Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

33. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 11, 1979, 11:45 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Guatemala

  • Rafael Castillo Valdez, Foreign Minister
  • Felipe Doroteo Monterroso, Ambassador to the United States
  • Cesar A. Orantes, Economic Counsellor, Guatemalan Embassy

• United States

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Viron P. Vaky, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
  • Robert A. Pastor, Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Guatemalan Relations (C)

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by expressing the Administration’s great concern about the current trends in Central America. He said that the problems would become even more acute unless the leaders in the region addressed them in a timely and effective fashion. (C)

The Foreign Minister recounted the origins of the meeting, by saying that a meeting had been requested with President Carter last December.² On January 6, a member of the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala asked him what topics would be discussed, and he responded that the purpose of the meeting was to send greetings from President Lucas and to exchange ideas of the problems in Central America. The FM was told that the White House had decided that a meeting with the President would be difficult. He said that he doesn’t know how acquainted Dr. Brzezinski is with Latin America and with the sensitivities of Latins and Indians. Indians are even more sensitive than Latins. Finally, he received a definitive answer that President Carter was too busy to receive him, but it would be all right for him to speak with Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski. (C)

The FM said that when he requested the meeting in December, Central America was in a state of war. Since then, the crisis in Nicaragua has improved. They have been able to keep their constitution, and there is much less violence. So he views the mediation effort as having been successful. He now believes that the OAS should stay away from the Nicaraguan problem, and because of that, he cancelled the appointment of the Guatemalan member to the mediation effort. Central America just wants to live in peace. President Carazo’s recent visit through Central America was essentially to search for peace in the region. The economic situation in Nicaragua, and also in Costa Rica for that matter, is not good.³ (C)

The FM expressed his concern about the cuts in aid.⁴ He said that he had done a very detailed analysis of the aid and found that of the $9.4M in U.S. assistance, $6M were loans at 3% over 30 years, and $3.4M were for population programs which were primarily designed to hold the population of the Indians down. This plus the $250,000 in military training are really very small amounts. If giving this aid to Guatemala causes problems for the Executive Branch in the U.S., then Guatemala will seek a way to minimize this irritant. The aid is so modest that it can be replaced. Guatemala’s main purpose is to try to find a way to increase our understanding with the U.S. Government. He said the problem of economic development in Guatemala is very great—50% of the population is backwards—but it can look elsewhere for aid. He said that some person had made a proposal to him to hire a lobbyist in Washington to get Guatemala’s message across, but he would prefer to use that money to build a new school. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski responded to the three points:

—No insult was intended on the U.S. part because of the inability of the President to meet with the Foreign Minister. Under our system of government, the Secretary of State is the principal conductor of U.S. foreign policy. The President lays down general lines, and occasionally gets deeply involved in specific areas of foreign policy, but it is more appropriate for the Secretary of State to handle the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. He was also aware that the Secretary of State had a good discussion with the Foreign Minister.⁵ (C)

—With regard to the aid and the training of officers, Dr. Brzezinski explained that the U.S. has a very highly decentralized system of government, and the Congress doesn’t always do what we request it to do. There is a tendency in Congress to be skeptical of certain relationships; but we will ask them to take another look at this aid. He could not make any firm commitments that the aid would be restored, but Ambassador Vaky said he thought there would be a good chance of doing that. (C)

—The assistance issue is related to a much broader question of developments in the region. There is no doubt that the region is entering an important period of tremendous internal and external transformation. The pressures for change due to increased literacy, population, and development will be great. How these pressures are channeled will depend to a great extent on the flexibility and imagination of leaders like Foreign Minister Castillo in Guatemala and elsewhere. Whether there will be violence or peaceful transition to a more modern system will depend on the decisions which are made by the leaders in the region. The process, for example, of trying to integrate the Indian population in Guatemala will create very real problems in that country. The United States is interested in a stable and evolutionary process. If it is not, it will be exploited by extremist factions in the region and by countries like Cuba outside the region. (C)

