Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

450. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 11, 1980, 4–4:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with the Special Presidential Mission to El Salvador and US Policy to El Salvador (C)

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador William Bowdler, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
• William D. Rogers, Former Under Secretary of State and Co-Leader of the Special Presidential Mission to El Salvador
• Robert Pastor, NSC Staff Member

The President asked about the situation in El Salvador. (C)

Mr. Rogers said that the situation in San Salvador is quite dangerous. One can hear bombs and weapons-fire during the night and day. (S)

The President asked Mr. Pastor if it were true that 9,000 people had died in violence there during the past year, and Pastor confirmed that there was such a report, but it was difficult to assess the accuracy of the number.² (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said the SCC had just met to discuss US policy to El Salvador, but rather than get into the specific issues, the SCC will report to the President tomorrow with a memorandum and with specific recommendations.³ However, Dr. Brzezinski thought that the President might want to hear directly from Rogers and Bowdler on their mission. (S)

The President opened by saying that he wanted to thank them both and especially to Mr. Rogers for giving up his time to such an important mission. He felt that the mission offered a stabilizing force to the situation down there, and he was confident that the leaders in El Salvador appreciated the mission for that purpose. He asked whether the FBI agents had already been sent to El Salvador to assist in the investigation. (S)

Acting Secretary Christopher said that the FBI people have experience and capabilities, which Salvadoran officials clearly do not have, and would assist the investigation. (S)

Mr. Rogers then summarized their mission. He said that he and Ambassador Bowdler had met with the leaders of the Junta, the High Command, and members of the Church and others, and they urged the leadership to begin a full-scale investigation. At that time, the vehicle that the nuns had used had been burned but was still on the road; the police had not taken the vehicle in yet. (S)

The President said the vehicle was probably pawed over. (S)

Mr. Rogers said that the FBI can definitely help. The Investigating Commission in El Salvador assured them that they would leave no stone unturned in their investigations there. (S)

The President asked whether Mr. Rogers thought that would be the case. (S)

Mr. Rogers said that we do not have any illusions. There is strong circumstantial evidence of possible involvement by some security forces. There was a patrol outside the airport, and the situation was very tense on that night that the Americans returned. There was a funeral the next morning for the Revolutionary Front leaders who had been assassinated. Two planes had come in from Managua, the second one carrying the American Sisters. Managua is hardly a popular place among the National Guard. The Canadians who were the last ones to see the American Sisters, had their vehicle stopped by the local militia. Finally, the commander of the local militia hastily arranged the burial of the three American Sisters and the lay worker in the mountains, and got the Justice of the Peace to supervise and officiate at the burial by the Civil Guard. At this point Mr. Rogers showed the President a map indicating where the bodies were buried. Of more concern was the fact that the Justice of the Peace informed the mission that he had been instructed during the last six months to cooperate with the local militia in supervising and officiating at mass burials, which occurred as often as two and three times a week. (S)

The President asked again whether the Justice of the Peace had been told to do that by the Guardia Civil. (S)

Mr. Rogers said that was the case, and the Justice of the Peace is currently in protective custody by the army, and it is possible he knows the security forces who are involved in the burial. (S)

The President asked whether they would take into custody those who would be found guilty of the crime. (S)

Mr. Rogers said that the government Investigating Commission is currently going to each of the security forces in the area and trying to find out what they were doing at the time. The purpose, of course, was to identify who these security forces were. (S)

The President asked about the attitude of higher officials with regard to this crime and to the violence. (S)

Mr. Rogers said that they had met with the Junta and with the top Command, and all expressed profound sorrow with what had occurred, and assured the mission that they would give the US and the Church—the two aggrieved parties—satisfaction, and that they would follow the investigation to its end, whatever that might be. (S)

The President asked for the mission’s assessment of whether in fact this will be the case. (S)

Mr. Rogers said that it is just as well that we have our technicians monitoring the progress of the investigation. It is only that which leads him to expect that the investigation will be a serious and a genuine one. (S)

Acting Secretary Christopher also pointed out that there is a good possibility that one or two members of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission may be invited to monitor the investigation. (S)

The President asked whether the same sort of bloodshed is continuing. (S)

Mr. Rogers said that it was. (S)

