16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala, the Consulate in Belize City, and the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
269573. Subject: Belize Negotiations.
1. Guatemalan Foreign Minister Molina and British Commonwealth Secretary Rowlands met secretly in Washington November 1 to 3. They reached an agreement on cession of the territory south of the Moho-Aguacate line, straightening the western boundary and cession of the cays up to the Monkey River (Sapodilla and Ranguana). But the two sides are far apart on a development project. Guatemala asked the British to pave a road entirely inside Guatemala which would cost about $70 million, considerably more than the British wish to spend. Secretary Vance met with Molina before and after the negotiations and with Rowlands during the negotiations.2 Rowlands saw Under Secretary Habib after the negotiations.3
2. Molina told the Secretary before the negotiations that Guatemala favored a joint development project in the Toledo district followed by a plebiscite. The Secretary informed him that he thought the British could not accept a plebiscite. Molina stressed the importance of keeping any agreed settlement secret until after the March elections so Belize would not become a political issue. He thought the settlement could be made public in April and would pass the Council of State and Congress by May or June. He also emphasized the importance of a mediator, who would not mediate, but who was necessary in order to sell the agreement to the Guatemalan public.
3. Rowlands told the Secretary on November 1 that he was optimistic an agreement could be reached by November 3, but he was not very sanguine that Belizean Premier Price would accept any agreement which entailed ceding of territory. He said the U.S. could be helpful by mobilizing support for an agreement once it was reached. Support by the Caribbean Commonwealth and Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia would be very important in convincing Price that he had to accept an agreement. Rowlands brought up the question of a [Page 48] security guarantee which loomed large to Belizeans. He related that Belize had psychological problems with an OAS guarantee since it was a Latin organization and mentioned a joint Caribbean, Canadian, U.S. expression of commitment. The Secretary said commitments posed real problems with Congress, but we would consider what could be done if an OAS guarantee would not be sufficient.
4. On November 3 after the negotiations, Rowlands told Habib the Guatemalans had requested black-topping of a 354 kilometer road wholly inside Guatemala at the cost of $70 million. The British could not cede territory and also provide a large financial contribution. It was left that Rowlands would return to London and consult his government on what figure the British would be willing to provide with the understanding it would be much smaller than if it were not connected with territorial cession. Rowlands would talk to Price on November 8 and present the proposed territorial cession to him.
5. Molina told the Secretary on November 3 that the crucial problems—territorial boundary, maritime boundary, and the cays—had been resolved. The British did not accept the Guatemalan idea of a joint development project followed by a plebiscite so the GOG needed an alternative to sweeten the package presented to the Guatemalan people. They proposed the British pave a 354 kilometer dirt road running north-south in the Peten and eastern Guatemala. The preliminary estimated cost was $70 million, but it might only cost $50 million. Molina described the road project as a modern version of the cart road in the 1859 convention and emphasized that President Laugerud believed it necessary in order to sell a settlement to the Guatemalan public.4 Molina also stressed the importance of the “mediator” whose role would be to assist the negotiators, not mediate the dispute. The Secretary said once the British and Guatemalans had reached an agreement he would suggest names for a mediator and if help is needed with Price we would do what we could.
6. The fact of these negotiations not to mention their contents should be handled with the utmost confidentiality, because any leak would run the danger of compromising the Guatemalan position to a degree that could end any possibility of a settlement.
[Page 49]7. A summary of British Foreign Secretary Owen’s follow-on talk in London with Price follows septel.5
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840070–0917. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Pfeifle; cleared by Matthews, Todman, Shelton, and in S/S–O; approved by Habib. Telegram sent unchanged to the White House on November 11 with the same telegram number. (Ibid.)↩
- No memoranda of conversation were found for Vance’s two meetings with Molina. For Vance’s November 1 meeting with Rowlands, see Document 14.↩
- Not found.↩
- The 1859 Anglo-Guatemalan convention that set boundaries for British Honduras and led to the 1862 establishment of the crown colony included a provision for British assistance in building a road from Guatemala City to the Caribbean coast. Guatemala declared that the convention was nullified because the road was not built and subsequently refused to recognize British claims to Belizean territory.↩
- Not found.↩