117. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
5142. USUN for Shelton. Subj: Nicaragua Mediation No. 44: FAO Proposal for Provisional National Government.
1. Summary: This morning (October 17) FAO–PC presented NG a concise and comprehensive plan for a provisional government. Proposal provides for executive power to be exercised for three years by three member Junta named by FAO; legislative power to be exercised first 2 years by 30 member (two from each of 15 organizations in FAO) council of state and for final year by elected constituent assembly; judicial power to be reorganized by council of state which will elect supreme and appeals court judges with supreme court justices in turn naming other judges; GN to be reorganized professionally and reformed by Junta; a National Police to be created by Junta; an elected constituent assembly to promulgate new constitution and electoral regime; and all articles of constitution and laws not contrary to these provisional arrangements to remain in force. For two hours we discussed in detail the following major problem areas which need clarification or revision:
—Representation of other sectors and PLN which not included in scheme;
—Mechanics of implementation, whether by constitutional or non-constitutional means;
—Measures to achieve national reconciliation; and,
—GN participation in determining its future.
PC will return to FAO plenary to wrestle with these problems. Meanwhile we are urging private sector and church to involve themselves with FAO in this critical stage of process. It will not be easy for FAO to resolve key issues remaining. Their effort in preparing this document represents an important step forward. End summary.
2. Meeting started slowly with PC objecting strongly to Novedades and government radio attacks on FAO members. They encourage rabid anti-Communists to assault them. They also complained about continued heavy repression of radio broadcasts under Codigo Negro. Jimenez [Page 309] promised to raise matter with Somoza and seek guarantees for FAO representatives and their families. He offered little hope that much more could be done about repression of radio broadcasts.
3. With this behind us, PC tabled document setting forth its scheme for a provisional government (PG) (text sent septel)2 they explained this was only an outline of what eventually will be a more detailed document. Meeting then recessed for NG to privately consider document. We developed questions to raise and agreed not to go beyond these inquiries at this time. The following discussion of document’s individual sections took place:
A. I asked why first, preambular paragraph referred to UN declaration of universal rights but not to OAS human rights convention? Ramirez explained that UN declaration was specified as basic umbrella agreement FAO had no problem with inter-American convention. He promised additional language which would declare intention to accept all of Nicaragua’s international obligations and honor all agreements including international human rights convention.
B. Noting that there was no special mention of goal of national reconciliation, I stressed its special importance as basic objective which would encourage elements outside the FAO to support plan. Cordova Rivas noted reference to this in Section II (last sentence) and agreed it should be move forward to first paragraph and highlighted.
C. Obiols, noting that Junta and Consejo appeared limited to FAO participants, asked if PC had considered including important elements outside FAO such as private sector and liberal party (PLN). Ramirez said PG charged with preparing new democratic republic could not be identified with discredited past and Somocismo or it would lose its credibility with the people. Obiols replied that pacific solution was not treaty between victorious FAO and vanquished PLN. Somocismo could be excluded but door should not be closed to other participants who were part of Nicaraguan reality. Cordova Rivas said FAO had not included interests groups such as private sector because it did not wish to establish Spanish-style corporate state and it left out GN to keep it free from politics. Tefel stressed that PG was not permanent and would prepare way for democratic system in which any group could participate. FAO wanted to “de-Somocize” country and break with past. Three-member Junta representing principal forces was not optimum solution but did satisfy minimum conditions. Obiols persisted, questioning whether peace could be assured and solution endure if signifi [Page 310] cant sectors were excluded. He warned that from minute PG was installed opposition to it would begin, especially from those outside. Ramirez replied that plan was to achieve peace and stability by eradicating Somocismo, not granting concessions to it. If this could not be accomplished via mediation then it would have to be done by violence because the people demanded it. Mediation had been accepted to accomplish FAO goals peacefully, not to concede these goals. Padre D’Escoto added that if FAO compromised and accepted Somocista PLN they would be denounced as traitors by people who were determined to die if necessary to rid country of Somocismo. I asked what FAO would do if Somoza with support of excluded PLN and GN refused to depart as FAO desired? Would it not be wiser to offer the assurances and a role which would draw them toward the FAO plan? Several on FAO side pledged fighting would continue, only worse than before.
