Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

381. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, August 25, 1979, 0200Z

4851. For Assistant Secretary Vaky from Bowdler. Subj: Conversation With President Romero.

1. (S-Entire text)

2. Accompanied by Ambassador Devine, I met for one hour and 40 minutes this afternoon (Aug 24) with President Romero. Earlier in the day we had called on the Foreign Minister to give him a brief of the points I was to make to the President and thereby prepare the way for a more immediate reaction on the part of the President.

3. After an exchange of pleasantries based on my previous service in El Salvador, I went through a detailed presentation of the talking points approved by the Department.² In doing this I underscored the delicacy of dealing with essentially internal matters but at the same time made clear our common concern in his government taking meaningful action to prevent a further deterioration of the political situation via a steady return to participatory democracy through the electoral process and an end to violence.

4. President Romero reacted favorably to the presentation, expressing his “great satisfaction” for what I had to say. He referred to his August 16 program³ and proceeded to detail the concrete steps he was taking to implement the program. In summary these were:

—Action taken preceding day by legislative assembly to expedite replacement of members of Electoral Council through partial amendment of the electoral code;

—Invitation to political parties to join with him next week in studying appropriate reform of electoral law;

—Conversations already commenced with representatives of the Red Cross from Managua looking toward early formalized invitation to ICRD;

—Planned invitation to OAS to send observers for March 9 elections. At my suggestion President also said he would be willing to invite OAS participation in reform of electoral law and observance of such acts as swearing in of the new members of the Electoral Council;

—Formulation of official instructions to Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Interior and other appropriate entities to permit return of political exiles. (In this connection he indicated that he had spoken recently to Fidel Chavez Mena about the return of Napoleon Duarte. A meeting between Chavez and Duarte was to have taken place this week in Costa Rica and he was expecting a report back from Chavez sometime next week. In this connection he expressed the view that the sooner Duarte returns the better and that any delay only worsens the problem.)

—Complete reorganization of ORDEN to clarify its mission;

—Discussions with the military of their movement back to the barracks and of his own replacement by civilian as next President. He noted that he is already gradually returning officials to the barracks at the rate of about one or two a month. With respect to a civilian successor, he said that great majority of military had received this idea rather well.

5. With respect to the measures we might take in response to GOES steps, Romero singled out two as of special importance. One related to the exchange of information to prevent clandestine shipment of arms to El Salvador. To this he added his interest in receiving technical assistance in the training of his intelligence and investigative forces. In this connection he made clear that he did not want experts from countries that had similar security problems and had dealt with them in anti-democratic ways, e.g. Argentina and Uruguay. The second point had to do with support for financial assistance both bilateral and from multilateral agencies. Romero pointed out the serious economic problems created by the closing of factories and the flight of capital. This trend, he said, must be reversed. Referring to his interest for help on anti-insurgency pointed out we no longer had a police program and the difficulties inherent in providing assistance of this nature in the face of a continued high level of violence from sources other than the extreme left. Romero made no reference to steps involving commercial sales, FMS or training.

6. At various points throughout the conversation I emphasized the importance of finding a means for bringing leaders of moderate groups into an effective consultative-participatory role in the implementation of political reform and social and economic development. I also stressed the importance of putting an end to violence from right-wing groups or entities associated with the government. Only in this way could it be made clear that responsibility for continued violence rests with the extreme left. His response to these points was that it would cause him no problem to invite such participation but the opposition leaders almost certainly would not respond just as they had not responded to his invitation to participate in the National Forum. Ambassador Devine and I pointed out that attitudes within TNC opposition groups are presently changing, that people are approaching us to discuss the seriousness of today’s problems and that this might well create a moment of opportunity to reissue the inviatation in the expectation that this time he will find a more favorable response. We also indicated that we were urging these groups to work constructively with him and would continue to do so. Another complaint voiced by Romero was that apparent agreements reached by him in private conversations with leaders of the opposition (specifically Christian Democrats) are frequently discarded or ignored by the latter in course of their public statements. (It was evident that he was citing discrepancies between private agreements reached with Fidel Chavez Mena and public statements on TV by Jose Antonio Morales Erlich.)

7. On our talking point regarding avoidance of indiscriminate violence in controlling strikes and revision of the labor code, Romero commented that 90 percent of recent labor disputes are in fact political, that premises are regularly occupied and hostages—including foreign executives—regularly seized and that he has been criticized for softness in dealing with this problem but that as a matter of fact GOES has been very lenient and restrained in its handling of such disputes. Romero noted that his Minister of Labor is already working on revision of the labor code. When I pointed out the importance of also involving other moderate groups in this process in order to enhance the image of broader participation in vital decisions of the government, he replied that his Minister is already consulting with labor and management groups. I pointed out that involvement of the church and universities would also be helpful.

8. At the end of the conversation Romero brought up the situation in Nicaragua. He expressed the fear that Borge was dominating the situation and that radicalization of the revolution was to be expected. I told him that it was premature to reach this conclusion. It is true that the radical elements control the guns and are in a strong position, but it was also important to recognize that moderate elements occupy influential positions. It was in everybody’s interest to strengthen these elements so that they in turn would be in a position to counter radicalization. I made clear that groups in El Salvador could assist in this process. While I do not think that he was convinced that the radicals could be stopped, he at least acknowledged that moderate forces in the civilian sector still held positions of influence.

9. Comment: President Romero had obviously been briefed beforehand by Foreign Minister, received us in friendly fashion, listened to my entire presentation with careful attention, and took the occasion to vent some of his frustrations with what he obviously considers less than fair tactics and positions on [the] part of opposition. He seemed receptive to our ideas but test will come in the implementation of what he said he is prepared to do. Particularly thorny point with which he did not come to grips was high and continuing level of violence emanating from both sides of political spectrum, ways of cutting back on this, and how to go about isolating the extreme left. While we repeatedly stressed the importance of devising means for greater involvement of moderate groups in the decisions bearing on the democratic opening, Romero was not as specific in what he might do in this regard as I would have liked.

Devine

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2487. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Vaky sent a copy of the talking points for Bowdler’s visit to El Salvador to Christopher under in an August 21 memorandum. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, unlabeled folder)
3. See footnote 4, Document 379.