Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

378. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 14, 1979

SUBJECT

• US Policy to El Salvador (U)

Yesterday, I had lunch with Joseph Blatchford, former Peace Corps Director and currently a lawyer in Washington and lobbyist for El Salvador. Joe is also an old friend of mine, and he knows Latin America very well and has a good rapport with President Romero of El Salvador. He gave me an excellent readout of the views of Romero and the atmosphere in El Salvador, and he gave me some useful recommendations which I will describe below. (S)

He said the Salvadoreans are still “reeling” from Vaky’s visit.² Their interpretation of Vaky’s message was that Salvador had to stick its neck out and undertake a series of reforms between now and the March 1980 elections; only after March would the US be prepared to assist the government. Romero and others believe that if the US adopts such a standoffish position, they cannot undertake these reforms. Romero sent a delegation from his Defense Ministry to Argentina and Uruguay to seek advice on how to deal with the terrorism problem. (Both Joe and I agree that it would not be feasible for Salvador to pursue the Uruguayan strategy, and he is trying to convince Romero of that.) (S)

I told Blatchford that the Salvadorean perception of our position is not quite accurate. We are willing to be helpful to the Salvadorean government in this interim period between now and March 1980, if the government can take steps which are viewed by the Christian Democrats (PDC) and other legitimate opposition groups as credible commitments to the democratic process. I said that my personal view was that the situation in El Salvador was becoming desperate, and that time was precious and short. The Christian Democratic Party will have its convention in September, and if the party divides, as current intelligence reports suggest might be the case, between those who continue to seek free elections and those who have given up, we may find ourselves at a point of no return. I emphasized that it was my personal view that the Romero government needed to do something dramatic now in order to attract the legitimacy and the support of the middle democratic parties. For too long, the Romero government has viewed the PDC as their enemy, rather than the hope which they really represent. If Romero wants to save his country from a civil war or a violent revolution, he really needs to do something dramatic like accelerate the electoral process so that elections could occur this Fall for Congress and the Presidency, or seek a coalition government. (S)

Blatchford said that it was impossible to get Romero to consider accelerating the electoral process. He acknowledged that the Romero government views the PDC as a threat, and he, working with the Salvadorean Ambassador in Washington, has been trying to change that. The Romero government feels pushed by the State Department beyond their capacity to undertake reforms. (I explained that they were being pushed by events not by us, and Blatchford accepted that while at the same time reiterating that the Salvadorean government’s perception is different.) He said the Salvadoreans are genuinely thinking about a “Urguayan solution,” and if that happens, the 200 assassinations a month which the government is currently sanctioning, will be multiplied by ten. (S)

Blatchford said that if we wanted the Salvadorean government to do something dramatic, we had to be prepared to do something dramatic as well. After requesting a meeting with the President, Romero was doubly disappointed to not only fail to get a meeting, but to get a “shock treatment” from Vaky. Joe said that if the message was what I said rather than what the Salvadoreans interpreted Vaky as saying—that is, if we are prepared to help them now undertake the reforms we want, that message might succeed in breaking the roadblock in our dialogue. But he insisted, the way the message is conveyed is as important as the message itself. We should not deliver the message from our Ambassador Devine to Romero nor should we use Vaky or Christopher, who are not credible to the government. He said the only one who is credible with the Salvadoreans at this time is you. They perceive you as the only one in the government who understands the problems of subversion and Communism. If you deliver the message, that would have tremendous impact. He recommended that you consider meeting with Romero at a half-way point, say Miami or New Orleans. Alternatively, we should invite the Vice President here to meet with you. (It would not be “correct” to invite Romero to Washington to meet you, and not see the President, and Vaky agrees with me that a meeting with the President now is out of the question. Vaky also agrees that a meeting with the Salvadorean Vice President will not do the trick since he does not exercise sufficient influence on Romero or the rest of the government.) (S)

I spoke to Vaky about both recommendations, and he agreed with the logic of your meeting with Romero, but wondered whether the Secretary would have problems with it. I said that I was certain that your preference would be not to do such a meeting, but I felt that Blatchford’s point was right on the mark, and we really did need something dramatic like a meeting between you and Romero. Vaky agreed and suggested that I ask you to speak to the Secretary about it. (S)

We are really running out of time and we need to convey the message of our new approach in an effective and persuasive manner by the end of the week. I am persuaded that a Brzezinski-Romero meeting in Miami (with Vaky and I present) would do the trick, and I strongly recommend that you raise this with the Secretary and seek his concurrence. If you and the Secretary approve, I will begin preparing talking points with Vaky for the meeting. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you speak to Secretary Vance about this. (U)³

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, El Salvador, 7/79–2/80. Secret. Sent for action. Aaron wrote at the top of the page: “ZB—Seems a little panicky. DA.” Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “Let Vaky recommend this to CV.”
2. See Document 376.
3. Brzezinski did not indicate his preference with respect to this recommendation; see, however, footnote 1, above.