Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

181. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, December 30, 1978, 1437Z

7316. Department for Secretary Vance and Vaky. NSC for Pastor. From Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: Nicaraguan Mediation No. 278—NG Discussions on Reply to PLN Counterproposal.

1. (S-Full text)

2. My NG colleagues and I yesterday discussed the PLN counterproposal at length and prepared a response both to it and the PLN’s preceding letter to the NG (Managua 6747 and 6805).² Jimenez and Obiols, who had already received the text and discussed it before my arrival, took the position that the counter proposal did not rpt not offer an acceptable basis for a peaceful solution. They found the same faults listed in my analysis (Santo Domingo 7272).³ They considered it a tactical move (1) to prolong the negotiations without any real interest to find a solution and (2) to create a situation in which the FAO would have to reject the counter proposal or further fragment by renewing talks on a proposal already accepted by them. My colleagues were also highly suspicious and resentful that the PLN should now seem to present itself as reasonable after deliberately frustrating the substantive talks during the critical week before Christmas.

3. Their attitude has been further complicated by Somoza’s visit to Guatemala to speak with President Lucas.⁴ Obiols told us that Somoza had complained about his role in the negotiations and the bias of the NG toward the FAO. Obiols observed that fortunately his personal relations with President Lucas are such that these accusations made no difference. But as a result of them, his president had instructed him to engage in no further direct talks with the PLN unless they first accepted the NG plan in principle. In response to my question whether President Lucas had found any flexibility in Somoza’s attitude toward remaining in power, Obiols replied that, on the contrary, Lucas had found him determined to continue.

4. Before starting to draft our reply we discussed the content and method of delivery. On content my two colleagues, their machismo aroused, were determined to answer the insinuated and explicit criticism of the NG contained in the PLN letter of December 21.⁵ My argument that we should avoid polemics and concentrate on the substance of the counterproposal fell on deaf ears. With respect to the counterproposal, Jimenez and Obiols were equally firm in insisting that our reply must state that the PLN alternative is not an acceptable basis for a solution and once more invite Somoza to accept the NG plan. In the discussion of this point, they expressed again their doubt that Somoza had any intent of accepting any plebiscite process that did not provide a strong prospect, if not certainty, of his winning. On the basis of this assumption, reinforced by President Lucas’ assessment of Somoza’s intention, they saw no reason to be drawn into further negotiation with the wily Somoza which would allow him to gain time, escape responsibility for failure of the negotiations and in all probability lead to the collapse of the FAO. My argument that on the basis of the Bodan-Pallais conversations with Embassy Managua, we might find significant areas of flexibility in the PLN position and thereby justify another effort to bridge the gap did not convince them. They argued that the NG plan is fair, workable and defensible. It places the NG role in Nicaragua on a high plane and leaves the FAO virtually intact with the advantage of having accepted the NG proposal. Their fear is that getting drawn into further negotiations with Somoza on the basis of the unacceptable counterproposal can bring no advantages to the NG or the FAO and runs the serious risk of eroding the advantageous position they now enjoy. Behind this line of argument there emerged for the first time significant domestic considerations. President Lucas has enough problems with the left without aggravating his situation by contributing to the collapse of the FAO. If Somoza is not going to accept anyway, it is better for Lucas to show that he supported a fair settlement accepted by the FAO. Jimenez commented that his role in the mediation had caused strains in the PRD for President Guzman as well as some press criticism. He mentioned Pena Gomez and Jorge Blanco as being highly supportive of the opposition to Somoza and unsympathetic to his role as a mediator. If the NG could not overcome Somoza’s resistance to a fair plebiscite, he too preferred to rest the mediation on the present favorable stand than to let Somoza gain some advantage that could be criticized at home.

5. On the method of delivery I tried, after talking with Pete Vaky, to get my two colleagues to join me in going to Managua on Wednesday⁶ to deliver our reply and make a last effort to persuade Somoza to negotiate on the basis of the NG plan. Obiols said categorically he would not go unless Somoza accepted our proposals in principle in advance so that all that would remain is to make the necessary adjustments and sign the document. Jimenez at first agreed to go with me but eventually pulled back in favor of having the three Ambassadors present the reply to Quintana with an indication that all three of us would come promptly to Managua if the PLN accepted the NG plan in principle. Obiols bought this formulation.

