Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

475. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 2, 1979, 5–6:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Central America

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
  • David Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
  • Viron Vaky, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

• OSD

  • Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
  • Walter Slocombe, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

• JCS

  • General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • Lt General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence
  • Martin Roeber, Analyst, Office of Political Analysis

• OMB

  • Bowman Cutter, Executive Associate Director for Budget

• AID

  • Douglas Bennett, Administrator-designate of AID
  • Abelardo Valdez, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean

• IDCA

  • Thomas Ehrlich, Administrator-designate of IDCA

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Ambassador Henry Owen

• NSC

  • Robert Pastor, Staff Member

Summary of Conclusions

1. The Problem. The SCC agreed that we were approaching a critical point in our relationships with the governments in Central America in the light of the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. El Salvador is the most “ripe” for political polarization and revolution. Honduras has a much better human rights record and its leadership seems more committed to development programs. There is considerable violence and dissatisfaction in Guatemala, but there is much less of a chance of a revolutionary situation emerging. (S)

2. Objectives. The SCC agreed that we should pursue four objectives: (1) Contain Cuba; prevent the consolidation or spread of extreme leftist regimes. (2) Attempt to reduce significant repression in El Salvador and Guatemala (and also in Nicaragua and Honduras) and encourage wider political and economic participation in all these countries. (We should continue to press for free elections in Nicaragua.) (3) Prevent armed conflict in the area, and to the extent possible, encourage peaceful change. (4) Stimulate growth to reduce the vulnerability of these countries to extremism of either right or left. There was some disagreement within the SCC about which of these objectives should be given priority in the case of conflict between the objectives. (S)

3. Honduras. The SCC agreed that Honduras should be given priority in economic assistance in order to make it a showcase to demonstrate our willingness to support a government in the region that has a relatively good human rights record. Owen will chair a group to explore various options to increase economic assistance; it will make recommendations by next Wednesday.² In addition, we will seek to give modest increases in military assistance and training to Honduras, and try to increase our military representation there. And we will encourage El Salvador and Honduras to reach an early settlement to their border dispute. In this case, and in the others, we should consult early and fully with like-minded Latin American governments about ways to encourage multilateral support for moderate democratic change. (S)

4. El Salvador. The SCC agreed that we should seek to extract a quid pro quo of economic and military assistance for human rights and political improvement. An illustrative list of what reforms we should ask for, and a list of assistance we should be prepared to provide is attached. We intend to review that list carefully to see what should be added—including economic assistance—and what should be deleted, but once agreement on a final list is reached, we should press to get the Salvadoreans to agree to all of it. We should also push for a peace settlement and an end to the assassinations by the para-military squads. There was a disagreement on what additional support to help the government deal with the subversion problem we should be prepared to provide. (S)

5. Guatemala. The USG should continue to press the government to stop political assassinations and to move toward free elections in 1982. Our approach to Guatemala is less urgent. (S)

6. Multilateral Consultations. We will make clear that we will not give aid to governments that export violence to other countries in the region. Secretary Vance will try to meet soon with Foreign Ministers and Heads of State—especially Venezuela and Ecuador—to discuss common regional security concerns and seek a common approach. (S)

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

U.S. STRATEGY TO EL SALVADOR

A. What we would ask for:

1. An immediate public declaration by the President (which we would publicly support and applaud) that there would be no military candidate in the 1982 presidential election, and that at that time the Salvadoran military would abandon politics and return to their barracks;

2. That in the meantime, the 1980 election for Legislative Assembly members and Mayors, will be free, honest, and guaranteed by the GOES and the military;

3. That immediate action will be taken to reform the electoral law, calling in experts from the OAS for this purpose;

4. That the Central Electoral Council will be reformed or re-implemented in such a way as to assure representation by all parties at a significant level;

5. That the OAS will immediately be requested to send observers to oversee preparations for the March 1980 election and the balloting itself;

6. That all political exiles, including Napoleon Duarte, may henceforth return to El Salvador at any time of their own choosing;

7. That labor law and labor regulations and procedures will be revised in such a way as to offer workers a greater alternative to illegal strikes;

8. Release of political prisoners not charged with common crimes;

and

9. A pledge to avoid violence and paramilitary killing.

B. What we would do:

1. Temporarily suspend public denunciations and pressure;

2. Approval of their applications for tear gas and/or other items of non-lethal crowd control equipment;

3. Approval of their applications for commercial purchase of military equipment;

4. Reversal of our long-held negative position on C–47 engines;

5. Withholding of pressure on other governments to block foreign arms sales to El Salvador;

6. Renewed assurance that our travel advisory will be lifted as soon as conditions permit; and

7. A general posture of greater cooperation than they believe we have displayed over the past two years.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 28, Latin America, 8/79–9/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote “OK.” Brzezinski sent Carter the summary under an August 6 memorandum, requesting that he approve it. Brzezinski noted that “options on possible increases in economic assistance” to the countries were being formulated prior to Vance’s trip to Ecuador (August 9–12). An unknown hand wrote at the bottom of the covering memorandum: “Dispatched to agencies 8–10–79.” (Ibid.) Dodson sent the approved minutes to Vance, Brown, McIntyre, Gilligan, Jones, Turner, and Ehrlich under an August 9 memorandum. (Ibid.) Roeber prepared a memorandum for the record, dated August 8, about the August 2 PRC meeting. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 11: (SCC) Central America) No other minutes for the meeting were found.
2. August 8.
3. Secret.