291. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State and the Embassies in Costa Rica and Panama1
3264. Dept pass info Immediate USCINCSO Quarry Hts. Subject: Meeting with Guard Commander July 18 (S).
1. (S)-Entire text
2. Shortly after departure of Amb Pezzullo to Panama, Charge and PolOff called on GN Commander Mejia at his request in the Bunker. Charge opened conversation by confirming Pezzullo’s departure and providing Mejia with informal Spanish translation of press statement released today by Washington and Managua.2 Mejia read statement carefully. His main comment was to ask whether the reference to the transfer of power to the “Government of National Reconstruction” meant the Junta in San Jose. The Charge confirmed that it did.
3. Gen. Mejia was joined by Col. Sanchez, the new G–1 of the GN. Sanchez inquired as to whether the U.S. would be prepared to support the GN in arranging an immediate ceasefire and the opening of talks between the GN and the military commanders of the Sandinistas. Sanchez asked if the U.S. could provide material support to the GN. The Charge replied no. Sanchez then stated that if the U.S. could provide moral support for a ceasefire and some indication that the other side [Page 710] would honor it, Mejia would give immediate orders to all Guard Commanders to cease fire and stand in place.
4. The Charge responded that he would do what he could, but the time was very late and we were not in direct contact with the Sandinista military leaders. Charge also suggested that it would be useful to arrange the prompt return to Managua of Archbishop Obando y Bravo who could lend moral support to any call for a ceasefire. Both Mejia and Sanchez agreed the Archbishop’s return would be a positive development.
5. Col. Sanchez stressed that the GN was willing to live up to the terms of the negotiations referred to in the press statement including a ceasefire and the prompt initiation of discussions with Sandinista military commanders. He said the GN was willing to honor the military commitments but did not want to become involved in the political negotiations. He indicated confidentially that he understood President Urcuyo is thinking of turning over political power to the military and fleeing the country. He said, however, that troops loyal to the GN command now have the airport under total control and would not permit Urcuyo to leave.
6. Charge indicated that he would be in touch with both Washington and Amb Bowdler in San Jose to determine what might be done to end the fighting and bloodshed. He stressed that the hour was late and suggested, given developments of the past 24 hours, it might be too late.3 Both Mejia and Sanchez emphasized repeatedly throughout the conversation and their desire to preserve “what is left” of the GN as an apolitical institution.4
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1999. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, Caracas, Guatemala City, and Santo Domingo.↩
- In telegram 3262 from Managua, July 18, O’Donnell reported that he had assumed charge of the Embassy following Pezzullo’s 10:16 a.m. departure from Managua. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790327–0810) In telegram 185481 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July 18, the Department transmitted the text of the statement scheduled for release at the Department’s noon briefing. The statement noted that Pezzullo had been recalled and the Embassy staff in Managua had been substantially reduced due to Urcuyo’s “continuing refusal” to abide by the transition plan. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/18–23/79)↩
- A telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director of the National Security Agency, July 18, included a situation report from Managua that morning. It reported that the National Guard in Managua was “beginning to break apart” as “many GN personnel” had “already deserted and others are in the process of deserting,” which signaled “the end of effective GN resistance” against the FSLN. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Intelligence Reports, July–December, 1979)↩
- Bowdler reported in telegram 3178 from San José, July 18, that a “snag” had occurred regarding the flight carrying GRN Junta members to Managua because Mejia did not want D’Escoto to join the talks. Bowdler believed that “Mejia wants to restrict the conversations to a cease fire and the future of the Guard, while D’Escoto, who seems to be in charge of GRN operations here, wants to negotiate the full turnover of power.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–2026)↩