For a long time, the United States has had a predominant influence in Central America. That is changing as we now seek increased equality and more mature relationships with the governments of Central America. In some ways, this transition in our role in the region is as difficult for us as it is for you. The debate over the Panama Canal Treaties is an illustration of this difficulty in the United States.⁶ But we now believe that it is no longer proper for us to exercise the degree of influence through an unequal relationship as we have done in the past. (C)

We became interested in Nicaragua and are interested in all of Central America because we know that the internal revolutionary tensions, if not properly managed, can lead to external revolutionary involvement by Castro, for example, and also through the Cubans by the Soviets. We hope that the problem of Nicaragua does not spread elsewhere. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he hopes that this message will be conveyed directly to President Lucas—that we are giving attention to the problems in the region, and that we believe that closing one’s eyes to the internal revolutionary changes that are occurring will not work. The status quo in the region clearly cannot be sustained. Imaginative changes are required. To do this, we should work together not only as we have done before in Nicaragua, but in general. Cuba’s involvement should give us all grounds for concern. Because of that, we should work together to see, for example, that Cuba does not get the Security Council seat in the United Nations. We would hope that you will take a long-sighted approach to this problem so as to fulfill our common goal. Please convey this message directly to your President. (C)

The Foreign Minister said that Dr. Brzezinski mentioned the need for imagination, and he acknowledged that this was needed in the region. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we want to help, though we do not want to intervene. However, it is also difficult to do so and to maintain our involvement and our assistance in the region because of the increasing fatigue which all Americans feel toward foreign policy in general. (C)

Tbe Foreign Minister said that Guatemala needs the U.S. understanding. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski reiterated that increased understanding can occur only in the course of needed changes. It must be adaptation in the region. We are not suggesting that Guatemala take as its model the United States. But the political and educational system must be expanded in Guatemala—for example, 15% to 18% of the population could be reaching for education at a higher level, instead of the 3% which the Foreign Minister eluded to. Dr. Brzezinski said that we would look into the Congressional issue, and that Secretary Vance had already talked to Senator Church about it.⁷ (C)

The Foreign Minister said that Guatemala is not interested so much in the $9M, but in the good relations with the United States. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said, in jest, if we can have a good relationship with Guatemala without spending the $9M, we wouldn’t object to that. Dr. Brzezinski apologized for the short meeting but he had to go to a meeting with the President. (C)

The Foreign Minister concluded the meeting by inviting Dr. Brzezinski to Guatemala for 2 to 3 days. Dr. Brzezinski said that he would love to visit; he acknowledged that he didn’t have as good a knowledge of the area as he would like, and that he had some friends from college days whom he might want to visit. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 3–6/79. Confidential. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.
2. In telegram 7517 from Guatemala City, December 22, the Embassy reported that Castillo telephoned the Embassy and said that President Lucas wanted him to “deliver personal message to President Carter sometime during the month of January.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780530–0443)
3. For coverage of Nicaragua and the mediation effort, see Chapter 2.
4. For the cuts to military aid to Guatemala, see footnote 6, Document 32. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended ending development aid to Guatemala in May over concerns about human rights. (Telegram 2920 from Guatemala City, May 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790169–1678)
5. Vance met with Castillo on May 9. See footnote 7, below; see also footnote 2, Document 32.
6. The Panama Canal Treaties were signed in 1977, paving the way for Panamanian ownership and operation of the canal by 1999. Congress ratified the treaties in 1978 after an acrimonious debate about the loss of U.S. control of the canal. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIX, Panama.
7. During his May 9 meeting with Castillo, Vance said that he had spoken with the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Frank Church (D–ID), earlier that day and that the committee’s action was not binding on the administration. (Telegram 127830 to Guatemala City, May 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790228–0361) A PRC meeting on Central America, June 11, recommended the approval of a $6 million rural enterprise basic human needs loan and a helicopter for the Guatemalan President “as a way to encourage positive directions in human rights and democratization in Guatemala,” along with a démarche “stating our deep concern about officially-sanctioned assassinations.” See Documents 469 and 470.