC

    • Mr. Robert Pastor

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. U.S. Policy to Nicaragua. The SCC agreed that the U.S. should be forthcoming in discussions on humanitarian assistance, and to a lesser degree on reconstruction assistance, with the new Nicaraguan government. We will seek first to determine Nicaragua’s needs and then, after [Page 1234] consultation with Congress, seek to re-program money for humanitarian assistance for FY 79 and explore various options for increasing reconstruction assistance in the future. Owen will follow up. (S)

2. The Central American Problem. The issue is whether El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala can gradually and peacefully broaden their bases of support by making the kinds of reforms necessary to deal with the inequities and inadequacies of the socio-economic and political structures. The alternative is revolution as just occurred in Nicaragua. Though OSD had some reservations, we all agreed that unquestioning support for the status quo was not only too sharp a departure from the overall foreign policy objectives of the Carter Administration, but it also could not work. We agreed on the following three objectives: (1) to give reassurance to the three governments who are nervous about the possibilities that the Nicaraguan revolution could spread; (2) to give them some economic and military assistance; and (3) to pressure them very hard to agree and begin implementing with all deliberate speed a program of meaningful reforms that will broaden the scope for political participation. (S)

3. A Recommended Approach to Central America. The SCC agreed that we should send Assistant Secretary Vaky on a mission to “object” countries (El Salvador, Honduras, and perhaps Guatemala) to explore with their leaders the kinds of reforms they would be willing to take if we supported them with economic and military assistance. The mission would also go to “framework” countries like Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, and Mexico to discuss the nature of the problems in these Central American countries and to seek ideas about what should be done about it. He will also explore the possibility of a meeting of several Foreign Ministers from the area and Secretary Vance to seek agreement on a common approach. Our objective would be to seek a multilateral solution to the problems in the area with the Latin Americans taking the lead. If that’s not possible, we would be prepared to take the lead. (S)

4. Impact On Nicaragua. We will take added precautions to make sure that the new government of Nicaragua does not perceive this mission as hostile or confrontational. Our forthcoming response to their humanitarian needs and a clear statement of our intent should help in this regard. (S)

5. Follow-Up. While Vaky is travelling, we will set up a working group to make recommendations on the kinds and amounts of economic and security assistance we should consider for the region and on the kinds of political and socio-economic reforms which will be needed to broaden the scope for political participation in the region. [Page 1235] We will convoke another SCC meeting to consider these recommendations and Vaky’s report in about a week.2 (S)

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0205, Central America Jan.–Aug. 1979. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Brzezinski sent the summary to Vance, Brown, McIntyre, Gilligan, Jones, and Turner under a July 26 memorandum. Brown’s initials appear on this copy of the memorandum. No minutes for this meeting were found.↩
  2. An unknown hand crossed out “another SCC” and added “PRC.” For additional information on Vaky’s mission, see Document 298. In telegram 5779 from Panama City, July 27, Vaky reported on his conversations with Paz in Honduras. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 7, Central America: 6/79–7/79) In telegram 5782 from Panama City, July 27, Vaky reported on his July 26 conversation with Torrijos. (Ibid.)↩