The President asked whether Duarte will do anything, and Mr. Rogers said that he is the best shot. Mr. Rogers tends to be pessimistic. Right now, the government had no instrument of public policy except murder. The prisons are empty, and there is a conspiracy of silence by the security forces not to tell who may have been involved, since perhaps many may be involved. (S)

In response to the President’s question about what Gutierrez was like, Ambassador Bowdler said that he is a good professional soldier, an engineer, with good instincts. If Gutierrez could really get control of the armed forces, this would be a positive step. Recently, Gutierrez received an overwhelming vote of confidence by the armed forces, but he still depends to a great extent on Minister of Defense Garica and on the National Guard. If Gutierrez could make changes in the High Command, then we could begin to expect changes in the behavior of the security forces. If not, Duarte cannot affect the situation down there. In response to the President’s question about the nature of the relationship between Gutierrez and Duarte, Ambassador Bowdler said there is no political tie, but there are bonds of respect and confidence both in themselves and each other. (S)

In response to the President’s question about whether there is a structure in place to implement decisions, Ambassador Bowdler said that the military is composed of approximately 400 officers, which are a tightly knit body which periodically meets to discuss problems and to decide on a strategy. This is a small country, and such a group plays a very critical role. If Gutierrez were to become Commander in Chief and also Minister of Defense, Ambassador Bowdler said that he feels reasonably confident that we can bring about the kinds of changes necessary to reduce the violence. (S)

The President asked whether Ambassador Bowdler would ascribe most of the bloodshed to the military, and Ambassador Bowdler said a high percentage of the killing was being done by the security forces. But it is necessary to make distinctions between the armed forces with 12,000 men, the National Guard with 2,000 men, the National Police with 2,000 men, and the Treasury Police, which in many ways is the most brutal of all. With respect to a question from the President, about whether Moran of the Treasury Police reports to the High Command, the answer was that he does. (S)

In response to another question from the President about whether all of these people would be reporting to Gutierrez, if he became Commander in Chief in fact, Ambassador Bowdler said they would. (S)

The President asked whether we should reconsider going ahead with our aid, and Ambassador Bowdler said he thinks we should support Duarte and the Christian Democrats, and the President agreed with that. (S)

How successful the Christian Democrats are in changing the military High Command is difficult to know at this time. The changes in the Junta are more likely and easier. (S)

The President asked, if Duarte were appointed President, what role the Junta would play. Ambassador Bowdler explained that the Junta would probably disappear, and there would be a Council of State of three members. (S)

In response to a question from the President about how well Ambassador White is doing, Ambassador Bowdler said that it is a difficult question. In some respects, he is doing very well. In others, for example, with the press and public statements, he has alienated some of the Christian Democratic leaders. In response to a question from the President about whether he is stable or highly excitable, Ambassador Bowdler said that there is a very difficult ambience in El Salvador at this time. The violence and the threats are very real. But on balance, Ambassador Bowdler said that White had picked up and taken charge of the Embassy and had given it new direction and has heightened their morale. The only real criticism is in some of the public postures that he takes. (S)

The President asked Acting Secretary Christopher to tell White to restrict any further statements. (S)

Acting Secretary Christopher said that he would do it again. (S)

The President said that perhaps the way to get the message across to Ambassador White would be to say the President is very proud of what he is doing, but that it might be better to restrict some of these statements. (S)

Mr. Rogers said that White used to work for him, and he always had a capacity for self-righteousness, which could explode at different points in time. (S)

The President asked whether such a request could conceivably be counter-productive, but said that it should be made. However, in doing it, you should stress that we are very much aware and admire what he is doing there, but to encourage everyone to refrain from public comments. (S)

Ambassador Bowdler said that he spoke to White today and made such a suggestion. (S)

Acting Secretary Christopher made clear that we all felt that he was doing a courageous job. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that he would likely be replaced by the new Administration and obviously this has affected him. (S)

Acting Secretary Christopher said that was one of the problems. He said that tomorrow we would forward to the President recommendations on what we should do on foreign aid.⁴ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 183, SCC–354, El Salvador, 12/11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
2. In his telegram 7720 from Tegucigalpa, December 10, Bowdler presented this figure. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890005–2184)
3. See Document 449.
4. Not further identified.