Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

308. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 24, 1979, 8:45–10:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with Members of the Nicaraguan Junta (S)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State
• Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Henry Owen, Special Representative of the President for Economic Summits
• Robert Pastor, Staff Member, National Security Council
• Lawrence Pezzullo, American Ambassador to Nicaragua
• Viron P. Vaky, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
• Daniel Ortega, Member of the Junta, Government of National Reconstruction
• Alfonso Robelo, Member of the Junta, Government of National Reconstruction
• Sergio Ramirez, Member of the Junta, Government of National Reconstruction
• Miguel d’Escoto, Foreign Minister, Government of National Reconstruction
• Rafael Solis, Ambassador-designate of Nicaragua
• Danilo Baltadano, Secretary to the Junta, Government of National Reconstruction

Vice President Mondale opened the meeting by welcoming the Junta to the White House. He noted the Junta’s desire for an open society that permits diversity of views, and said that the US looks forward to working with them toward that objective. He then invited the Junta members to comment on how they saw the current situation. (S)

Alfonso Robelo responded, noting that the Junta took office in a country that had been systematically looted by the Somoza regime over the last forty years. They had fought a war against tyranny, and on July 19 when they took office they found a country virtually destroyed. But the revolution had a mystique and goals: to eradicate a corrupt dictatorship and establish an independent country. (S)

The immediate critical problem is the nation’s economy.² The nation’s indebtedness is equal to three years of exports; there is almost 60 percent unemployment. 65 percent of the cotton acreage has been lost this year. Normally the first six months of a year are used to export the nation’s crops—cotton, coffee, meat—and to earn the foreign exchange to import needed goods in the second six months. The Somoza government had the advantage of reaping the income from the first six months of 1979, and the Junta is left with no income this year and the need to import. At present the Government is reviewing the problem of the external debt, and at the same time, trying to adjust to problems, especially unemployment, and trying to improve the country’s production in agriculture and meat. (S)

At this point, President Carter joined the meeting, and met each of the members of the Nicaraguan delegation. (To Daniel Ortega, he mentioned that he had read his speech in Havana.)³ The President welcomed the Junta members to the US. He stated that the US wanted to help Nicaragua, and to strengthen ties. We wanted to learn specifically about Nicaraguan needs—in the business, banking, agricultural areas and the like. American people share his feelings of friendship for the new government. We earnestly hope that Nicaragua will truly be non-aligned. Public condemnation of our country and fear of Nicaraguan intervention in its neighbors’ affairs naturally concerned us. (S)

The President went on to note that in addition to government support, the US could offer many other things. Not only could help be offered in the business and banking spheres, but the university system, for example, could provide assistance. Academic leaders would be willing to provide help if the Nicaraguans wished it. He noted that some in the Nicaraguan government had attended US universities—the University of Kansas, Rensselaer, Georgetown University. Similarly in the humanitarian—health, food—and other fields help could be provided that would relate directly to the well-being of the Nicaraguan people. (S)

His overall feeling, the President said, was one of hope that if difficulties were to arise we could discuss and resolve them frankly and in friendly fashion. As the Junta members knew, the US worked during the transition period with Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and others. We will continue to consult with them and more directly with the Junta in the future. (S)

Commander Ortega responded by saying that he wanted to thank President Carter for this opportunity to speak with him, and to begin the first frank dialogue between this small sovereign nation and a big one. Nicaragua wants to receive frank and unconditioned US support. They realize the US can help greatly in this period of reconstruction. They would be developing details regarding their needs. (S)

Ortega noted that in defining a foreign policy of non-alignment they exercised a sovereign decision long denied the nation by the Somoza dictatorship. They did so as well with the history of Nicaragua in mind. They did not do so to “make politics.” It is rather an elemental principle of the Sandinista revolution. His speech at the Non-Aligned Summit reflected this principle. It was not intended to be confrontational with the US, nor was he making this point as an apology (“to look good in your eyes”), but rather because it represented an elemental position of the government of Nicaragua. (S)

