Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

449. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 11, 1980, 3–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• El Salvador (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Ambassador William Bowdler, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
  • William Rogers, Special Presidential Mission to El Salvador

• OSD

  • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
  • Frank Kramer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

• JCS

  • Lt General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

• DCI

  • Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
  • Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

• FBI

  • Edward J. O’Malley, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division

• IDCA

  • Thomas Ehrlich, Director
  • Ed Coy, Assistant Administrator Acting, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, AID

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Robert Pastor

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy to El Salvador

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by asking the two emissaries to report on their mission to El Salvador, and on their conclusions and recommendations. He said that the group should also consider how we can make clear—for the public, the country, and the region—what our objectives are. (S)

Rogers said that in their inquiry into the murders of the three nuns and the lay worker,² they of course were not able to identify the guilty parties, but they did do a survey, and found that there was circumstantial evidence of possible low-level involvement by the security forces; no evidence of high-level involvement. More important, the government agreed to establish an Investigating Commission composed of one civilian and three military people, and that they gave positive assurances that they would pursue the case to the satisfaction of the United States and the Church, the two aggrieved parties. Rogers said that he had urged them to accept the seconding of outside experts, and that they agreed to that, and that an FBI agent is there now. There is also a good possibility of others—perhaps one or two representatives from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, who will be allowed to observe and monitor the investigation. We have no illusions about what will happen, but to the extent that the FBI agents and the Inter-American Commission observers can watch over the investigation, we are more assured that it will be a genuine and a serious one. (S)

In answer to a question from Dr. Brzezinski as to whether the killings were political or done just by thugs, Rogers said that they were political to the extent that Catholic workers had become targets of considerable hostility by right-wing and security forces. This is manifest in the threats which many church groups are getting in El Salvador. Secondly, the Sisters had just returned from Managua, not a popular place among the security forces. Finally, they had arrived on the eve of the funeral of the Revolutionary Front leaders. (S)

With respect to the capacity of the Junta to control security forces and to implement reforms, Rogers said there is a real possibility of changes in the executive structure, with Duarte being appointed President of the Junta. In answer to a question from Dr. Brzezinski about when the changes will occur, Ambassador Bowdler provided a full briefing about the current situation in El Salvador. The Junta is currently experiencing a serious crisis of confidence, which is characterized by decomposition of authority. This is because the Junta is not functioning well and because the level of violence is high, with an appreciable input from the security forces. In addition, the economy is doing very poorly. The assassination of the six leaders of the Revolutionary Front and the four Sisters are merely symptoms of this basic problem. However, these two events have brought the crisis to a head for the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). The Christian Democrats have decided to provoke a showdown with the military because they find it difficult to be able to continue in the government unless there are important changes. There are two issues: the restructuring of the Junta to give greater effectiveness and efficiency to the government, and secondly, changes in the high command, which will permit reorientation of the military in its strategy to fight the far left. The latter means that the military would not indulge in indiscriminate killings. (S)

Bowdler said that the negotiations are continuing. There is no dispute on the need to change the Junta. When Bowdler left, there was pretty much agreement that Duarte should be the President, and whether there will be three leaders or one remains to be decided. The Junta change could occur by December 15, or it could occur as early as today or tomorrow. Everyone agrees that it will be done. (S)

Bowdler continued by saying that the other half of the problem is the High Command. The PDC senses that the basic problem is the Minister of Defense and his Deputy, and they are trying to negotiate their departure. They believe that by putting Gutierrez as Minister of Defense, that would change things. When Bowdler spoke to Gutierrez two nights ago, the latter said that he was working on this issue with the High Command, but to be successful, Gutierrez believes that he needs the cooperation of Garcia and Vides Casanova. The Embassy has said that the PDC is still holding firm to its position. If these changes occur, we could look to a definite change about the way that they will deal with the far left. However, Bowdler assesses that there is a less than 50–50 chance that Garcia will be moved to another post. On this point, Carlucci agreed. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Bowdler was assuming that we would be weighing in heavily when he made this assessment. (U)

