189. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
220. Subj: Nicaraguan Mediation No. 294: NG Meeting with Somoza.
1. (Confidential-Entire text)
2. The NG met with Somoza at 4:00 pm in “The Bunker”. Only other person present was FonMin Quintana. After an initial round of new year best wishes and explanation of FonMin Jimenez absence, we presented the NG replies to the Dec. 21 and 26 PLN letters.2 Somoza and Quintana read through them carefully before making any comment.
3. On the response to the first PLN communication Somoza made only passing comments. He noted our statement on the unusual comportment of the PLN delegates during the presentation of our December 20 proposal and the responsibility we placed on the PLN for the impasse during that critical week of direct talks. He tried to shift the blame to the FAO for refusing to serve in his government in the event the plebiscite was favorable to him. Quintana then made deprecating remarks about the FAO falling apart and if we waited a few days we could be witnesses to its demise.
4. On the response to the counter proposal Somoza said that an official reply would be forthcoming within the time frame specified (January 19) after he had discussed it with his advisers. Then on a personal level he made a series of observations on the NG plebiscite plan and the political scene the highlights of which were these:
A) The NG plan for the plebiscite called for a major change in Nicaraguan thinking and way of doing things that might be acceptable to a small group of the elite opposed to him but did not reflect the wishes of the large mass of Nicaraguans of more modest means who were comfortable with the way things had been done in the past fifty years. To introduce this degree of change would be disruptive. He pointed to the case of the Shah of Iran to support his thesis that too brusque a change in institutional patterns can be highly destabilizing.
[Page 489]B) He does not believe that violence is on the increase and does not fear radicalization and polarization. Nicaragua faces violence from outside and within. With OAS help along the Costa Rican border, external violence could be reduced. He thinks he can deal with internal violence.
C) He is confident that the FAO will soon disappear leaving the political arena to the government and the extreme left. This is not unique to Nicaragua. He should not be made responsible for growth of the left. That is a consequence inherent in the capitalist system. We see it in France and Italy. The outs want in so that they can run things their way. In the socialist system the right would grow if allowed to do so which the Communist regimes do not.
D) He deprecated the FAO as a small group of well-intentioned political novices who had no idea how to govern. The business elements associated with them he dismissed as frustrated malcontents who “suck the milk and bad-mouth the cow.” He reaffirmed his duty to stay in power and defend the interests of the people of Nicaragua.
5. Comment: This was not the talk of a man considering leaving office. The most disturbing aspect was the certainty and relish with which he and Quintana were predicting the collapse and disappearance of the FAO. They expected the Patriotic Front to take its place. This Somoza described as the legal front of the Communists. My colleagues and I received the distinct impression that Somoza wants the moderate third force to disappear so that the choice that is left is between the government and the Communists.
6. After the meeting with the NG, I asked Somoza if I could see him alone. He readily agreed. I told him that in connection with his study of the NG response to the PLN counter-proposal, I wanted to convey how we saw the situation. I proceeded then to go through the talking points contained in State-3700.3 I digressed at two points to tell him that we did not agree with his estimate that violence will remain a manageable problem and we did not share his view that polarization, with the demise of the FAO, was not a matter of concern. We took a very serious view of the violence both in terms of Nicaragua and the instability which exists in other parts of Central America. On the point dealing with the specific steps we intend to take if he turns down the NG proposal with the NPA variant I took a slightly different tact. I told him that if our mediation efforts fail as a result of his refusal to accept our plan, he could not expect our relationship to continue as it has been. In our previous conversation, I had indicated that it would be adversely affected and I had mentioned some of the options. I [Page 490] wanted him to understand the seriousness of this aspect. I did not repeat the specific measures we have in mind.
7. Somoza’s reaction to this was calm and almost matter of fact. He said he did not know why the USG was always threatening him. He noted that Ambassador Solaun and Jorden had done it before my arrival on the scene. He was aware that the USG was out to get him “since January 1977”. I told him we were not dealing in personalities but realities. What had taken place in Nicaragua during 1978 was a matter of deep concern. We wanted a peaceful solution to the crisis in his country. That is the purpose of the mediation. The NG plan is regarded as an objective, and fair way to let the people decide the fundamental issue.
8. Somoza’s response to my rebuttal was that he wanted to study the NG letter. He noted that the NPA seems to be acceptable. I told him he was correct in this interpretation, although what we propose represents a substantial modification of the PLN plan. I explained that what we wanted is a plebiscite process that will be acceptable to both sides and credible to all concerned. Our plan meets this test. Somoza then asked me whether I realize that others than himself had to be convinced to accept the plan, especially in the Liberal Party. I told him I was fully aware of vested interests, but I was also confident that with his personal support and the fact that our plan calls for participation of the PLN and the Guardia Nacional in any future government, should the plebiscite be adverse, this type of resistance could be overcome. He laughed and said I overestimate his persuasive powers. On this note we left it that he would study our communication and reply before January 19.
9. Comment: The two meetings with Somoza were cordial throughout. He was affable and relaxed. He seemed more self-confident, especially in the meeting with the NG as he described the local scene. Interestingly, he made no mention of voter registration in either of the meetings. Obiols told me, however, that Quintana had placed special emphasis on the point while waiting for me to emerge from the private session. I think the PLN response may well center on this aspect.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Human Rights—Nicaragua IX. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Caracas, Panama City, San José, and USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights.↩
- See Document 181. Guzman and Jimenez had agreed on January 8 that Jimenez would stay in Santo Domingo in preparation for Pope John Paul II’s visit. (Telegram 126 from Santo Domingo, January 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–1411)↩
- See Document 185.↩