Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XV, Central America

292. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, July 19, 1979, 1615Z

3274. Panama for Amb Pezzullo. Dept pass Action Flash to USSOUTHCOM. Subject: (S) SITREP: 10:00 am July 19.

1. (S)-Entire text

2. As of 0900 situation as follows: Local radio station ABC apparently under control of FSLN and broadcasting Red Cross communique announcing establishment of safehavens in churches, hospitals, and Embassies of Latin American countries. Station also broadcasting appeals to both GN & FSLN to avoid confrontations and urging all citizens to remain off the streets until situation fully resolved. Earlier this morning, radio station also broadcast message from Archbishop calling for ceasefire.²

3. Embassy has monitored police frequency broadcasts (source of which still uncertain) requesting GN troops to ceasefire and avoid confrontations.

4. Situation in Managua appears basically calm although frequent exchanges of fire have been occurring, including the area around the Embassy. Situation at Embassy is as follows: all U.S. employees are remaining off the streets at Embassy or Residence. FSN employees are being reduced to absolute minimum. Crowds outside of Embassy extremely light. Five Amcits (TV crew from Texas) are currently on Embassy grounds and refuse to leave premises because they feel insecure off.

5. Two of the five GN guards at the Embassy remain, however, they have shed their webgear and are not carrying their weapons. The Amb’s local body guards will be taken to safehaven. At the residence, the GN Guards are reportedly preparing to laydown their arms as well. Shooting intensified in the immediate area of the residence and the Embassy this morning. There did not seem to be active fighting and no shooting was directed toward the Embassy or residence.

6. As of 0900, EmbOffs have had no, repeat no, contact with Urcuyo, FonMin Bodan or General Mejia. (We have received numerous reports that Urcuyo has left the country and is in Guatemala).³ Telephones apparently are out of order or not being monitored at Foreign Ministry, bunker, or the Intercontinental Hotel (where many of remaining government officials are living). Late reports indicate the TelCor office near National Palace (headquarters of international operations) has been taken over by FSLN who are permitting international operators to place phone calls. We are attempting to verify current status of airport, but latest word indicates that it remains in GN hands and closed to all traffic. Few GN patrols appear in evidence except along the north way leading to the airport.

7. At 9:45 ABC radio broadcast FSLN military communique calling on Managua residents to prevent outbreaks of violence and to remain calm, stay home and out of streets until FSLN guarantee safety of city.

8. All signs point to complete disentegration of National Guard.

O’Donnell

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790006–0409. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, Caracas, Panama City, San José, and Santo Domingo.
2. An information report from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director of the National Security Agency, July 19, noted that Obando y Bravo had read a statement on Radio ABC “urging an end to the hostilities” in Nicaragua and recommending that the Government of Nicaragua meet with the FSLN to “settle their differences.” (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Intelligence Reports, July–Dec 1979)
3. In a July 18 memorandum to Vaky and Bushnell, Starrs noted that John Ford had relayed a message that Uruyo sent to Orfila through Sevilla-Sacasa. This message reads: “1) Urcuyo: does not want to remain in power. 2) He does not want to carry out the agreement to deliver power to the GRN. 3) Urcuyo wants a ‛Government of National Reconciliation’, to be formed by the liberal party, the conservative party, the National Guard and the Sandinistas. 4) If a government as described in (3) above could be formed, he would immediately transfer power to it.” (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda, July 1979) An information report from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director of the National Security Agency, July 19, reported that Urcuyo had “expressed his intent to resign his position on the morning of 18 July 1979 but was not allowed to do so” by Mejia who said “it would appear that the GN was attempting a coup d’état and would thus remove the government’s claim to be the legitimate constitutional successor to the previous government.” (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Intelligence Reports, July–Dec 1979) An information report from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director of the National Security Agency, July 19, relayed reports that Urcuyo had departed Managua for Guatemala during the evening of July 18. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Intelligence Reports, July–Dec 1979)