Bowdler said that the Christian Democrats have skillfully gotten Gutierrez to see all six Presidents in Tegucigalpa, and have gotten these Presidents to weigh in very hard with Gutierrez on the importance of these changes. He thinks that this will be important in getting the PDC’s demands listened to, and it will also reinforce Gutierrez’ backbone. Bowdler thinks that we ought to let the negotiations play out. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we shouldn’t let it be known that if the outcome of the negotiations is good, we will proceed whole-hog in support of it. (S)

Bowdler said that the PDC assumes that to be the case. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should let it be known. Otherwise, some will think our aid is “on-hold”, while others think it is cut off. (S)

Bowdler said that the PDC told him that our decision to place aid “on-hold” was helpful to them in the negotiations. They believe they have only two chips to play: a negative chip if they decide to leave the Junta, and a positive chip of U.S. and Venezuelan support. Bowdler said that he would hesitate to say anything that would lessen their leverage. (S)

Claytor said that you could double their leverage if you give them something more. (C)

Christopher said that that is often the U.S. mentality—try to increase their leverage by conditioning aid, but the PDC may see things differently. (S)

Pastor said that the PDC could not possibly know what the U.S. would be prepared to give if the negotiations turn out to their satisfaction, since the U.S. doesn’t even know yet. What we need to be able to tell them with some precision is what they can expect and what our specific concerns are. They cannot know what we will be prepared to deliver, and they certainly don’t know what concerns are going to permit us to go ahead, and which concerns will inhibit us from going ahead. In the past, our vagueness has left us room to walk away from our promises, and there is a strong feeling among the Christian Democrats that we have not really fulfilled our promises. Duarte raised the point of the helicopters specifically with the President for that reason. (S)

Bowdler asked whether we might not want to hold ourselves back if the situation shifts dramatically to the right, and the Christian Democrats decided to leave. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that at that point we need to determine what is in our national interest. (C)

Bowdler said that we might have to back away at that point. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that is all the more reason why we should go ahead and give the Christian Democrats maximum leverage now, and we can do this by making our intentions very clear. If we want to save the situation, we ought to do that. (S)

David Aaron said that this is a problem of which we are only one part. Garcia has got to think that if they drag their feet, they’ll get a better deal with the Reagan administration. That’s why we ought to say that we’ll back them. But there is another reason why we should spell out what we would like. It would be used as a yardstick by which to judge the actions of the new administration as well as their concerns. If our concerns are reasonable, it will be an enduring yardstick, and if we’re not clear, then we’ll lend ourselves to charges that we laid back, for ideological reasons, and let the situation go downhill. (S)

Carlucci said that we need to be clear on what we want. The dismissal of Garcia is too much at this time. Caranza and Moran are much more likely. (S)

David Aaron said that we ought to try to get something which is symbolic, and shows that the situation has not gone to the Right. It appeared that even Duarte and Gutierrez were ambivalent about trying to take on Garcia. (S)

Bowdler said he doesn’t think that we ought to get into details. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we ought to try to agree on a formula that says to the PDC that if you achieve your objectives, then we are prepared to do the following. (S)

Rogers said that we are not really very far from that. The big issue is economic aid—the loan in the Inter-American Development Bank, $20 million in ESF, PL–480. We didn’t really address that issue in our discussions. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said we ought to also look into military aid. (S)

Carlucci said that we cannot really dissociate military from economic aid. For example, if our purpose is to help restore the economy, we will need military aid to protect the harvest. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we could define a framework that says more formally what we expect from the PDC and what we’re prepared to give. We would say that we are prepared to provide substantial assistance, if they meet their objectives, and we let them know the specifics. (S)

Bowdler asked what would we do if there were no changes in the High Command. (S)

