Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

131. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State and the Embassy in Nicaragua¹

Caracas, November 4, 1978, 0451Z

10485. Managua for Ambassador Bowdler Only. Subject: Results of President Perez’ Conclave.²

Summary: President Perez presented me tonight³ with the results of his meetings with Nicaraguan visitors. I did not meet any of them but had an hour conversation with the President and Foreign Minister. Perez extracted the following deal. Robelo and Chamorro will return to Managua and on Monday⁴ will meet with the FAO and GN to say they accept the general outline of the FAO plan. They will agree to give the GN a month to complete the plan. Once the FAO agrees to a plan, Tunnerman will state from Costa Rica speaking on behalf of the Group of 12, that the plan is the best solution for Nicaragua. Pastora will make no public comment of support but will refrain from military action during the timeframe of approximately one month. I told the President that I would report this to Department and that I thought he had achieved our objective of maximizing the support for the mediation while heading off violence. End summary.

1. President Perez called me to Miraflores tonight where I met with him and Foreign Minister Consalvi. There was no member of the Nicaraguan group in the room although they were nearby. The President was understanding with my reasons for not wanting to meet with any of the group. He had completed his meetings yesterday and today and gave me a general rundown of what had transpired.

2. He said he had met yesterday Robelo, Chamorro, Romiro Cardenal and Tunnerman. He had told them the following:

—He was pessimistic about a mediation effort but fully supported it and the United States’ effort to avoid chaos in Nicaragua.

—He criticized the decision of the Group of 12 to withdraw from the mediation saying that this created a division within Nicaragua and created competition between elements over which was the most qualified to rule at a time when national unity was essential.

—He offered to write a letter urging the Group of 12 exiled in the Mexican Embassy in Managua to resume their role in the FAO.

3. Perez said that he subsequently covered similar ground with the group plus Pastora and one other member of the Sandinista group who arrived this evening from Panama. Cap’s summary of the reactions to his presentation were as follows: Tunnerman indicated that the die was already cast by the Group of 12 and it would be difficult, if not impossible, for them to rejoin the FAO. Pastora described the situation within the Sandinista movement as being somewhat difficult to control but that since the FSLN–T had the strongest forces and were the best armed, he believed he had control over the situation. Pastora and his colleague (neither the President nor Consalvi could remember his name) discussed the type of bourgeois democracy that they would like to see established in Nicaragua after Somoza is “eliminated.” Pastora stressed that in order to accept President Perez’s urgings he would have to understand what the timeframe was. Tunnerman also said that he could speak for the Group of 12 who are in the Mexican Embassy in agreeing to a certain timeframe. Robelo, moreover, was apparently helpful in supporting Perez in urging for support of the mediation for a period of time.

4. I then read to the President and Foreign Minister from a Spanish translation of the instructions I had received from the Department with some helpful addenda provided by Bill Bowdler. The key phrase for the President was clearly that we believed that an agreement could be completed by the first of December and preferably before. In addition to reading slowly the very helpful text I received from the Department, I described the impact of the US action with regard to the IMF postponement and how Somoza had taken this badly.

5. The President after hearing my presention said that he was encouraged by what he had heard but had to say he was still skeptical that Somoza would actually leave. He then said that he wanted to be precise about what he had extracted from the group. He described the following agreed scenario:

—Robelo and Chamorro will return to Managua and meet with the FAO and the GN on Monday at which time they will accept the general FAO scheme and agree to participate in final neogiations.

—They will set roughly one month as the timeframe for completion of the plan. (Cap was somewhat vague on this point and at one point said that the group would give the GN 15 days after the presentation of the plan to Somoza to carry out the program of removing Somoza).

—Once FAO accepts the plan, Tunnerman agreed to issue a statement from Costa Rica in the name of the Group of 12 stating that the plan was the best way to save Nicaragua from chaos.

—Pastora agreed that he would make no statement in support of the plan but would withold military action for the agreed period.

—Cap said that all agreed that the removal of Somoza and all of his family was a major condition of the program.

6. Cap said he was skeptical that the US would be able to remove Somoza. He said he wanted to believe we could do it and would do everything he could to support our efforts. He said that he had described to the Nicaraguans his earlier proposal to me that Venezuela work with the United States and other governments to prepare a military logistics plan that would be brought to bear should violence erupt in Nicaragua and the Rio Treaty⁵ be invoked. Cap said he fully agreed that no joint military force could move into Nicaragua to put down civil strife without a decision under the Rio Treaty. But he asked whether the United States would encourage him to send an emissary to Colombia, Panama and a few other countries to have a force in place just in case it was required. I replied that I had discussed this earlier with the Foreign Minister⁶ and that we did not agree to any such pre-positioning or pre-planning, certainly at this stage. Foreign Minister Consalvi said, partially in jest, since the United States’ troops are always ready to intervene, we do not need to discuss such matters with other countries. Perez said that his suggestion was merely to provide to the United States unilateral backup should force be required to save lives. I said I would convey his suggestion again to the Department.

7. Cap also had several other points to make regarding the situation in Nicaragua. He said that the United States must stop Israel from supplying arms to Nicaragua. He said that we could use his name in talking to Israel and say that President Perez will criticise them before the world on behalf of Latin America if they do not cease the shipment of arms which, according to the Nicaraguans with whom he has talked, have been very large in recent weeks and months. Secondly, he said that he had learned that the Papal Nuncio in Managua, who was a strong supporter of Somoza, is planning to seek the appointment of Leon Pallais as Archbishop of Managua. President Perez said he talked today to the Papal Nuncio here to pass the word to the Pope that the church and the people of Nicaragua are all opposed to Somoza and to indicate that the Papal Nuncio was seeking to support Somoza. Thirdly, he said that when the time comes that the United States must bring pressure to bear on Somoza. He is prepared to participate actively in any way possible. He was speculating on how Venezuela might use its oil exports to Nicaragua to bring short-term pressure in support of other pressures.

8. We discussed briefly the IMF decision. I told him that it was my understanding that the Spanish representative had ceded his chair to the Nicaraguan who then proceeded to vote against our proposal for postponement. I said I was somewhat surprised given the close relations between Venezuela and Spain that the Spanish had not cooperated. Perez was shocked and said that he felt betrayed by the Spaniards and instructed Consalvi to talk to the Spanish Ambassador immediately. He was prepared to call Madrid to find out what had gone wrong but he [garble—said?] that he had decided not to call Suarez the night before the vote since he felt certain that Spain would support the United States’ position. The Department is requested to supply any clarification I might need on the Spanish role.

9. I told Perez when I left that I thought his role had been exceptionally supportive. He said that if we could continue to work together this well over the next month, we should be able to maximize the chances of achieving our common objective of establishment of the beginnings of a democratic process in Nicaragua. I said I would report to my government the conversation and would be in touch again with him Monday evening or Tuesday with any reactions. My initial reactions were, however, that he had achieved all that we could have asked of him.

Luers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101–1973. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis.
2. In telegram 10432 from Caracas, November 3, Luers reported that he had been invited to “participate with President Perez in a meeting with Nicaraguans” that afternoon and requested instructions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2480) The Department responded in telegram 280167 to Caracas, November 3, instructing Luers not to participate in the meeting because he was “not the mediator” and because he “could not portray all the nuances or latest information, your participation would not be that helpful.” The Department added that Luers should instruct Perez to tell the Nicaraguans that the United States Government could succeed and that it had made progress. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 39, Nicaragua: 11/1/78–11/3/78)
3. November 3.
4. November 6.
5. See footnote 3, Document 331.
6. Not further identified.