They understood, Ortega went on, that the American people and different Administrations may have looked at Central America in different ways. We know, he said, that there are sectors of the US people, Congress, and the Administration that may not understand the depth of what Central America is living through today. As a result, their understanding of what is happening may not correspond to realities. Nicaragua, Ortega said, is not a factor in the radicalization of El Salvador; it was not in the past, nor the present, and will not be in the future, nor in Guatemala. He mentioned these two countries, he said, because they have the most serious social problems. To some degree, this is the result of relationships of the past. We now have to react to the consequences of problems created by past administrations. (S)

In President Carter’s Administration, Ortega said, we have noted the beginning of concerns about the area and the taking of measures which, if they have not gone to the heart of the problems, have nevertheless been of some help. (S)

Ortega wanted to make one point very clear: Nicaragua faced an immediate and fundamental task of reconstruction. It would be irresponsible and adventuristic to involve itself in the problems of other countries. Nicaragua, he said, is focused on reconstruction. It will not intervene elsewhere. What worries them, however, is that this charge may be used by those in El Salvador or Guatemala to justify their present policies. (S)

President Carter responded by observing that what Commander Ortega said was encouraging and could provide a basis for a good relationship. “If you don’t hold me responsible for everything that occurred under my predecessors,” he said, “I won’t hold you responsible for your predecessors’ actions.” We are in a new era, the President added. We are eager to understand your problems and to be helpful, recognizing your independence and sovereignty. We have a clear opportunity for new friendship between our people, and I am eager to encourage this trend with your help. (S)

The President mentioned that he had received a good report from Senator Zorinsky after his trip.⁴ He then invited the Junta members to step outside for a photograph, and subsequently excused himself. (9:20 a.m.) (S)

When the meeting resumed, the Vice President asked Acting Secretary Christopher to review the assistance we have so far extended—humanitarian aid, reprogramming, the AID pipeline. Christopher explained the various kind of aid we are providing in some detail, and he noted we are studying additional requests to the Congress for supplemental funds. We knew the balance of payments gap was considerable. We hoped to be helpful not only bilaterally but through multilateral institutions as well. Sometimes when other countries look at our resources, they see them as unlimited. But those who know the US understand the limits. (S)

Commander Ortega stated that they were aware of this aid, in particular of the AID pipeline. The major problem, however, was the external debt, especially for this year, which may exceed $600 million. He said he did not see how Nicaragua could repay it this year. He noted that much of this external debt was contracted for and used by Somoza for personal gain and to engage in repressive measures. Ortega said that perhaps the US could help to restructure this debt, particularly with private banks in the US and also in Europe. He suggested an international assumption of the debt because Nicaragua will not be able to pay it off either in the short or medium-term. (S)

Mr. Ramirez observed that this was truly an acute problem. They do not want to resolve the problem by adding new debts. If there could be rescheduling and a moratorium to allow domestic production to begin again without this asphyxiating pressure on top of them, this would be most helpful. (S)

Mr. Christopher stated that we understood this problem and would help all we could. He was glad to hear that Nicaragua was working with the IMF. The IMF is important. It could be hardheaded and tough, but the IMF was also practical. Nevertheless, understandings with the IMF would be important. He assured them of US support in rescheduling the debt, which is owed to the US and to European banks. (S)

Mr. Owen added that he wanted to stress the important role of the multilateral institutions. One of the best ways to involve other creditors was through these institutions. In rescheduling, in reconstruction aid, and in long range development aid, working with the IFI’s to create a coherent whole would be most valuable. They might find it useful to designate a centerpiece—as for example the World Bank with regard to development aid—which could help them form a coherent assistance effort. (S)

Mr. Christopher then said he wanted to refer to the matter of human rights. He said that he admired the commitment of the government of Nicaragua to human rights and the steps it is taking to carry out that commitment. He stressed that no other factor is likely to be more significant in our long-term relationship than this commitment. (S)

