Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

448. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, December 11, 1980

SUBJECT

• SCC Meeting on El Salvador, December 11, 1980–3:00 p.m. (U)

The two purposes of the Bowdler/Rogers mission were: (1) to make sure that the Salvadoran Government (JRG) would conduct a genuine and serious investigation of the assassination of the American Sisters, and (2) to lend our full support to those Christian Democrats and military in the government determined to gain control of the security forces and reduce right-wing terrorism. The purpose of the SCC is to review their report, and to decide whether and when we should continue our aid to the government. In a cable, Bowdler posed the question for the SCC very well: “. . . how to use our influence to help induce the necessary changes (in the Junta and in the military high command) without forcing either a collapse of the ruling coalition or otherwise accelerating the process of deterioration.” The agenda is at Tab A.² Bill’s cable is at Tab B; it remains the best analysis of the status of the negotiations.³ (S)

We are at a delicate moment. Our announcement to suspend aid has shaken our friends in the country and the democratic supporters of the JRG abroad. Of course, that in part was our intention, but the longer we wait to restore aid, the more we risk that we could destroy the ruling coalition, and certainly the economy. I therefore believe that the SCC should conclude with a recommendation to restore economic aid, but to defer military aid until the satisfactory resolution of the political negotiations between the Christian Democrats (PDC) and the military. (S)

I. The Bowdler/Rogers Report. You should ask Rogers to summarize the report. It concludes that the JRG intends a genuine and serious investigation of the death of the Nuns, but in order to ensure that this occurs, we will need to monitor it closely and provide support, particularly from the FBI. That is why Webster has been invited. We will have a difficult time convincing the Catholic Church that the JRG’s investigation is sincere, and you should ask Bill Rogers what additional steps we should take to convince them (and us). (S)

II. Political/Military Crisis. You should ask Bowdler for an update on the status of political negotiations, and you should also ask him for a description of our minimal conditions for restoring aid. These should relate to our four objectives:

(1) To reduce the right-wing violence; to gain greater control of the security forces; and to avoid the perception that the JRG has shifted sharply to the right. (S)

(2) To assist the JRG in its struggle against the leftist guerrillas. (S)

(3) To assist the JRG to implement the reforms (in particular, to give Titles to the peasants) and to restore the economy. (S)

(4) To reiterate the JRG’s willingness to dialogue with the moderate political left. (S)

These are our general objectives. More specifically, we need a dramatic and tangible restructuring of the military high command, including the dismissal of several of the leaders of the security forces (e.g., Carranza or Moran) who are most clearly associated with the repressive right. This needs to be done to end the para-military violence, to gain international support, to cover our domestic flanks, and to deprive the Salvadorean left of new strength. This is particularly important in light of the dismissal of Majano. Second, we need them to follow through on their promise to investigate, arrest and punish those in the security forces and in right-wing groups who participated in the killings. Third, we need them to give title to the campesinos. The AFL–CIO which has been working on the land reform, tell me that unless titles are given soon, the peasant organizations and their leadership will defect to the left. In my opinion, these should be our minimal conditions, but Bowdler should comment. (S)

III. U.S. Policy. I believe their report gives us sufficient reason to announce that we intend to restore economic aid, and we should do that after the Christian Democrats give us the green light. Let them use it to maximum effect. With regard to the security aid, I think we should let the pipeline continue to flow, but we should hold up on signing the FY 81 agreement until the negotiations are satisfactorily concluded and there is better reason to believe the investigation will have results. Helicopters should only be given if all of our conditions are met. I think it will be a terrible mistake to send MTTs to El Salvador at this time or any time in the near future; they will give us many more problems than they can possibly help the Salvadorans. We should continue and perhaps expand our training in Panama instead of MTTS. I understand that DOD does not believe that we need lethal military equipment at this time, but you may want to check that. (S)

IV. Consultations. We made a serious mistake to unilaterally announce last week’s decisions without consulting anyone in the U.S., in the Junta or abroad. We should take special care to try to consult this time so as to multiply the impact of our decisions and to reduce possible criticism. We need also to brief Congress. (S)

V. Statement. After seeing the report, I will draft a suggested public statement which you may want to use at the meeting. I will have that ready before the meeting. (U)

I have just received two additional documents:

—The draft report of Bowdler/Rogers (Tab C),⁴ which describes in great detail their investigation into the murders of the American Sisters. You may want to skim the summary and recommendations (pages 11–20). Only State has seen this draft; the final report awaits Bowdler’s examination when he returns later this morning. (S)

—A background paper prepared by the State Department (Tab D)⁵ is quite startling in its explicit indictment of the security forces for “much and perhaps the majority of the violence.” I understand that this paper is the product of an all-night battle between ARA and HA and a determination by S/S was made to get a paper out. Even the Rogers report only refers to “circumstantial evidence” of security forces’ involvement; I cannot understand how the State Department could indict and convict based on the same evidence. But the thrust of the paper is that the security forces are the main problem, and I understand Bowdler agrees with that totally. I also think there is a good [deal?] of truth to that statement. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 33, Meetings—SCC 354, 12/11/80. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum was stamped: “ZB has seen.”
2. Tab A, an agenda for the SCC meeting on December 11, is attached but not printed.
3. Tab B, telegram 7720 from Tegucigalpa, December 10, was not attached. It is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890005–2184.
4. Tab C was not attached. The full report entitled “Report to the President of Special Mission to El Salvador” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 22, El Salvador: 12/13–19/80. In telegram 8561 from San Salvador, December 8, Rodgers and Bowdler sent an initial report about their activities in El Salvador. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880136–1869) Carter wrote on another copy of the telegram: “Zbig—Hold SCC—Advise me,” and signed his initial. Denend wrote below: “12/9 Scheduled for Thursday 9:30.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, El Salvador: 12/80–1/81)
5. Tab D was not attached. The undated “El Salvador: Background Paper” is in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 183, SCC–354, El Salvador, 12/11/80.