Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

477. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, August 14, 1979

SUBJECT

• Central American Strategy

During my consultations with Latin American Chiefs of State and Foreign Ministers in Quito, Ecuador, August 10 and 11, I found a remarkable consensus regarding the situation in Central America.

With regard to Nicaragua:

—All recognized the potential danger we face in Nicaragua and the presence of Marxists in some key positions. They agreed, however, that it would be a mistake to assume that radical influences will inevitably prevail.

—Virtually all agreed that it was important to assist the new government actively, and to be highly visible in Nicaragua through extension of economic, humanitarian and technical assistance.

—All urged the US to respond promptly and generously to the needs and requests of the new government. All urged that humanitarian and economic aid be extended without “political conditions,” and that what the US did would be central to what eventually happened.

—All urged substantive economic aid; they also urged some response to bilateral requests for military assistance, although they recognized this was more complicated and difficult.

—Most nations are planning or have undertaken economic and humanitarian assistance. The Andean Group is planning extensive help to the new government through the Latin American Economic System organization (SELA). Most are dubious about their capacity to help militarily, but Panama and Costa Rica are aiding the police, and Venezuela is prepared to consider military requests.

With regard to Central America:

—All agreed Honduras was in the best shape of the northern tier countries, was embarked on an encouraging course, and should be assisted.

—All agreed that the situation in El Salvador was dangerous, and that some movement toward a more open system through the electoral process offered the only chance to avoid confrontation and polarization.

—All agreed on the rigidities in the Guatemala situation and potential dangers there, and that moves to reduce these should be encouraged.

A number of Latin American leaders stressed to me that the US was too inactive in Latin America; that there was need for a “new dimension” to our relationship, for more active involvement in and response to Latin American problems and concerns. It was clear that Central American events have become something of a watershed, and have focused the worries and concerns of Latin America on our relationship. This gives us both a challenge and an opportunity.

To respond to the Central American situation specifically, we are undertaking the following lines of action:

With regard to Nicaragua:

—We will continue substantial amounts of food and humanitarian assistance.

—We are requesting reprogramming of $8.5 million of FY 1979 funds for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, and will be proposing substantial funds for FY 1980 for economic reconstruction aid. We have despatched technical personnel to assess reconstruction needs.

—We are encouraging private contacts with the private sector and private institutions in business, labor, media and other sectors.

—We propose to provide a military team to assess and vet Nicaraguan requests for military assistance. We propose to be responsive in terms of training and provision of non-lethal material. Mobile Training Teams can also assist in reconstruction efforts.

—We will provide technical experts and assistance.

With regard to Honduras:

—We will encourage the Honduran Government’s present policy of return to constitutional government, and its social and rural development programs.

—We are planning increases in economic assistance for social and economic development, including rural “impact” programs.

—We will provide modest increases in military training and provision of equipment.

With regard to El Salvador:

—We propose to explore with the President of El Salvador the institution of electoral reforms and a credible electoral process for the March 1980 municipal elections; we would propose to provide a quid pro quo of economic and limited military assistance for human rights and political improvement.

With regard to Guatemala:

—We will continue to press for human rights improvement and to persuade the Guatemala Government to prepare for free elections in the 1982 presidential elections, preferably with a civilian president. We would be prepared to be helpful to the extent we can to achieve these improvements.

Multilaterally:

—We will continue in close consultations with other Latin American nations, especially the democracies, and encourage parallel and coordinated actions.

—I intend to go to the OAS General Assembly meeting in La Paz in October both to demonstrate high-level interest and to continue personal consultations and exchanges.²

—We will strengthen cooperation with regional groups such as the Andean Pact.

Clearly, our Central American strategy—and in Latin America generally—will require substantial resource inputs. We have tried to promote reform in Latin America by persuasion and encouragement. We have sometimes created political vacuums by denial of economic and military assistance, but we have not been able to formulate and deliver on a partnership approach to bring about constructive change. As we have created vacuums, it has been inevitable that others would enter; not just Cuba, but such countries as Panama in Nicaragua or China in Chile. The crisis in Central America now challenges us to formulate a partnership approach in which we provide substantial resources provided constructive change moves forward. Our greatest challenge is in Nicaragua where the devastation has been so great, and where the task of reconstruction will be seen by Nicaraguans and Latins generally as a test of our sincerity and capacity.

Additional resources are clearly required for these new challenges and crises. I will be sending you a separate memorandum outlining the funding I believe is needed for Central America.³

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 83, Sensitive XX: 8/79. Secret. Carter wrote in the top right-hand corner of the page: “Cy—A) Sounds good. B) Severe budget restraints. C) See Zbig’s 2 questions. J.” Reference is to two questions Brzezinski wrote on an undated note: “Two additional issues: 1) How do we reassure those whom we want to undertake reforms that they will be protected from outside subversion; i.e. do we draw the line somehow? 2) How do we discourage, isolate or punish the Cubans—and also entice them into a healthier relationship?” Denend (on behalf of Brzezinski) returned Vance’s memorandum and Brzezinski’s handwritten note to Vance under an August 16 memorandum.
2. October 20–23.
3. See Document 480.