Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

407. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 29, 1980

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy to El Salvador

On January 28 I chaired an SCC to hear Ambassador Bowdler’s report on his trip to El Salvador and the rest of Central America and to decide what additional steps were needed to bolster the new government in El Salvador and prevent the extreme left from seizing power.²

The CIA has written a report which describes the extraordinarily rapid growth of guerrilla groups and their popular front organizations in El Salvador in the past year.³ Hardcore insurgents have grown from 200 in 1977 to more than 2,000 today. Through kidnappings in 1979, these groups may have amassed $40 million for weapons and operations. With Castro’ s personal influence, the two leading guerrilla groups, their front organizations, and the Salvadorean Communist Party merged this month, giving them added strength. The CIA concludes that “if external support for the insurgents is half of what it was in Nicaragua, the extremists in El Salvador have a better-than-even chance to seize and hold power after the anarchy and violence they will sow.”

The conclusions of the meeting are summarized at Tab A. The SCC agreed to follow-up in the following ways:⁴

1. [less than 1 line not declassified] State will prepare a report suggesting ways to divide the extremist groups and persuade the moderate-left groups to give their support to the junta.

2. State and NSC will encourage Vatican officials to try to influence Salvador’s Archbishop Romero to support moderate change through the new junta.

3. CIA, DOD and State will prepare a report describing the threat in Central America and examining alternative ways to cope with it, including possible increases of U.S. personnel and resources. DOD will also examine military contingencies, a counterinsurgency proposal, and alternatives for intercepting illegal arms shipments to the guerrillas.

4. State will prepare draft messages for you to Heads of State in the region in order to demonstrate your personal concern with recent developments and to seek their cooperation. CIA will do a report analyzing the views and activities of Mexico and Panama.

5. State will chair a special Inter-Agency Task Force on El Salvador and Honduras to monitor developments closely and assure a coherent response.

6. State will examine a number of questions on aid, FMS, IMET, and balance of payments support.

The SCC concluded that the deteriorating situation in El Salvador should be viewed with the greatest seriousness by the U.S. Government as it has enormous implications for the region and for the credibility of the U.S. in the world. We need to follow developments there very closely in the weeks ahead.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A.⁵

Tab A

Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting⁶

Washington, January 28, 1980, 1:30–2:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US Policy to El Salvador and Central America (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Ambassador William Bowdler, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

• OSD

  • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
  • Frank Kramer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

• JCS

  • Lt General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

• OMB

  • Ed Sanders, Deputy Associate Director for International Affairs

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Ambassador Henry Owen

• NSC

  • Robert Pastor

Summary of Conclusions

1. Salvador Junta. The current junta is a coalition of moderate military elements and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC); it is weak and in a tenuous position. In order for this junta to stand a reasonable chance of success, it must broaden its base, develop an effective social and political program, and strengthen its defenses from the extreme left and right. We should try to persuade the extreme right not to overthrow the junta, while the junta approaches the extreme left with a political-military strategy. The junta has informed us that U.S. assistance—particularly military assistance—will be easier to accept politically if we do it as part of a multilateral effort, involving the Andean Pact countries, Spain, and West Germany.

2. Extreme Left. The CIA presented a report which describes the extraordinarily rapid growth of guerrilla groups and their popular front organizations in El Salvador in the past year. Hardcore insurgents have grown from 200 in 1977 to more than 2,000 today, and terrorist-incited violence has increased as dramatically. Through kidnappings in 1979, these groups may have amassed $40 million which they use to purchase weapons and coordinate an extensive guerrilla network. With Castro’ s personal influence, the two leading guerrila groups, their front organizations, and the Salvadorean Communist Party merged this month, giving them added strength. Membership in the front groups already exceeds 60,000 activists.

3. Divide and Weaken the Extreme Left. CIA and State will prepare a report suggesting ways to divide the extremist groups, and to try to persuade the moderate-left groups to stop supporting the extreme left and start assisting the junta. The Archbishop has recently expressed his support for the left, and we will continue our efforts to ask the Pope if he would invite the Archbishop to the Vatican to seek a change in his views.

4. Threat and Response. CIA, DOD, and State will prepare a report examining the leftist threat in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala and the capabilities of each of these governments to cope with that threat. The report will also focus on what additional US resources ([less than 1 line not declassified] DOD personnel) are necessary to assist these governments to cope effectively with the threat. DOD will also prepare two papers: (1) on US military requirements that could become necessary if the situation in El Salvador should deteriorate very rapidly; and (2) on a counter-insurgency program which the Salvadorean government could implement either by themselves or with our assistance.

5. Multilateral Support. The junta has approached the Andean group (which has a mission in El Salvador now), Spain, and West Germany for assistance.⁷ Independently, we have urged each of these governments to help. State will also draft a possible message for you to send to the Heads of State of these governments, expressing the seriousness with which we view developments in El Salvador and your hope that we will work together to assist the new government there. State will prepare a separate and individualized message for the Heads of State of Mexico, Panama, and Nicaragua, stating clearly that the U.S. policy of nonintervention should not imply that we accept the intervention of other governments in El Salvador. If current efforts to obtain multilateral support for the junta do not bear fruit, we will recommend the sending of a Presidential Emissary to these countries.⁸ CIA was also tasked to do a paper on how the governments of Mexico and Panama view the problem in El Salvador, what they are doing, and whether they would cooperate with a broader effort to assist the Government of El Salvador.⁹

6. Economic and Military Assistance. The U.S. has informed the junta that we are prepared to increase our economic and military assistance at their request. While awaiting their specific request, State will examine: (1) ways to expedite the transfer of economic aid; (2) whether the Salvadorean request for $200 million balance of payments support is a legitimate request or whether it should be referred to the IMF; (3) whether an expanded US aid program is needed and how we should relate the international banks to such an effort; (4) how we can reprogram additional IMET, above the $300,000 currently requested; and (5) whether we should grant 12-year FMS financing terms rather than seven years.¹⁰

7. US Government Organization. We agreed to set up a special inter-agency Task Force in the State Department under Deputy Assistant Secretary Cheek to monitor developments in El Salvador, and also Honduras, on a regular basis, to respond to questions from the SCC, and to raise important issues for high-level consideration.

8. Nicaragua. The economic situation is likely to reach crisis proportions in the next six months unless the government receives substantial amounts of economic aid. If there is no progress within this period, Ambassador Bowdler believes that the Nicaraguan government will either crack down and turn sharply to the left, or it will adopt a more pragmatic approach. The chances of the latter occurring are not good, but would be increased if the US and western governments are playing large roles at that time. We will repeat to the Nicaraguan government our grave concern with any possible Nicaraguan government involvement in El Salvador.

9. Central America. The Honduran and Guatemalan governments are targets of guerrilla groups, and the pattern of escalating anti-government political activity is very similar to what has occurred in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Honduras is already conduit of arms supplies to the Salvadorean guerrillas, and CIA and the Department of Defense will re-examine the possibility of intercepting these arms shipments.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, El Salvador, 7/79–2/80. Secret. Carter initialed the first page of the memorandum.
2. See Document 406.
3. Reference is to a January 24 memorandum from Turner to the National Security Council regarding the “threat of a leftist extremist takeover in El Salvador.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 14, Folder 3: SCC Meeting El Salvador, Nicaragua)
4. See footnote 9, Document 406.
5. Carter indicated his approval and signed his initial.
6. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
7. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this sentence: “Best approach.”
8. Carter underlined “Presidential Emissary” and wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
9. Carter wrote “good” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
10. Carter wrote “work with OMB” in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.