Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

428. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 21, 1980

SUBJECT

• El Salvador: Ambassador White’s Assessment (S)

You requested an assessment of the current political situation in El Salvador from our new Ambassador and after about a week, he has produced a veritable encyclopedia.² Let me summarize it, and then offer some comments:

—El Salvador is not in imminent danger of being lost and, if we use our power correctly, the chances of success are very good. The U.S. has a critical role to play; but to play it successfully, we will need increased economic aid, more and better personnel (for reporting and analysis), and non-lethal FMS and IMET. He recommends against sending MTT’s or helicopters until the worst rightist violence has ended.³ (S)

—The military is the key, but it is an open question whether the younger officers can muster sufficient leadership, conviction and force to reform the military and eliminate the officially sponsored and tolerated violence. (S)

—The major, immediate threat to the existence of the JRG is right-wing violence, which either emanates from elements of the security forces or is tolerated by them. To end this, he believes Col. Majano must build up a corps of progressive officers who gradually acquire enough power to force out the commanders of the security forces. (S)

—The Cubans are providing some training and weapons to guerrillas but their role is marginal. The long-term threat comes from nearly 5,000 Marxist guerrillas, but in order to succeed in eliminating this threat, the JRG will have to successfully implement the reforms and attract moderate leftist groups. The Archbishop will be key to the latter. (S)

White concludes that our present course of supporting a moderate solution is actually our only option. In his words, the alternatives are a Marxist victory, which he considers “unacceptable,” or a rightist purge, which he thinks can only be a short-term transition to a Marxist victory. (S)

I’m sure we all agree with the Ambassador’s principal conclusion: to support the current government. The problem with his assessment is that it sounds too much as if he wrote it all before arriving in El Salvador.⁴ In actual fact, he has not had much opportunity yet to talk with key actors in El Salvador. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that we respond to White along the following lines:

—That you have reviewed his report and agree that the current government represents the “moderate solution,” and we will continue to play an important role supporting it. That you would value his assessment again after he has had an opportunity to talk to all the key actors. (S)

—That State will expedite the transfer of highly qualified personnel to our Embassy in order to improve its reporting, operating, and analysis. (Reporting from the Embassy is currently inadequate, and there are too few people to make the contacts necessary for us to have a good picture of the evolving political situation.)

—That we will expedite the flow of FMS and IMET, but will withhold action on the MTT’s and helicopters because of the military’s tolerance of repression. Ambassador White should try to use the MTT’s and helicopters as instruments to persuade the military to bring an end to the right-wing violence. (S)

—That he should continue to encourage Salvadorean leaders to seek support from other countries besides the U.S. (S)

—That we have already expanded aid levels for El Salvador to a level which demonstrates our willingness to help. We are prepared to consider further specific requests, but not to provide a blank check. The problem right now is not money but a lack of order. The World Bank is prepared to be helpful, but the violence precludes it at this time. (S)

—That Ambassador White should develop a specific strategy for stopping rightist violence. (S)⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, El Salvador: 3/80. Secret. Sent for information. Carter wrote “Zbig J” at the top of the page. Pastor sent the memorandum to Brzezinski under a March 21 covering memorandum indicating that he had responded to Brzezinski’s request to summarize White’s cable (see footnote 2 below) and provide his reaction to it. Pastor requested that Brzezinski sign the memorandum and sent it to the President.
2. Reference is to telegram 2038 from San Salvador, March 19, in which White provided his assessment of the situation in El Salvador. On March 21, Denend wrote on a copy of the telegram: “ZB—White argues not to send the MTTs or the helicopters.” Brzezinski wrote to Pastor on the copy of the telegram: “RP—Reaction? Key pts? Need 2p. summary for the P.” The telegram was resent, as WH80351, from the White House Situation Room to Camp David for the President on March 22. (Ibid.)
3. Carter underlined the portion of this sentence that begins with “against” and ends with “ended.”
4. For more on White’s arrival in El Salvador, see Document 424 and footnote 3 therein.
5. Carter wrote at the bottom of the page: “Zbig—These points are ok but I do not desire to write the Ambassador. J.” Brzezinski’s March 25 memorandum to Vance noted that Carter had accepted the recommendations and that Vance should inform White. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, El Salvador: 3/80) In telegram 82782 to San Salvador, March 28, the Department informed White of the recommendations. (Ibid.)