Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

14. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 1, 1977, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Belize

PARTICIPANTS

• British

  • Mr. Ted Rowlands, Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs
  • Hugh Cortazzi, Deputy to Minister Rowlands
  • John Martin, Private Secretary to Mr. Rowlands
  • William Squire, Counselor, British Embassy

• American

  • Secretary Vance
  • Under Secretary for Political Affairs Mr. Habib
  • Assistant Secretary for ARA, Mr. Todman
  • Donald Tice (notetaker)

Mr. Rowlands opened the discussion by saying that, in his view, by Thursday² it was possible there would be an agreement between himself and Guatemalan Foreign Minister Molina on a Belize package. Rowlands said that the Guatemalans are “not coming up fighting” the way he had expected with regard to territory in addition to the Moho.³ On the other hand, Rowlands’ instructions had been to hold back on the cays and grant those as a final concession if necessary to obtaining an agreement. But, Molina had taken the cays for granted from the start and therefore Rowlands had already in effect had to concede them.

The central issue of the first day’s discussion was that of a major development project between the Monkey and Moho Rivers and its possible link to some type of consultations or plebisite. Rowlands said he was trying to talk the Guatemalans out of this because he could see no prospect for the British putting some 100 million pounds into a project, which would be also funded by the Guatemalans, in an area for which there had been no final settlement with regard to sovereignty. In response to a question from the Secretary, Rowlands said that the idea of a joint development project had first been raised in the London talks by the British, but that it had become hopelessly complicated by the addition of the plebiscite link by the Guatemalans. The point Rowlands had made to the Guatemalans was why would they want to invest a lot of money in a project in an area where a subsequent referendum could very well go against them in a ratio of 9–1. Add to this the instability inherent in the unsolved sovereignty question implied by the plebisite and it did not seem to Rowlands that this made sense to either side.

Secretary Vance asked what in the economic sphere the British were prepared to offer in lieu of a joint project. Rowlands replied that the Guatemalans were eager to have some type of road system linking the Peten to the coast and he could propose the joint funding of such a system under which the British would bear some of the cost of the roads inside Guatemala.

Secretary Vance asked about the role of General Mendoza in these negotiations and whether he carries real authority. Rowlands replied that the British had been told quietly by the other Guatemalan negotiator, Skinner-Klee, that they should be solicitous of Mendoza because he would have a key role in delivering the military on any agreement.

Rowlands said that in his view there are five ingredients which will need to be included if an agreement is to be reached. These are:

1. a territorial settlement;

2. an agreement on the cays;

3. agreement on a development project or projects but without linkage to a plebiscite;

4. some provision for ongoing consultation with regard to feasibility of port construction and rights in connection with the ceding of the cays; and

5. how to process the whole package through to final agreement.

Secretary Vance said that the United States would, of course, be quite prepared to be helpful. Mr. Rowlands replied that the way in which we could probably be most helpful would be in mobilizing support for an agreement once it had been reached. Rowlands was no way near as sanguine as Mr. Habib seemed to be that Belizian Prime Minister Price would accept any agreement which entailed the ceding of territory. Price would be travelling to London next week and meeting with Rowlands. Rowlands would inform him of any agreement that had been reached with the Guatemalans and then it would be necessary for everyone that Price spoke with to stress to him the need to accept the agreement. The Secretary mentioned that Price would be returning to New York and would be seeing Ambassador Young. The Secretary said that Rowlands should inform us immediately of Price’s reaction so that we would know how to brief Andy Young for his discussion with Price.

Rowlands said that it would be key to obtaining support of the British Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, that is, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Barbados. In Rowlands’ view, if we could have the Commonwealth countries and other key countries such as Canada, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia supporting the agreement, then Price would probably not “come out fighting” and would know that he had to accept the agreement.

Secretary Vance said that we understand the problem, that we will be thinking about it, and that we will be prepared to be helpful.

Rowlands then raised one final item which he said he considered to be key—this was the question of a security guarantee which he said loomed much larger in the Belizian view than it did to us. Mr. Habib asked whether an OAS guarantee would not take care of that since Belize would join the OAS upon gaining independence. Rowlands responded that there is a psychological problem there because the OAS is a Latin organization and Belize is not a Latin country. He felt that it might be more acceptable to Belize were there to be some type of expression of commitment or some type of guarantee jointly by the United States, Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Secretary Vance said that such things as commitments and guarantees pose us with some real problems with Congress, but that we would look to see what could be done in this area if in the final analysis an OAS guarantee would not be sufficient.

Mr. Habib said that one of the ways to reassure the Belizians would be for the British to leave a significant armed forces there for at least a couple of years after independence. This could be done under the guise of training the Belize military.

As the conversation ended Mr. Rowlands said that he would keep Mr. Habib, and through him the Secretary, informed of the progress of the talks.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, unlabeled folder. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tice on November 2 and approved by David Anderson (S/S) on November 8. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
2. November 3.
3. In telegram 254508 to Guatemala City, October 22, Vance noted that he was “convinced that the British have gone as far as it is possible for them” and instructed Andrews to advise Molina that “Guatemala should give very careful consideration to the British proposal,” which he described as “cession of territory up to the Moho River (along Aguacate Creek, but excluding the additional triangle from Orange Point), something on the cays and maritime frontiers, plus a joint development project.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770389–1043) In telegram 6581 from Guatemala City, October 22, Andrews confirmed that he delivered Vance’s message to Molina. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770390–0426)