Human rights can be thought of in three categories, he said, integrity of the person, economic rights and political rights. As to the first, as he had said publicly, he admired the way the government had carried out its commitments to avoid reprisals. He could not recall another case of a violent triumphant revolution in which the conquered were treated with as much carefulness as in this case. (S)

On economic rights, equitable distribution of income was an important goal. History might show that mixed economies are perhaps the best way to handle these requirements in a situation such as Nicaragua’s. As regards political and social rights, we were pleased to observe such things as freedom of the media. We looked forward to the day when the people’s participation in the political process could be full; we knew this was a basic aim. (S)

Human rights was perhaps the principal engine that brought about the downfall of Somoza. It could be the principal force that propels the new Nicaragua. There was no fixed formula or ideas that anyone would impose. What was important was the overall configuration of human rights. (S)

Ramirez responded that they agreed with these comments on human rights. It is precisely the desire for human rights that caused the revolution, and the new government is working ceaselessly to see that this is carried out. He referred to the Bill of Rights which was recently issued. He pointed out that nevertheless, many who were responsible for crimes—both against people and in the sacking of the national patrimony—had fled. The government had engaged a law firm in the US to seek not only extradition but the recovery of assets wrongfully stolen. He wanted to point out that the balance of payments problem could be resolved without new credits if the nation could recover such assets that were taken and are now in the US. (S)⁵

Commander Ortega added one last point. They had, he said, information that former National Guard officers were plotting in Honduras and El Salvador. Instrumental in this were Comandante Bravo and Somoza’s son. Some former Guard officers had crossed back into Nicaragua apparently attempting to contact former Guardsmen now in hiding in Nicaragua. They had captured some of them, Ortega said, and that is how they received this information. CIA sources, he said, have reported that political and economic chaos in Nicaragua would facilitate intervention, and this concerns them. (S)

In addition, Ortega said, soundings were being made among the populace in Nicaragua as to the popularity of Comandante Bravo. Ortega noted that Bravo travels regularly to the US and has contact with US Congressmen. (S)

Honduras has so far refused to return the aircraft that was flown to that country after the collapse of the Guard despite its statements that it would do so. (S)

All of these things worried them. He hoped that the US could help avoid a conspiracy which they were sure was being hatched and which would start another crisis in Central America. (S)

Mr. Christopher said we are concerned about such reports. We would oppose that kind of endeavor, and we will work with neighboring countries to prevent such an exercise from taking life. Our information is somewhat more encouraging. Guardsmen in Honduras and Guatemala were, according to our information, demoralized and simply looking for a way to earn a living in those countries or back in Nicaragua. Nevertheless, he wished to assure the Junta members that we have no different interest than theirs in preventing tension and crises, and we would do what we could to avoid such problems. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 7/79–9/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Vaky drafted another version of the memorandum, which is in the Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda, Etc., September 1979. Carter’s handwritten notes, indicating the points he made in the conversation, are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Nicaragua, 6/78–9/79.
2. During the afternoon of September 24, the Junta members met with U.S. officials to discuss Nicaraguan debt rescheduling and an economic reconstruction strategy. The memorandum of conversation of the meeting is in the Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda, Etc., September 1979.
3. Ortega’s September 6 speech, delivered at the Non-Aligned Movement’s sixth summit conference in Havana, was highly critical of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua throughout the twentieth century. (“Nicaraguan Junta Member Ortega Addresses Conference,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, September 11, 1979, pp. AA7–12) Carter wrote in his September 24 notes: “Nicaragua Junta. Want to be friends, helpful. Ortega’s condemnation don’t help.” (Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Nicaragua, 6/78–9/79)
4. Senator Edward Zorinsky (D-Nebraska).
5. Pezzullo wrote to Christopher and Vaky in telegram 3483 from Managua, August 3, that William Rogers was leading Arnold and Porter’s assumption of the GRN case against Somoza. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2066)