Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

410. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 12, 1980

SUBJECT

• Mini SCC/I Meeting—White House Situation Room 12 February 1980

• Chairman

  • Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. William G. Bowdler, State
• Mr. Jim Cheek, State
• Ambassador Robert White, State
• Lt. Gen. John Pustay, JCS
• Mr. Frank Kramer, ISA
• Maj. Gen. Robert L. Schweitzer, USA
• Mr. Robert Pastor, NSA
• Representative from the Department of Justice
• Representative from OMB
• [name not declassified] CIA

1. Maj. Gen. Robert L. Schweitzer, Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy (DCSOPS), who recently returned from a trip to Honduras, was asked by Mr. Aaron to give the group his appreciation of the situation in Honduras. The General reported that people and materiel were being infiltrated through Honduras to support subversive activities in El Salvador and Guatemala. He pointed to the Coco and Patuca Rivers and the Gulf of Fonseca as the primary infiltration routes adding that air infiltration is also taking place via light aircraft using remote airfields. He stated that Hondurans are receiving guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Insurgency in Honduras is presently focused on the establishment of logistical and operational support sites. According to General Schweitzer these small insurgency-support groups are vulnerable to interdiction. The General claims the Honduran armed forces can be expected to fight but will depend heavily on U.S. materiel and training support to meet the threat in Honduras. General Schweitzer stated that the interdiction operations should include: (a) surveillance and interdiction operations in the Gulf of Fonseca and other coastal areas; (b) surveillance and interdiction of river infiltration routes; (c) surveillance and interdiction of air infiltration into remote landing sites; (d) ground reconnaissance and combat patrols to conduct border surveillance and interdiction operations; (e) long range surveillance and interdiction operations along remote infiltration routes; (f) a capability for rapid reinforcement of long range patrols to exploit information gathered by these patrols; and (g) capture insurgent personnel and equipment. Special operation companies should be organized, trained, equipped and deployed in small boats, helicopters, ground vehicles or on foot as appropriate. These units will require special training and equipment to accomplish their assigned tasks. Both aerial surveillance and surface surveillance would be required to combat seaborne infiltration.

2. Mr. Aaron stated he had received the DOD and CIA covert action plans for El Salvador.² While finding the CIA plan on track, he did not feel that it was enough and said that more of an effort must be made. He stated he would like to see a dramatic strengthening of our efforts in Salvador and Honduras. He advised Ambassador White to immediately increase the size of his mission in San Salvador. Mr. Aaron emphasized that our efforts in El Salvador must be given top priority adding that the Middle East is important for oil but Salvador is our own backyard. Mr. Aaron also stated that more personnel must be added to those elements in Headquarters working on the Central American problem. He talked about a special group to draw up and implement an aggressive game plan for each country as well as the entire region. It was suggested that what was more urgent were decisions on the plans already presented. Mr. Bowdler will write an action memorandum addressing the issues requiring decisions in Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala for the SCC meeting scheduled for 14 February 1980.³

3. Mr. Aaron requested and the group was provided an update on training in Salvador (see below). They were also informed that a training program for Honduras would be under way in the next two weeks.

a. A [less than 1 line declassified] counterterrorism team began a four to six week course in VIP protection on 25 January 1980 in San Salvador. There are 31 students representing the Estado Major Presidencial (EMP) which includes members of the national police, presidential security force, national guard and treasury police. The VIP course will be followed by a one-week course on Incident Management for higher-level security officials. A follow-up VIP protection course is currently being planned for approximately mid-April and will be expanded to include executive driving.

b. A [less than 1 line not declassified] team is scheduled to arrive in Salvador on [date not declassified] to conduct a Technical Defense Measures training course for approximately 25 security management personnel.

c. An independent contract annuitant expert in counter-intelligence arrived [date not declassified] to initiate contact with the newly formed Salvadoran National Analysis Center (CNA) in preparation for training the 13 members of CNA. Another [less than 1 line not declassified] officer will join the independent contractor on [1 line not declassified] to prepare, plan and coordinate the training schedule. The independent contractor will remain in Salvador for six months [1 line not declassified].

d. Terrorist devices as well as threat-and-response training for nine new candidates to the local bomb squad is scheduled for April 1980 at a training site in the U.S.

4. In conclusion, the following was noted in describing problems in each of the three countries:

a. Honduras—the least complicated; the government is cooperative and we should be able to provide whatever help and equipment is necessary.

b. El Salvador—the most delicate; the PDC/Military relationship may not last. State is concerned that if the MITs are brought into the country, this could cause a crisis in the PDC and force it to leave the government. There is concern over a possible split in the military. It is also recognized that if we do nothing, this could be even more dangerous for the present junta and government.

c. Guatemala—the most difficult because of the nature of the government and the human rights issue.

5. Mr. Bowdler scheduled a meeting for 1000 hours on 13 February 1980 and requested a new memo on staffing requirements for Central America.⁴ The highest priority is to increase the staff of the U.S. Mission in San Salvador.

[name not declassified]
Chief, Latin America Division

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 11: (SCC) Central America. Secret. No other substantive record of the February 12 SCC meeting has been found. Drafted by [name not declassified] on February 13.
2. See Document 409.
3. The meeting took place on February 15. See Document 412.
4. Attached but not printed is a February 13 memorandum from [name not declassified] to Bowdler, in which [name not declassified] provided the CIA response to the request for staffing. In a February 13 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor described the February 12 SCCM as “an extremely frustrating meeting, and DOD and CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] pretended that the problems we were having in Central America were because of our human rights policy. I am not aware of anyone arguing that that is a problem in El Salvador and Honduras, nor do I think it would be useful at this point to bring Guatemala in because: (a) it is not an urgent problem as the others; (b) there is absolutely no evidence of guerrilla arms going to Salvador or Honduras from Guatemala; and (c) if Honduras and El Salvador can make their transition towards social reforms, that will be the best policy we could send to Guatemala.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 20, El Salvador: 2/12–24/80)