D. At this point Cordova Rivas diverted discussion from repeated threats of dire consequences. He insisted that FAO was accommodating reality of GN in Section IV, which not only left this “pillar of order” in place incorporated into PG but also treated it with moderation. Tefel emphasized that GN would be retained as nation’s sole armed force although bad elements would be cast out. I asked if FAO contemplated GN having an effective participation in its reorganization and drafting of new organic law. Ramirez said Section IV pre-supposes GN participation and was drafted as it is to make clear GN would be under civilian control. Jimenez commented it would build GN confidence if specific reference were made to its participation. PC then indicated that it would revise line one of Section IV to read “the Junta of government, in consultation with an advisory council composed of active duty members of the GN, will reorganize professionally, etc.”.
E. Proceeding to Section V Jimenez asked how National Police (NP) would be created, who would serve in it and under what Ministry. Ramirez said paper before us would be supplemented by documents that would spell out such specific details. FAO believed NP should be under Ministry of Government (gobernacion) to give it civilian character. FAO did not wish to create parallel armed force to GN but rather a corps with military organization and civil functions. Jimenez asked if GN officers with police experience would participate in NP. Ramirez agreed that they should.
4. Concluding discussion of paper Robelo stressed that some of the points of view which had been expressed by FAO participants were personal. The FAO plenary would now have to reconsider document taking into account this discussion and take formal positions on questions raised. PC would respond with these positions at next meeting. Jimenez emphasized that points expressed by mediators were only questions offered with a view to obtaining a better understanding and [Page 311] not to dictate to FAO. Ramirez, referring to lengthy discussion of PLN which would be reported to FAO plenary, asked if it was necessary to give NG definitive reply or could question be kept open. Jimenez reiterated that NG had not proposed PLN participation but merely expressed doubt about how reconciliation could be achieved without it. PLN members after all were also members of Nicaraguan family which reconciliation should reunite. I reiterated question about the route by which the PG would come into being. Robelo closed observing that producing this document had been “great labor” for FAO but he thought it constituted important progress. NG agreed.
5. Comment:
(A) The paper given us today is, as the FAO–PC group explained, an outline and not repeat not a full fledged proposal. Many details need to be filled in. This draft was designed to give gist of their thinking on basic issues and stimulate our questions.
(B) This was our most interesting and productive session with PC to date. As foregoing indicates, key issues remain which it will not be easy for FAO to resolve. We will be urging private sector and church actively to participate in their resolution and this critical stage of process. Two footnotes are of interest. First, prior to this meeting we had drawn up list of thirteen key questions which we thought logically and reasonably should be covered in final solution. The FAO document dealt in full or in part with all of them except details of national reconcilation. This is a good omen. Secondly, the threats which Ramirez and others from G–12 made during the discussion confirm reports from moderates that he readily employs this tactic within FAO plenary.
(C) We are preparing separate message3 assessing FAO document, tactical situation and next steps. I will forward this message as soon as I have had a chance to consult Ambassador Solaun. One of big stumbling blocks is the continued FAO refusal to dialogue with the Liberal Party.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 21, Human Rights—Nicaragua V. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Guatemala City, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, San José, Bogotá, Panama City, Caracas, Santo Domingo, and USUN.↩
- Telegram 5141 from Managua, October 18, included the full Spanish-language text of the FAO–PC’s proposal for a provisional national government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780425–1159)↩
- In telegram 5152 from Managua, October 18, Bowdler wrote to Christopher, Newsom, and Vaky that “the FAO outline for a provisional government is a significant step forward,” but added that it had “major defects” in that “nothing is said about the transition from the Somoza government to the provisional government” and that the “draft as it now stands gives a monopoly of power both in the Junta and the Consejo to the groups which comprise the FAO,” which is “not realistic.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2501)↩