Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

406. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, January 28, 1980, 1:30–2:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US Policy to El Salvador and Central America (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Ambassador William Bowdler, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

• OSD

  • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
  • Frank Kramer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

• JCS

  • Lt General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

• OMB

  • Ed Sanders, Deputy Associate Director for International Affairs

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Ambassador Henry Owen

• NSC

  • Robert Pastor

Minutes

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by suggesting that Ambassador Bowdler report on his trip throughout Central America.² (U)

Ambassador Bowdler said that there are two crises of greatest concern to us in the region, Nicaragua and El Salvador. In Nicaragua, the basic problem is how to get the economy moving. If there is no progress made within the next six months, the government will have to take some sort of action. He doesn’t know how they will deal with it, whether they will turn to the left and crack down, or whether they will become more pragmatic. There is evidence of both strategies at the current time. On the one hand, they have invited the cotton growers to participate in the discussions on the development of agriculture. On the other hand, the Sandinistas have cracked down hard on the Trotskyists in Nicaragua. (S)

Bowdler said that in El Salvador, the PDC—Military Coalition is highly tenuous. It has not yet jelled. In order to succeed in pulling itself out of a tailspin, it will need to do three things: (1) broaden its base; (2) implement its program of social reforms; and (3) strengthen its defenses from the extreme left and the extreme right. The base of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is not as large as the military originally thought, or even as large as the PDC had thought. It has been eroded greatly over the last eight years. They do not have a large public backing at this time. The military are divided along generational, rank, and to a certain extent, ideological lines. If the Junta moves too rapidly, the military could split. The PDC has similar problems; 30 percent within its ranks are more inclined to go to the left. The only reasonable chance this Junta has of pulling itself together is if it satisfies the three conditions he mentions above. (S)

Secretary Vance said that the way to broaden the base of the junta is to draw from the Center and the Right, and isolate the extremes. (S)

Bowdler summarized several of the basic policy questions: How to build cohesion in the junta? How to get the church to be neutral? How to get the government to accept our military assistance? On the last question, the Christian Democrats said that they need a “multilateral cover” in order to bring in our military assistance.³ They fear that if we go in alone, that will become the battle cry of the extreme Left, and they do not want it to happen like that. They are quite willing to accept our presence in a multinational program, and they have already approached the Spanish and the Germans and several other countries. They want the Colombians to help on guerrilla warfare, the Spanish to assist in the National Guard, and they want us to help in surveillance and interception, and to provide equipment and civic action techniques to the military. (S)

In response to a question from Dr. Brzezinski, Bowdler said that none of this is moving yet. We have approached the Salvadoreans, and have approached each of these governments, and by Monday,⁴ we hope to formalize the requests. The Andean Mission, composed of representatives from Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, will arrive tomorrow. Bowdler had spoken to Herrera about this. (S)

Pastor said that President Herrera has been moving extremely slowly on this, based on his last conversation with Ambassador Luers. He wondered whether we shouldn’t press Herrera by a Presidential letter. (S)

Ambassador Bowdler said that Herrera may be waiting for the report from the Andean group. Perhaps we will need to follow-up after the Andean group returns. (S)

Secretary Vance asked whether it would be worth another push to Herrera before the report. Ambassador Bowdler said there would not be any harm to it, and Secretary Vance said that then we should do it. (S)

Ambassador Bowdler said that whatever we choose to do in El Salvador we must also follow in Honduras. We do not know for sure where the arms or the guerrillas are coming from, but it’s very possible that they’re coming from Honduras. (S)

General Pustay wondered whether we shouldn’t be building up the OAS peacekeeping force on the border. Ambassador Bowdler said that he wouldn’t try to get them involved at this point. (S)

Secretary Vance said that the Mexican Foreign Minister believes the only way to get through this current crisis in El Salvador is by revolution. They probably are helping the Marxists. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether the Mexicans were also including the Guatemalans as possible candidates for revolutions. Secretary Vance said that apparently all that they are considering now is Nicaragua and El Salvador. (S)

