185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic1
3700. Military addee handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Nicaraguan Mediation: Talking Points for Response to PLN. Santo Domingo for Ambassador Bowdler. SouthCom for General McAuliffe.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. You are authorized to present to President Somoza, together with your NG colleagues, the approved reply to the PLN counterproposal contained in State 2585.2
3. You are also authorized to convey privately to President Somoza the following points:
—The plan outlined in the response I and my colleagues have presented was carefully reviewed and personally approved by the President and Secretary Vance.
—The USG believes it is a fair and workable plan and that its provisions are essential if the plebiscite is to be a fair and true test which can resolve the country’s political crisis. It has taken into account the concerns expressed by Somoza regarding a national plebiscite authority and sovereignty. We do not believe that its elements can be compromised any further without destroying the credibility and fairness of the plebiscite arrangement, and rendering an agreement among all Nicaraguan parties impossible.
—As I indicated before, the USG does not believe we can string this process out any more. The time has passed for further counterproposals and delaying tactics. We believe that the PIA must have the responsibility to resolve disputes that arise on the plebiscite’s details within the National Authority or the process would be drawn out too long.3
—I therefore have been instructed to urge you to reconsider your position and to accept this plan—as a framework for concluding [Page 481] promptly an agreement with the FAO, and accordingly to instruct your negotiators to enter immediately into serious discussions to conclude such an agreement—not only for the plebiscite but for the post-plebiscite arrangement so as to avoid chaos, a vacuum and radicalization of the country. If you are willing to do this, the Negotiating Group will immediately convene the PLN and FAO negotiators to complete the task.4
—I want to repeat clearly that this plan represents an irreducible minimum for negotiating a satisfactory and fair solution to the country’s problem. If you reject it, no national agreement will be possible. We will conclude that the mediation effort can no longer succeed and will terminate that effort.
—If that occurs, your country will—as I have pointed out in the past—face increasing tension, violence and polarization, and move on a downward spiral. It will not be possible for us to maintain the relationship with your government we have had in the past.
—I am instructed to inform you that if you reject this and the mediation collapses, we intend to readjust our relationship and we will withdraw the Military Mission, the Peace Corps and substantially reduce our AID Mission and other staffing in our diplomatic Mission.
—I am therefore instructed to convey to you urgently and strongly my government’s hope that you will consider your position carefully and accept this framework for a solution to Nicaragua’s crisis so as to avoid further violence and the danger of radicalization of Nicaragua and Central America.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Human Rights—Nicaragua IX. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Guatemala City, Managua, Panama City, San José, and USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights. Drafted by Vaky; cleared by Aaron (NSC), Armacost (DOD/ISA), Edward Coy (AID), Thyden (S/S–O), and in substance by Gen. W. Smith (JCS); approved by Vaky.↩
- See Document 184.↩
- Pastor added this sentence to an undated draft version of the telegram. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/1–16/79)↩
- Pastor added this sentence to an undated draft version of the telegram; see footnote 3 above. (Ibid.)↩