Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

379. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in El Salvador¹

Washington, August 18, 1979, 1704Z

216924. Exdis for Ambassador Devine. Subject: Policy Toward El Salvador.

1. S-Entire text

2. The President has approved the PRC recommendation of August 2 that we should seek to secure establishment of a real and credible electoral process leading to free municipal/legislative elections in March 1980 in return for which we would be prepared to offer a quid pro quo of economic and security assistance.² Our immediate objective is to arrest the rapidly advancing polarization and avoid an otherwise almost certain violent confrontation between the government and the extreme left by a) strengthening moderate, legitimate forces and b) providing an electoral process capable of channeling and releasing the build-up of internal, social, economic and political tensions.

3. An immediate approach to President Romero to seek such an understanding has been approved, and we will be providing you shortly with further instructions as to the modalities. We expect to send a high-level official from Washington for this purpose.³

4. President Romero’s August 16 “national impact” announcement (San Salvador 4644) provides a good base—and reason—for opening such a discussion and pinning down promises made.⁴ The list of reform measures we would seek and the assistance we would offer are listed below. These do not cover all the reforms we would ideally wish. Rather, they are those a) which we think can realistically be expected in the circumstances, and b) which relate to the immediate political objective of trying to avoid another Nicaragua. These are also intended as quid pro quos, that is one set depends upon the other. There will, however, be some need to phase them in relation to each other, i.e. we would not expect to have a complete package of reforms accomplished and in hand before we move at all, nor would we provide all our assistance in advance. Thus, any understanding with Romero will have to define some step by step approach we will be prepared to deliver on our promises as he delivers on his, bearing in mind that delivery by him would have to include acceptance by appropriate leaders so that a consensus and true electoral process is in fact established.

5. Our discussion with Romero would start in recognition of the significant promises he made August 16. On that basis we would seek:

A) Confirmation of our understanding that his commitment to free elections and to respecting the results is sincere and true, and not cosmetic or dissembling, and his understanding that this is a sine qua non for our further cooperation. Further actions by him—formal proclamation, decree, etc.—would be useful.

B) Reform of the central electoral council to ensure credible representation of all parties and reform of the electoral law to ensure guarantees of a free election. (FYI: We understand that reforms are planned but that these have not been drawn up in consultation with the parties; thus there is the risk of the worst of all worlds—the GOES believing that it had done something and the parties rejecting the reforms as unacceptable.)

C) Actual implementation of the invitation to the OAS to verify the election. On this point we want to urge OAS expert presence as soon as possible to testify to the campaign’s integrity as well as the voting on election day.

D) GOES guarantee of the security of the candidates.

E) Movement toward concrete dialogue and understandings among the GOES, political parties, military, and business sectors as to the “rules of the game” for a credible free electoral process. (FYI: Fidel Chavez’ suggestions in this regard as to the direction the dialogue should now take seems sensible and worth supporting—San Salvador 4564. End FYI.)⁵

F) Implementation of Romero’s promise to invite the ICRC to investigate prisons and the question of political prisoners.

G) Avoidance of indiscriminate violence in controlling strikes and demonstrations.

H) Sincere GOES efforts to end private death squads and violence, and an increase in the discipline of security units. This is an important point which we shall have to stress. Reports of death squad activity undercut the GOES’ credibility, belie its sincerity and affect our capacity to cooperate with it.

I) Recognizing the GOES’ concern with the labor situation, we would urge a revision of the labor code and labor regulations, perhaps by a multi-party commission with wide civic representations, to provide alternatives to illegal strikes.

6. In return we would be prepared to do the following (to the extent permitted under U.S. law):

A) Approve export license applications for reasonable amounts of commercially purchased military equipment.

B) Reprogram modest levels of IMET and FMS financing for FY 80.

C) Provide assistance for a special urban impact aid program in addition to the longer term rural development thrust currently under way. (FYI: We are thinking of a 10–15 million dollar program if we go for a supplemental appropriation; a smaller figure would be involved if the decision is made to reprogram. End FYI.)

D) Proceed with FY 80 planned and programmed aid projects.

E) Support pending non-BHN IFI projects, assuming they meet normal economic criteria—a development corporation 10 million dollar industrial credit in the IBRD and a 4.0 million dollar pre-investment studies loan in the IDB.

F) With regard to paragraph 6 above, it should be understood that actual implementation of several of these measures especially B, C, D and E, would depend upon a clear major commitment and steps by the GOES, which provide obvious indication of a change in the existing pattern, including the security forces’ human rights performance.

8. In relation to any representations we may make we note the following:

—We will have to follow a delicate line, i.e., reassurance to the GOES that we are neither trying to destroy them nor have we written them off, but at the same time achieving serious and real reforms by them which will clearly have institutional changes as a consequence.

—Moreover, as we consider how to proceed on this track with El Salvador, we will bear in mind the pace and level of our relationship with Nicaragua.

9. We would appreciate any comments you may have on all the above as soon as possible.⁶

Christopher

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador Telegrams, 8/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Guatemala City, Managua, Tegucigalpa, Panama City, San José, Caracas, and Bogotá. Drafted by Vaky; cleared in AID/LA, L/PM, DOD/ISA, OMB, T, S/P, PM, HA, NSC, ACDA, H, S/S–O, and Treasury; approved by Christopher.
2. Vaky sent a briefing memorandum to Vance on August 8, which he termed “an initial attempt to ‛scrub’ the quid pro quos discussed at the PRC.” (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, unlabeled folder) In an August 14 memorandum to Carter, (see Document 477) Vance proposed exploring electoral reform with Romero along with the “quid pro quo” approach on economic and military assistance.
3. See Document 381.
4. In telegram 4644 from San Salvador, August 16, the Embassy reported that Romero had made his announcement of “national impact” that day. This initiative included electoral law reform, the return of political exiles, OAS supervision of the Presidential election, and Red Cross investigations at prisons. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, unlabeled folder)
5. In telegram 4564 from San Salvador, August 14, the Embassy reported that in talks with Embassy officials, Christian Democratic Party member Fidel Chavez stated that the time for further dialogue between his party, the Church, the Salvadoran Government, and private business groups was past and that “each sector interested in moderate political change should present a concrete set of proposals.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790373–0868)
6. Devine replied in telegram 4738 from San Salvador, August 21, by endorsing the proposed scenario, stressing the need for Romero to take “concrete steps if there is to be any hope of organizing free election with opposition participation,” and warning that if the approach failed the U.S. Government “will then be in serious quandary and must consider what, if anything, could still be done to protect our interests in El Salvador and Central America.” (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador, Telegrams, 8/79) In telegram 4949 from San Salvador, August 30, Devine reported that he had “initiated” the policy described in his instructions and remarked: “We should seek concrete human rights and electoral reform improvement—as opposed to mere words and declarations of intent—but then be prepared to move forward pari passu matching deeds with deeds and publicly explaining that this is our rationale.” (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador Telegrams, 8/79)