Pastor said that is precisely the reason why we need to be specific about our concerns. We should not leave them in any doubt, and we should not leave them in any doubt about what we are prepared to do. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that certainly we would prefer that they could do more, but if they cannot do more, then we will still be prepared to go along. (S)

Christopher said that we ought to say that if the PDC accomplishes its purposes, then we are prepared to go out in full support. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed with that. If the PDC is satisfied, then we’re satisfied. We will restore economic aid and give all of the military aid. (S)

Christopher ticked off the economic items—the IDB loan, the $20 million ESF, the PL–480. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should not cut any particular item. We should go ahead with all of it to get maximum political impact. (S)

In response to a question from Christopher about what additional economic aid we could be talking about, Ehrlich said that they are planning an additional $28 million of development assistance for FY 82. (S)

With respect to military aid, Christopher said that with regard to the pipeline, the trucks have not been stopped. There is an FY 81 agreement of $5.7 million which he would be prepared to go ahead with. He asked what the MTT’s would be doing. (S)

Bowdler said that the MTT for the helicopters is the most urgent. (S)

Kramer said that the MTT for the helicopters would go in in January, and the helicopters would go in in February. Pustay said that it would take 90–100 days to train the crews, although the training has already started in Fort Rucker. (S)

Christopher asked about the lethal military equipment, and about whether there was any need for it. (S)

Pustay said that there are some M–79 grenade launchers. Christopher asked whether there was any money for it. Kramer said that it could be knocked out.” Dr. Brzezinski said, “Then let’s knock that out.” (S)

Pustay said that the MTT’s will need to work in the brigade headquarters, in order to indoctrinate the troops operating in the field on counterinsurgency and PSYOPS. There are 12 men in each team, and 3 teams. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he is prepared to go with that. (U)

Rogers said that it is a question of how long order is going to be maintained in that society. We need to adopt a program for persuading them to adopt a different tactic. (S)

Bowdler said that this is why the change in High Command is so important; if you get some new Commanders, then you will get different behavior. (S)

Carlucci said that there are also some programs that needed to be supported in the intelligence field. Kramer said that we also need to do more in border control. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski summarized that we should prepare a recommendation to the President, which has instructions for White to deliver a message to Duarte that if the PDC reaches a political arrangement with the military, which satisfies them as permitting a basis for political stability, and if they informally reached these minimal requirements, then the U.S. will resume aid—to wit, economic and security assistance along the lines we have just mentioned.³ (S)

Christopher said that a nuance needs to be brought into that. The PDC has a very good program, and we should say to them that if their program succeeds, and they reach their objectives, we will support that. (S)

Pastor suggested that we need to be honest with our own concerns, and specific as well. Should we really rely totally on whether the Christian Democrats are satisfied by the outcome? (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we needed to support the Christian Democrats. He asked about consultations with the Venezuelans. Bowdler said that he could go there anytime this weekend. Ambassador White should go in simultaneously. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked about our public posture. (C)

David Aaron said that we really need to get out a good statement both to make clear what we are trying to do here, and also to explain what we are trying to do down there. We should say that the Presidential Mission has returned and consulted with the President. They have found that all of the principal elements in El Salvador want to restrain right-wing terrorism and make the government more effective, and implement the land reform by transferring titles, etc. All support that, and we are prepared, if progress is made in these areas, to also support it. He suggested that the public statement not be as specific as our private demarche. (S)

Carlucci pointed out that we should also address the investigation per se, and Aaron agreed with that. Christopher said that the statement should start by referring to the investigation, and also mention that we are supplying technical assistance, and that observers from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights might also be participating. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we had basically reached agreement on the formula. He asked again from Bowdler whether he understood that it only stood a less than 30–50 chance of success. Bowdler said that he was only referring to the ouster of Garcia. (S)

Christopher emphasized that the second half of the statement should make clear that we are not talking about a US formula, but objectives of the Salvadorans themselves. (S)

Rogers asked what the purpose is of making such a statement. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we should, of course, wait a day or two. (S)

