293. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State and the Embassies in Nicaragua and Costa Rica1
5501. Subj: Salamin Reports Status in Managua.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. Marcel Salamin told me at 12:30 p.m. that Col. Mejia and most of his staff had simply abandoned their posts and had gone to Las Mercedes Airport trying to find some way to get out of the country.2 He said that one Lt. Col., Fulgencio Larga Espada, who had a sense of responsibility, had remained behind in order to smooth the way for transition. Salamin said that he had just heard a broadcast of a joint declaration between Larga Espada and Humberto Ortega from Managua calling for a ceasefire, calling for all forces to respect the lives of people, inviting stranded units of the GN to raise a white flag and get in touch with the Red Cross, announcing that churches and Embassies were open to soldiers or others who felt threatened, and for dispersed GN soldiers to return to their units.
3. Salamin said that the first FSLN patrols from Leon were entering Managua, that there was some fighting because the GN was not being led or informed and therefore there were some pockets of resistance in the city. He also said that, due to the sudden collapse of the Managua govt, the battles were continuing on the Southern front.
4. Salamin said that the Junta was still very much the official govt of Nicaragua and would be entering Managua shortly, as soon as the city was secured. He said they had also issued a bulletin calling for calm and urging citizens not to pillage and cause destruction.
5. Salamin said that Torrijos felt it was important as soon as Las Mercedes Airport was secured for the USG to start sending in humanitarian relief. He said that the first country to be sending in relief planes would obviously gain great credit and that we should be making plans now and “warming up engines” in anticipation of being able to go in. [Page 714] Torrijos has also requested that a C–130 be made available from Howard AFB to take Salamin and about 10 members of the Panamanian Embassy staff, to stop by San Jose and pick up the rest of the GNR Cabinet members and working committees, and proceed to take this group to Managua.
6. I told Salamin that the latter request would require a political decision on our part because we have been adopting the policy all along of letting events in Nicaragua be a Latin America solution and not to take the lead ourselves. Salamin said he understood that but as a realistic matter we had been instrumental in effecting the departure from the scene of Somoza and then Urcuyo and should not shrink back from taking strong action now which would help stabilize the country and assure a favorable orientation of the new GNR toward the United States.
7. I said that I would be in touch with Amb Vaky immediately on these points.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua, 7/18–23/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- A telegram from Managua to the Director of the National Security Agency, July 18, noted that the Nicaraguan National Guard “appears to be on verge of collapse and may cease to exist as an institutional armed force in a number of hours.” (Ibid.) An information report from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director of the National Security Agency, July 19, noted that Larga Espada had “announced the surrender of the National Guard” to the FSLN at 11:50 that morning. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Intelligence Reports, July–Dec 1979)↩