Ambassador Bowdler said that Guatemala is also clearly a target. In Honduras, bank robberies and kidnappings have already begun. This is probably the first phase of a guerrilla struggle. In Guatemala, Castro is urging 3 or 4 of the revolutionary groups to unite. This is the same pattern that he has followed elsewhere. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked if all the steps that Bowdler had outlined occur and arms are funneled through third countries, what is his estimate of the likelihood of the Left taking over? (S)

Ambassador Bowdler said that it would be a tough battle. If the junta begins to succeed, it will get increasingly attacked by both extremes. He said he thought the junta would stand a reasonable chance of taking care of the Left, if we can hold the Right in place. If the junta does not succeed, Bowdler thinks that the PDC will pull out, and the military and the extreme Right will take over. (S)

Ambassador Owen said that we will have a civil war regardless of which way it goes. Ambassador Bowdler said that is true, but the difference is that we can support this government, whereas we would have real problems with an extreme Right government. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we have given this issue only sporadic attention because we have had so many other demands on our time. Also, because of a stringent budget, we have not been able to have the flexibility that we need. If Ambassador Bowdler’s analysis is correct, then he would conclude that this is an extremely serious situation. Secondly, that the Salvadorean crisis has important political implications for U.S. policy all over the world. Third, we need to look hard at our program, based on the assumption that this is a very serious problem for the United States. (S)

Secretary Vance said that he is operating under that assumption. The big question he has is, do we have enough funds to do the job? (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked what it would take to counter the Left in El Salvador. (S)

Secretary Vance said that there is a real mess down there now. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we need a combination of economic and political measures to deal with the problem there. Perhaps we also need a Presidential statement. (S)

Ambassador Owen said that this is a very different situation than in Afghanistan. A Presidential statement there drew the line. A Presidential statement on El Salvador could well be counterproductive. (S)

Graham Claytor said that what we need is a multilateral cover. We should focus on trying to get one or two other countries in with arms or advisers, and then we could send in the MTT’s. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we make absolutely clear to the Mexicans and the Cubans that there are certain things we just will not tolerate. In that sense it should be a little like Afghanistan; we did a lot in that case that the Russians did not anticipate. Perhaps we should try to get this across to them before the event in El Salvador. (S)

Ambassador Owen said that it was a lot harder to do things in El Salvador. What we are doing in economic aid to El Salvador is not negligible. If we are going to think about a supplemental, then we’re not talking about trying to get any money in until at least July. (S)

Secretary Vance asked whether the $200M requested by the Salvadorean junta for balance of payments support represented a valid request. (S)

Ambassador Bowdler said that we need to look at that very carefully. (S)

Ambassador Owen asked whether there was any way that we could speed up aid to El Salvador. Secretary Vance said that part of the problem is that we can’t get the junta to move on it quickly. (S)

Ambassador Bowdler [1 line not declassified] (S)

Ambassador Owen said that if this case is that important, we should send a high-level emissary to the region. (S)

Secretary Vance said that he supports that idea, if we do not get an immediate response to the request for multilateral support for El Salvador. (S)

Ambassador Bowdler said that the Andean mission would be making a report by next Wednesday.⁵ We should follow-up after that report with Ambassador Luers and in the other capitals. (S)

Secretary Vance said that we should go in and urge the Spanish and the Germans to help. We should send Todman to Madrid and we should also invite the Germans in to meet with us. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should press them further, diplomatically, and consider sending an emissary. On the Pope, we are already contacting him, but perhaps we should consider more. (S)

Secretary Vance asked whether we needed any increases in FMS. Ambassador Bowdler said that we need the MTTs in there first; then, we should find out what more they will need. Dr. Brzezinski said that we should beef up the CIA and DOD; these agencies should let us know if we need an increase in their personnel. (S)