6. During this conversation, I mentioned Pallais’ interest in going to Washington with Quintana to discuss a possible compromise between the NG and PLN plans. Obiols and Jimenez reacted very negatively to this. They saw it as a clever Somoza move to open a new negotiating front in order to stretch out the negotiating process, confuse the issues and escape responsibility for failure of the mediation. They hoped that we would not agree to such a move but keep the pressure on Somoza to accept the NG plan in principle and negotiate the details. They again with some bitterness referred to PLN tactics prior to the Christmas break to frustrate the talks and the current effort to circumvent the NG in order to escape responsibility for the impasse.

7. The proposed reply to the PLN (Santo Domingo 7315) reflects the foregoing views.⁷ The principal criticisms levelled against the NG in the December 21 letter are answered firmly but non-polemically. The reasons for the non-acceptability of the PLN counterproposal are set forth succinctly. These will be readily understood by Somoza and the public in Nicaragua. They would need further elaboration for persons not familiar with Nicaraguan political realities. The NG is aware of this latter aspect but considered this was not the appropriate vehicle for making the explanations. The status report to the governments, on the other hand, could serve this purpose. Obiols signed the letter before returning to Guatemala this morning. Neither Jimenez nor I have done so, pending consultation and authorization.

8. I am not sure where all this leaves us as to next steps. It is not clear to me whether the Bodan-Pallais approaches⁸ show a genuine concern over future USG–GON relations following my conversations with Somoza on December 23 and 27,⁹ or a ploy to escape shouldering the responsibility for the impasse or at least to blunt the measures on our part suggested in the last two demarches. On the one hand, I am attracted by the opportunity to test Pallais and Quintana (men with whom one can deal) on the degree of flexibility in the GON position. One has to keep in mind, however, that these are not the fellows who decide and their initiative may be no more than a spoiling mission. Even if there is a considerable measure of flexibility, we will have to decide (in view of the attitude of my colleagues and FAO) whether it is sufficient to reinvolve them in the mediation and to obtain FAO acceptance without fragmenting that fragile organization. The decision on this will also have to factor in our own domestic considerations which I am not in a position to judge.

9. This leaves the question of the proposed NG reply: The content, timing and method of delivery. This obviously will depend on how we respond to the Pallais-Quintana mission. If the Department decides to give the green light, the reply should be held up pending the outcome. If the light is red, I recommend that the response be conveyed through the three Ambassadors to Quintana privately with a clear indication of the NG’s willingness to return to negotiate a final document. Public release of the document would depend on the PLN response and other related factors.

10. Yesterday the NG members prepared an outline of our status report to the MFM via the governments. We did not get down to drafting because most of our time was devoted to an analysis of the PLN counter-proposal and our reply. We agreed to work on different sections of the paper and (tentatively) to return to Santo Domingo January 5 to put it together. Obiols inability to stay here over the weekend prevented us from wrapping up the report on this round. I did raise with my colleagues the mechanics mentioned in State 326061.¹⁰ My colleagues and I prefer the second method described as being less likely to generate heated debate. We are not thinking in terms of a resolution critical of the GON. The report itself should explain how the impasse occurred and this will speak for itself. A resolution noting the result, expressing regret at the lack of success to date and urging further efforts if events allow is as much as one could hope for at this stage.

Yost

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780540–0005. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Caracas, Managua, San José, Panama City, and USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights.
2. See footnote 3, Document 172. In telegram 6805 from Managua, December 27, the Embassy included the Spanish-language text of the December 26 PLN counterproposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780535–0675)
3. See Document 180.
4. In telegram 6857 from Managua, December 30, the Embassy reported that Pallais had noted that Somoza had travelled to Guatemala and met with the Presidents of Guatemala and El Salvador on December 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780540–0131)
5. See footnote 2, Document 184.
6. January 3, 1979.
7. In telegram 7315 from Santo Domingo, December 30, the Embassy included the Spanish-language text of the proposed NG reply to the PLN communications of December 21 and 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780540–0004)
8. Telegram 6833 from Managua, December 29, noted Bodan’s appeal that the “US contemplate Somoza’s remaining in full control until the end of his term in 1981.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780538–0217) Telegram 6854 from Managua, December 29, reported Pallais’s concerns that Bowdler “had termed the PLN counter-proposal unacceptable before he had studied or discussed it,” and that the NG “had not been impartial.” Pallais also proposed that he travel with Quintana to Washington to seek a compromise. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2280)
9. See Documents 176 and 179.
10. In telegram 326061 to Santo Domingo, December 28, Vaky provided Bowdler with some preliminary scenarios for the mechanics of the Negotiating Group’s presentation to the OAS, including a proposed “second approach” which was to not circulate the Negotiating Group’s report in advance (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780536–1110)