David Aaron said that there are two reasons why we need to get such a statement out. Even in the Catholic community, they don’t understand our position. A little certainty would reduce this misunderstanding. Secondly, it is important for us to establish some framework for resuming the assistance, both for the PDC and also to show that the US Government is serious about some standards. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said, however, that the statement should not be so rigid. (S)

Pustay asked about the MTTs, and Dr. Brzezinski asked whether more than 36 people would be needed. Christopher pointed out that we should be careful about the size of the US military presence. Pustay said that perhaps an additional five people would be useful. Christopher said that he would be influenced by how well the Salvadoran military did; e.g., if they got rid of Caranza, he would be more enthusiastic about going with more military aid. (S)

Claytor said that we should do more, because they need more. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that 50 men should be the ceiling. (S)

Bowdler said that we deceive ourselves if we think that we will save the situation by putting these MTTs in. If we do, and they continue their same tactics, we will find ourselves in a position of receiving the blame for what they’re doing. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that is a good warning. He summarized by saying that all of this is premised on what the PDC will accomplish.⁴ (S)

Claytor said that the helicopters would not be able to arrive before February, and we could therefore always pull that item off if necessary. Christopher said if 50 men all went in at one time, there would be some who would suggest that this is like an invasion. Claytor said that the biggest risk is sending none in. Dr. Brzezinski said that the argument is a quibble. We will put in 50 men, but sequentially and incrementally. Christopher agreed with that.⁵ (S)

Dr. Brzezinski ended by saying that the President had expressed an interest in meeting with the two emissaries (and Rogers, Bowdler, Christopher, Brzezinski and Pastor then met with him).⁶ Christopher said that the statement would be issued at noon at the State Department the next day.⁷ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 33, Meetings—SCC 354, 12/11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Pastor sent the minutes to Brzezinski under a December 21 memorandum requesting that he approve the minutes for record purposes. Brzezinski approved on December 23. Pastor also noted that White had not yet met with Duarte, regardless of the SCC’s decision. Pastor added: “Of course, his instructions have changed dramatically since then, and Duarte has been out of the country during most of this period.” (Carter Library, Vertical File, El Salvador)
2. See footnote 4, Document 447.
3. In telegram Tosec 10027/329627 to San Salvador, December 13, the Department instructed White to inform Duarte that “if he and his Christian Democratic colleagues reach agreement with the military leadership along the lines of the PDC program,” economic and military assistance would resume. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, El Salvador: 12/80–1/81)
4. The summary of conclusions of the December 11 SCC meeting noted: “The SCC agreed that we should give our full support to the Christian Democrats in their negotiations with the armed forces. This means that if their objectives—in restructuring the government, changing the high command, implementing the reforms, and opening a dialogue with the Democratic left—are satisfactorily met, then we would be prepared to restore economic and military assistance.” (Carter Library, Vertical File, El Salvador) Brzezinski sent the summary to Carter under a December 12 memorandum requesting that Carter approved the summary. Carter approved the summary on December 12. (Ibid.)
5. In a December 12 memorandum to Turner, Davis provided a summary of the SCC meeting on December 11. Davis noted that Christopher “seemed very uncomfortable with the plans for augmented security assistance, unless conditioned on substantial evidence of a shift in military policy.” Davis also noted that the CIA had shared doubts with Carter “that the Salvadoran military can be brought under effective civilian control any time soon, or that they will substantially alter their indiscriminate tactics in confronting the left.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 18: (SCC) El Salvador)
6. For Bowdler and Rogers’s meeting with Carter about their mission to El Salvador, see Document 450.
7. In telegram Tosec 100022/329484 to San Salvador, December 12, the Department included the press statement, which was reported in the New York Times on December 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800592–0813; Juan de Onis, “U.S. Lists Conditions for Resuming Aid to El Salvador: Reagan Advisers Criticized,” New York Times, December 13, 1980, p. 28)