David Aaron asked whether we are structurally prepared to deal with this problem well. He suggested we consider setting up a task force on El Salvador and Honduras in order to give full-time regular attention. Ambassador Bowdler said that he would recommend that Jim Cheek chair such a task force. Dr. Brzezinski said that would be very useful. The task force could meet regularly and send reports to the NSC and to State. David Aaron said that the task force could also develop psywar plans, and think about propaganda initiatives. Secretary Vance asked if we should develop additional reprogramming of $300,000 for IMET. Ambassador Bowdler said that we should. Secretary Vance said that in that case, let’s develop the proposals. Secretary Vance asked whether we should grant Salvador 12-year financing of FMS rather than 7 years. He also asked that we take another look at the balance-of-payments request by El Salvador. (S)

Claytor suggested that CIA and DOD develop a plan to interdict the flow of guerrillas and arms into the area. Secretary Vance asked Turner to develop a paper on what Mexico and Panama are doing, and what we should do, about that. Secretary Vance said that the Panamanians may be helping the guerrillas get passports, much as they did with the case of Nicaragua. (S)

Jack Davis of CIA said that the Panamanians are on the fence right now, and they want to be on the winning side. Secretary Vance said that we should send Ambassador Moss in to talk with Torrijos on this soon. Ambassador Bowdler said that we should try to involve the Mexicans, perhaps through an economic regional plan. But first we need to find out their intentions. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he realizes the sensitivity of the region, but he wondered if it really is counterproductive to let them know that we care about what’s going on there. Isn’t it worse if the area thinks that we don’t give a damn? (S)

Secretary Vance said that the region will look much more at what we do than what we say. Dr. Brzezinski said that a private message is what he is talking about. Ambassador Owen asked whether we have made clear to the Nicaraguans our concern about this matter, and Ambassador Bowdler said that he had gotten a flat statement from Borge, Nicaragua’s Minister of Interior, that the Nicaraguan government is not supporting the guerrilla groups in any way at this time. Pastor suggested that the President send a letter to several of these Heads of State, expressing our concern and the seriousness with which we view the issue. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should suggest a letter from President Carter to the Heads of Government of the region, perhaps including Panama and Mexico, restating our commitment to non-intervention, but expressing concern about what the Cubans are doing and about the problems in the area, and what we would be able to accept. He said that the acceptance of the principle of non-intervention by the United States does not entail a license for others to intervene. The message must be very carefully drafted. Secretary Vance agreed to try that idea. (S)

David Aaron asked DOD and CIA what kind of local and other forces would be necessary to cope with the threat in the region. He wondered whether the scale of our effort would be commensurate with the threat that we sense. What do we really need? (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we are really faced with a dilemma. We have moved to a policy of non-intervention, but we need to make others understand that American policy does not mean a green light for others. Our policy depends on others’ actions. (S)

Ambassador Owen said that we should convey concern to the governments of Mexico and Nicaragua that our policies to them and their policies to others will affect our relationship. Our posture should be firm. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that at the same time, however, we want to stick with the same course that we have developed from the beginning. The major theme in the message is that we don’t want to reverse history. (S)

In response to a question from Secretary Vance, about whether this should be an oral or written message, Dr. Brzezinski suggested we decide this once we receive the letter and check the circumstances. He asked what capabilities do we have to divide the Left. (S)

Admiral Turner [1 line not declassified] We now have a counter-terrorist program, but not a counter-insurgency program yet. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked Mr. Bowdler whether the Colombians will be very helpful on training against guerrillas. Bowdler said their experience is extensive but ineffectual. (S)

Mr. Pastor pointed out the necessity of trying to give the Junta a sense of momentum. To do this, we will need to help them regain support from at least one or two of the moderate left groups which have gone to the left. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he would consider writing a simple letter to the Pope. He had discussed Central America with the Pope during their dinner in Washington. He asked if State could give him a draft.⁶ Secretary Vance said that State had already talked to Cassaroli, so this won’t be news to the Pope, but the important point is the Pope has to get to Romero, and call him back from Salvador to talk to him. (S)

