377. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Central America (U).2
Attached at Tab A is an intelligence assessment of Cuba’s strategy for promoting revolution in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.3 At this time, the Cubans are training some of the cadre and encouraging different groups to better coordinate their activities. The scenario is ominous, though the estimate suggests that the Cubans will go slow until after the NAM Summit.4 My guess is that Salvador is headed for a full-scale insurrection by perhaps as early as this Fall, and we need to do something rather dramatic now to get them to focus on the real nature of their problem and to do something that will give the non-Communists a chance. (S)
While Pete was in Salvador,5 he tried out my idea for early elections (this Fall) with President Romero, who deflected by saying they weren’t necessary. I think early elections may be his only hope, and that they could work to halt polarization in its tracks. But they need to be held soon because the Christian Democratic Party is already beginning to split between those who want free elections and those who think the time has passed when the government can be trusted to hold them. Unless we get Romero to move quickly, he will lose the middle to the radicals. The only way to stop the polarization process is to give a rapid injection of legitimacy to the Salvadorean government, and this can only occur by an early, free election. We are very, very fortunate that there is a [Page 943] legitimate and responsible middle in Salvador now—the Christian Democratic Party—but they won’t hold together for long. (S)
We need to get this message of the necessity of early, free elections to Romero, and I propose we use three channels:
(1) General Torrijos, who has a lot of old “school ties” with the Salvadorean military leadership. (S)
(2) Joe Blatchford (former Peace Corps Director), an old friend of mine, and presently Salvador’s lobbyist in Washington. He is trusted by Romero, and I trust him as well. I have discussed Salvador’s problems with him several times, and I believe he would be sympathetic to this approach. (S)
(3) Salvador’s Ambassador Quinonez is smart and savvy. You and/or Secretary Vance should see him. (S)
The message is simple:
—We believe early and free elections in El Salvador (by this Fall) are the only way to stem the polarization and prevent the guerrilla groups from eventually seizing power. (S)
—We are prepared to provide our full support through economic and military assistance during the transition to elections and after. (S)
—The government needs to take steps now to provide the environment within which free elections are possible. The electoral code should be reformed; political prisoners should be released; exiles should be permitted to return; and the killing must cease. Salvador should invite observers and technical advisers from the Andean countries, Costa Rica, and the US to help and to observe the electoral process. The Ecuadorans, in particular, can be helpful in explaining the “retorno” process—where the military oversaw rather than participated in the election. (S)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, Meetings—PRC 120, 8/1/1979. Secret. Sent for information.↩
- Pastor wrote to Brzezinski and Owen on August 1, in advance of an August 2 PRC meeting on Central America, to stress that El Salvador was the most urgent case and needed a dramatic remedy. (See Document 474) The PRC recommendations, approved by Carter, included a quid pro quo of economic and military assistance for human rights and political improvement. In an August 3 memorandum to Brzezinski, forwarding the summary of conclusions of the August 2 PRC meeting, Pastor stressed that the Salvadoran Christian Democratic Party was central to any solution for the country. (See Document 476)↩
- Tab A, attached but not printed, is an August 1979 report prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency entitled “Central America: Short-Term Prospects for Insurgency; Part III: The Vulnerability of the Northern Tier, An Intelligence Assessment.”↩
- See footnote 3, Document 308.↩
- See Document 376.↩