Deputy Secretary Claytor asked about our ability to intercept arms shipments. Turner said that there are persistent reports about commercial airlines bringing in military equipment, but we haven’t been able to nail this down yet. Jack Davis said it is important to give Honduras a capability to move against the apparat which is being set up there. (S)

Mr. Aaron asked whether there are Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras, whom we have trained, who could be helpful. He said that he sensed that there is a lack of cadres to intercept such arms shipments. (S)

Mr. Davis said that there are people who could be used, but he didn’t think that we should use Nicaraguans. He would recommend we devote much more time to building up Honduran capabilities. (S)

Mr. Aaron said that we need dozens of people, not just one or two in the area. Unless this is a major organizational effort, we will not be able to succeed. (S)

Mr. Bowdler said that there is too much of a risk to get the Nicaraguans involved. He recommends that we beef up our military group [less than 1 line not declassified] in both countries. (S)

General Pustay [1 line not declassified] He also said that we need a few victories in order to change the momentum. (S)

Mr. Pastor [1 line not declassified] If we are going to deal with this growing problem, we are going to need to think in much larger terms than just that. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then summarized the necessary tasks to be done as a result of the meeting:

(1) The CIA should prepare a report suggesting ways to divide the extremist groups in El Salvador, and persuade the moderate left groups to give their support to the Junta.⁷ (S)

(2) State should continue to encourage the Vatican to try to influence the Salvadorean church in a favorable direction and should prepare a letter for Dr. Brzezinski’s possible use. (S)

(3) State Department, in consultation with CIA and Defense, should prepare a report describing the threat to established governments in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, and propose alternative ways to cope with this.⁸ (S)

(The other tasks suggested by Dr. Brzezinski are in his tasking memorandum of January 31, 1980.)⁹ (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 109, SCC–274, 2/15/80, El Salvador. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. For the summary of conclusions of the meeting, see Tab A, Document 407.
2. In telegram 542 from San Salvador, January 24, the Embassy reported on Bowdler and Devine’s January 23 meeting with the members of the JRG and Foreign Minister Chavez Mena: “Bowdler cited profound USG interest in JRG success in its reform effort and willingness to help.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800042–0519) Bowdler reported on his trip to El Salvador in telegram 529 from San Salvador, January 24: “My discussions have served to confirm internal conflicts and drift but have turned up little that is new.” He also noted that “the far left meanwhile is picking up in strength,” as indicated by the January 22 demonstration, which “achieved two objectives:—it showed marked progress toward unity and drawing power;—the shooting cast it in the role of the victim and gave it more grist for attacking the PDC-military alliance.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1860) The Washington Post reported on January 23: “At least 20 persons were killed and more than 120 wounded yesterday when a street demonstration organized by El Salvador’s newly formed united revolutionary front ended in a gun battle with government and paramilitary forces.” (“20 Die as Gun Battle Ends Demonstration in El Salvador,” Washington Post, January 23, 1980, p. A26)
3. In telegram 545 from San Salvador, January 24, the Embassy reported that Majano had “restated the case for multilateral cover for dispatch” of U.S. Military Training Teams to El Salvador during the second day of Bowdler’s visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1853)
4. February 4.
5. February 6.
6. Tarnoff sent Brzezinski a draft letter from Brzezinski to Pope John Paul II on January 31. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 182, SCC–261, El Salvador, 1/28/80)
7. See footnote 6, Document 409.
8. See Document 410.
9. In a January 31 memorandum to Vance, Brown, McIntyre, Jones, and Turner, Brzezinski requested a number of additional reports (described in Document 407). (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 20, El Salvador: 1/80) For the outcome of Brzezinski’s instructions given in the January 31 memorandum, see Document 411 and footnote 8 thereto.